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A Different Path Taken:
Texas Capital Offenders Post-Atkins Claims
of Mental Retardation
by PEGGY M. TOBOLOWSKY*
Introduction
Texas has played and continues to play a major role in the
evolution of capital punishment in this country.! Capital offenders
convicted in Texas represent approximately ten percent of the total
current state death row population.2 Texas has executed
approximately thirty-eight percent of the state capital offenders
executed since the United States Supreme Court ("Supreme Court"
or the "Court") "reauthorized" capital punishment in 1976.' Cases
* Professor and Chair, Department of Criminal Justice, University of North Texas;
B.A. 1974, Washington University; J.D. 1977, George Washington University.
1. Texas has utilized capital punishment since it was a republic. See generally Peggy
M. Tobolowsky, Texas and the Mentally Retarded Capital Offender, 30 T. MARSHALL L.
REV. 39, 41 (2004) [hereinafter Tobolowsky, Texas]; Peggy M. Tobolowsky, What Hath
Penry Wrought?: Mitigating Circumstances and the Texas Death Penalty, 19 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 345, 348 & nn.23-24 (1992) [hereinafter Tobolowsky, Penry]. The relative frequency of
the state's imposition and carrying out of capital sentences has been accompanied by
substantial litigation in the applicable state and federal courts resulting from such
sentences. See infra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
2. See Facts about the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER,
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (last updated Sept. 23, 2011)
(reflecting 321 Texas death row inmates and 3,184 total state death row inmates as of
January 1, 2011).
3. See id. (reflecting 475 Texas executions out of 1,267 executions of state offenders
since 1976, as of September 23, 2011). In 1972, the Court's judgment reversing the death
sentences in the cases before it included conclusions by a majority of Justices that the
death penalty, either per se or as it was then being applied, was an unconstitutionally cruel
and unusual punishment. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam); see infra
notes 37-39 and accompanying text (describing the Furman decision and its results). In
1976, the Court rejected the claim that the death penalty itself is an unconstitutionally
cruel and unusual punishment and addressed the constitutionality of five state capital
punishment systems. The lead case in this group was Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976), in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of capital punishment per se and
the "guided discretion" capital procedures enacted by Georgia. See also Proffitt v.
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originating in Texas have played a significant role in the development
of the capital punishment jurisprudence shaping the scope and
implementation of the death penalty in the United States.!
Texas's significant role has also been reflected in its treatment of
capital cases involving mentally retarded offenders and those with
related mental impairments.! However, the "Texas approach"
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (upholding the Florida guided discretion procedure); Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding the Texas guided discretion procedure). But see
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (rejecting North Carolina's mandatory
capital provisions); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (rejecting Louisiana's
mandatory capital provisions).
4. Texas litigants have been petitioners in some of the Court's most significant
capital punishment cases. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) (addressing
claims of actual innocence on collateral review); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981)
(addressing the right to counsel before a psychiatric examination regarding a capital
sentencing issue); Jurek, 428 U.S. at 262 (upholding the Texas post-Furman capital
sentencing procedure); Furman, 408 at 238 (including a judgment that the death penalty
was unconstitutional as applied to a Texas petitioner).
5. See generally Tobolowsky, Texas, supra note 1, at 39 (describing the evolution of
Texas law regarding mentally retarded capital offenders). Although there has been a
recent trend to use the terms intellectually disabled and intellectual disability rather than
mentally retarded and mental retardation, the definitions of these new terms remain the
same as the previous terms. See AAIDD AD HOC COMMITTEE ON TERMINOLOGY AND
CLASSIFICATION, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND
SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 6 (11th ed. 2010) [hereinafter AAIDD]; Robert L. Schalock et al.,
The Renaming of Mental Retardation: Understanding the Change to the Term Intellectual
Disability, 45 INTELLECTUAL & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 116 (2007); Disability
Label Will Change: Measure Will Remove "Retardation" from Law, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Sept. 25, 2010, at 14A. Because capital punishment jurisprudence still uses the
mentally retarded and mental retardation terminology, it will be used in this Article. See,
e.g., Bobby v. Bies, 129 S. Ct. 2145 (2009); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). But cf. Rosa's Law, Pub. L. No. 111-256 (2010) (substituting
the term intellectual disability for mental retardation in specified federal enactments and
regulations without change in the meaning of the term). Similarly, the principal
professional organization that addresses mental retardation will be referred to in this
Article as the American Association on Mental Retardation rather than its current re-
designation as the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities.
Although the definition has evolved slightly over time, the major national
professional organizations that offer a diagnostic definition of mental retardation have
generally utilized a three-part definition that includes an individual's significantly
subaverage intellectual functioning that is concurrent with impairments in adaptive
behavior and originates during the developmental period (age eighteen or below). See
AAIDD, supra at 6-11 (describing evolving definitions); AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL
RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS
OF SUPPORTS 21-23 (10th ed. 2002) (describing evolving definitions); see also AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
41-49 (4th ed., text rev. 2000). These organizations have also used a classification system
within mental retardation based on the severity of the condition, using intelligence
quotient ("IQ") scores to differentiate between the severity levels: "mild" (scores between
fifty to fifty-five and approximately seventy), "moderate" (scores between thirty-five to
[Vol. 39:12 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Fall 2011] TEXAS'S POST-A TKINS CLAIMS OF MENTAL RETARDATION
regarding these offenders has not always been well-received by the
Supreme Court.' In 1989, the Court held that the Texas capital
punishment system did not provide a constitutionally adequate
vehicle for a sentencing jury to "consider and give effect to" a capital
offender's mitigating evidence of mental retardation in Penry v.
Lynaugh.' For fifteen years, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
("Texas Court"), the state's highest appellate court for criminal cases,
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ("Fifth
Circuit"), the court that handles federal appeals in Texas cases,
addressed Penry claims dealing with mental retardation and other
mitigating evidence.' However, in several cases beginning in 2004, the
Supreme Court again rejected the "Texas approach" and concluded
that these courts had adopted substantive review standards for Texas
post-Penry mitigating evidence claims that were incorrect and too
restrictive under the Constitution.9 The Supreme Court's rulings in
Penry and these post-Penry cases have resulted in substantial
litigation and relitigation of scores of Texas capital cases involving
forty and fifty to fifty-five), "severe" (scores between twenty to twenty-five and thirty-five
to forty), and "profound" (scores below twenty or twenty-five). AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL
DEFICIENCY (subsequently Retardation), CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION
13 (8th ed. 1983); AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra at 42, 49. As of the 1992 revision of its
diagnostic and classification manual, the American Association on Mental Retardation
eliminated the classification system within mental retardation based on IQ scores because,
inter alia, it was based only on the intellectual functioning component of the definition, it
understated the significant disadvantages experienced by those labeled as "mildly"
mentally retarded (the largest category of mentally retarded individuals), and it was
susceptible to incorrect application and misuse by educational and service providers and
decision makers in the criminal justice system. See AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL
RETARDATION, supra at 22-23, 25-26, 30-37, 207-08. See generally Peggy M.
Tobolowsky, Atkins Aftermath: Identifying Mentally Retarded Offenders and Excluding
Them from Execution, 30 J. LEGIS. 77, 86-99 (2003) (describing the evolution of the
diagnostic definition of mental retardation, legislative definitions for criminal justice
purposes, and related issues).
6. See infra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
7. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 302, 328; cf id. (reaching the same conclusion regarding the
offender's mitigating evidence of his abused background).
8. See infra notes 84-109 and accompanying text.
9. See Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37 (2004) (per curiam); Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S.
274 (2004); see also Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286 (2007); Abdul-Kabir v.
Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233 (2007); cf. Johnson v. Texas 509 U.S. 350 (1993); Graham v.
Collins, 506 U.S. 461 (1993). The Court also found that the supplemental "nullification"
jury instruction that the Texas Court and Fifth Circuit had concluded satisfied the
concerns identified in Penry regarding the consideration of mitigating evidence was a
constitutionally inadequate means to achieve this requirement. See Penry v. Johnson, 532
U.S. 782 (2001).
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mitigating evidence, including mitigating evidence of mental
retardation.0
In 2002, in Atkins v. Virginia," the Supreme Court announced a
ruling with an even greater impact on mentally retarded capital
offenders. Although it had previously rejected the claim in Penry,12
the Supreme Court, in Atkins, held that the execution of mentally
retarded offenders is unconstitutional, and entrusted the enforcement
of this constitutional ban to the states. At the time of the Atkins
ruling, almost half of the states authorizing capital punishment had
already legislatively prohibited the execution of mentally retarded
offenders.14 Texas had no such prohibition." Since the Atkins ruling,
and in the absence of legislative action," the Texas Court and Fifth
Circuit have adopted substantive and procedural standards to resolve
Atkins post-conviction claims of mental retardation." The Texas
Court has also prescribed most of the standards to resolve Atkins
claims at the trial court level 8 and on direct appeal." Since the Atkins
ruling, ninety Texas capital offenders have had their Atkins claims
resolved at the trial, appellate, or post-conviction levels.20
10. See, e.g., Rivers v. Quarterman, 661 F. Supp. 2d 675, 685-88 (S.D. Tex. 2009), aff'd
sub norn. Rivers v. Thaler, 389 F. App'x 360 (5th Cir. 2010); Ex parte Briseno, No. AP-
76,132, 2010 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 338 (Tex. Crim. App. June 9,2010); Exparte
Davis, No. AP-76,263, 2009 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 750 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov.
18, 2009) (per curiam); Tobolowsky, Texas, supra note 1, at 103 & nn.285-86 (describing
the scope of Texas Penry litigation issues).
11. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
12. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 328-35; id. at 351 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
White and Kennedy, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); cf id. at 335-40
(opinion of O'Connor, J.). Contra id. at 342-49 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 350 (Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
13. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317, 321. Contra id. at 321-28 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by
Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting); id. at 337-54 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
Thomas, J., dissenting).
14. See Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 77-78 & nn.6-7 (representing eighteen of the
thirty-eight capital punishment states at that time).
15. See infra notes 122-28 and accompanying text; see also Ex parte Briseno, 135
S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (establishing interim procedures to implement Atkins in
the absence of legislation).
16. See infra notes 170-89, 945 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 217-80, 295-350 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 620-22, 629-65 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 614-28 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 351-611, 666-701 and accompanying text. This Article describes
Texas Atkins claims as of January 1, 2011. See infra Tables 1, 2 (describing the resolution
of these cases). Additional Atkins claimants obtained relief on other grounds prior to the
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Some have questioned whether the mental retardation definition
and procedures adopted by the Texas Court and Fifth Circuit for
Atkins purposes are consistent with the constitutional ban the Court
articulated in Atkins.2 1 These concerns, of course, are not merely
academic ones. If the state and federal courts reviewing Texas Atkins
claims have implemented Atkins in an unconstitutional manner,
Texas mentally retarded capital offenders are at greater risk of
execution than similar capital offenders in other states.
This Article examines these important issues. The Article first
reviews the treatment of mentally retarded capital offenders under
Texas law prior to Atkins.22 It then examines the substantive and
procedural standards adopted by the Texas Court23 and Fifth Circuit 24
in order to implement Atkins. Critical to this examination is an
analysis of how these courts have applied these standards to the
ninety Texas Atkins claimants they have addressed since 2002,25 a
number that far exceeds the Atkins claimants of any other capital
punishment state.26 The Article then compares the implementation of
Atkins in Texas to its implementation in other states, an analysis that
illuminates the issue of Texas's compliance with the Atkins mandate
to identify mentally retarded offenders and exclude them from
execution. This Article concludes with a discussion of potential
responsive action by the Supreme Court.27
resolution of their Atkins claims. See, e.g., Ex parte Dixon, No. WR-56,822-01, 2005 Tex.
Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 281 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 2005) (per curiam) (finding
Atkins claim moot due to sentence commutation based on age). Other claims are pending
resolution. See, e.g., Ex parte Cathey, No. WR-55,161-02, 2008 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 850 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 18, 2008) (per curiam).
21. See, e.g., John H. Blume et al., Of Atkins and Men: Deviations from Clinical
Definitions of Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
689, 710-14, 725-27 (2009); Anna M. Hagstrom, Atkins v. Virginia: An Empty Holding
Devoid of Justice for the Mentally Retarded, 27 LAW & INEQ. 241, 253-56, 269-70 (2009);
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Atkins v. Virginia: Lessons from Substance and
Procedure in the Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 57 DEPAUL L. REV.
721, 727-28 (2008).
22. See infra notes 28-137 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 217-80, 614-65 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 295-350 and accompanying text.
25. See infra Tables 1, 2; infra notes 351-611, 666-701 and accompanying text.
26. In a review of 234 Atkins claims addressed as of May 2008, Texas Atkins claims
represented approximately twenty percent of the total. There were forty-six Texas claims
compared to the next highest state that had twenty-six claims. John H. Blume et al., An
Empirical Look at Atkins v. Virginia and Its Application in Capital Cases, 76 TENN. L.
REV. 625, 628, 637 (2009).
27. See infra notes 702-943 and accompanying text.
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I. Mentally Retarded Capital Offenders in
Texas Prior to Atkins
A. Overview of the Pre-Atkins Period
The treatment of mentally retarded capital offenders in Texas
prior to Atkins is best described by reviewing this treatment prior to
Penry,28 and then between Penry and Atkins.' Prior to Penry, the
Texas Court and the Fifth Circuit had concluded that a capital
offender's mental retardation could be adequately considered within
the existing Texas capital sentencing procedure.' These courts also
rejected claims that the execution of mentally retarded offenders was
unconstitutional.3 1 Following Penry, the Texas capital sentencing
procedure was modified to better incorporate into the sentencing
process the consideration of mitigating circumstances, including
mental retardation.32 The Texas Court and Fifth Circuit also
addressed many claims alleging Penry error in the pre-Penry
treatment of mental retardation as a mitigating circumstance.3 3 Prior
to Atkins, however, these courts continued to reject claims that the
execution of mentally retarded offenders was unconstitutional.' In
addition, following several years of legislative proposals, the Texas
Governor vetoed a legislatively enacted ban on the execution of
mentally retarded offenders in 2001.
B. Pre-Penry Treatment of Mentally Retarded Capital Offenders in
Texas
For most of the State's history, capital sentencing juries in Texas
were given unrestricted discretion to choose between a death
sentence and alternative periods of confinement for convicted capital
offenders.3 ' This was the case in 1972, when the Supreme Court held,
in Furman v. Georgia, 7 that the "imposition and carrying out" of the
death sentences of two Georgia offenders and one Texas offender
28. See infra notes 36-63 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 84-137 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 91-109 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
36. See Tobolowsky, Penry, supra note 1, at 348-49 nn.23-25.
37. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
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constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments." The Court's judgment in Furman not
only invalidated the death sentences of the actual litigants in the case,
but also the death sentences of all offenders awaiting execution in
Texas and throughout the country."
Although none of the Furman litigants specifically raised issues
regarding mentally retarded offenders, the Texas Legislature had to
address the Court's concerns about Texas's discretionary capital
sentencing system if it desired to constitutionally impose a death
sentence on any capital offender in the future. In 1973, the Texas
Legislature enacted a new capital murder statute, designed to narrow
the class of capital offenders to those who committed intentional or
knowing murders in the context of one of several identified categories
of aggravated circumstances, such as murder in the course of the
commission of specified felonies." The Texas Legislature also
replaced the largely discretionary capital sentencing system with new
sentencing procedures, designed to guide jurors' discretion in capital
*41
sentencing.
Under the new sentencing provisions, a separate evidentiary
sentencing proceeding followed an offender's conviction for capital
murder. The sentencing jury's responses to a three-issue inquiry
determined whether the offender received a sentence of death or life
imprisonment. These issues concerned the deliberateness of the
offender's conduct, the unreasonableness of the offender's act in
38. The Furman case was decided by a five-Justice majority. Id. Two Justices
determined that capital punishment itself constituted cruel and unusual punishment under
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 257-306 (Brennan, J., concurring in
judgment); id. at 314-74 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment). Three additional Justices
found that the discretionary Georgia and Texas procedures, as then applied, violated these
constitutional provisions. Id. at 240-57 (Douglas, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 306-10
(Stewart, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 310-14 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
Contra id. at 375-405 (Burger, C.J., joined by Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ.,
dissenting); id. at 405-14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 414-65 (Powell, J., joined by
Burger, C.J., and Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting); id. at 465-70 (Rehnquist, J.,
joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun and Powell, JJ., dissenting).
39. Id. at 417 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ.,
dissenting); see Hall v. State, 488 S.W.2d 94, 96-97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (indicating that
Texas capital offenders would have their death sentences commuted or reformed to life
imprisonment after Furman).
40. See Act of May 28, 1973, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess., ch. 426, art. 2, § 1, 1973 Tex. Gen.
Laws 1122, 1123 (subsequently codified at TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (West Supp.
1974)). In this session, the Texas Legislature also repealed the capital provisions
regarding treason, rape, and armed robbery. Tobolowsky, Penry, supra note 1, at 351 n.42.
41. See Act of May 28, 1973, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess., ch. 426, art. 3, § 1, 1973 Tex. Gen.
Laws 1122, 1125-26 (codified at TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (West 1974)).
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response to any provocation by the deceased, and the probability that
the offender would commit future violent criminal acts that would
pose a continuing threat to society.42 The State was required to prove
each issue beyond a reasonable doubt. A unanimous affirmative jury
finding on each issue presented resulted in a death sentence. A
negative response by ten or more jurors as to any of the issues
resulted in a sentence of life imprisonment. Capital murder cases in
which the death penalty was imposed were subject to automatic
review by the Texas Court.43
Both the Texas Court and the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of these post-Furman sentencing procedures. in
1975, in Jurek v. State,45 the Texas Court determined that the new
sentencing procedures satisfied the Court's concerns in Furman
regarding the previous discretionary sentencing provisions, by
sufficiently guiding jurors' discretion in reaching the ultimate
punishment determination between death and life imprisonment.4 6 In
rejecting vagueness challenges to the three-issue sentencing
procedure based on its failure to enumerate a more exhaustive and
precise list of factors for consideration, the Texas Court indicated that
this procedure contemplated consideration of a broad range of
aggravating and mitigating factors.47 Moreover, the Texas Court
stated that the controlled discretionary sentencing system retained
appropriate "individualization based on consideration of all
extenuating circumstances" and the element of mercy.48
42. Id.
43. Id. See generally Tobolowsky, Penry, supra note 1, at 348-49, 351-53 (describing
Texas capital sentencing provisions before and after Furman).
44. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), aff'g Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.2d 934 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1975).
45. Jurek, 522 S.W.2d at 934.
46. Id. at 938-40. Contra id. at 944-46 (Odom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (raising concerns about the mandatory nature of the provisions, the vagueness of the
sentencing provisions, and the use of a probability finding in the issue concerning future
acts of violence); id. at 946-50 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (criticizing the use of a probability
finding in the sentencing procedure and raising vagueness concerns). See generally
Tobolowsky, Penry, supra note 1, at 354 n.56 (identifying sources addressing the
constitutional sufficiency of the capital provisions).
47. Jurek, 522 S.W.2d at 939-40. The Texas Court identified several illustrative
factors that could be considered concerning the continuing threat of future violent acts
inquiry, including "whether the defendant was under an extreme form of mental or
emotional pressure, something less, perhaps, than insanity, but more than the emotions of
the average man, however inflamed, could withstand." Id.
48. Id. at 940.
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In 1976, the Supreme Court decided the Jurek appeal along with
appeals in four other death penalty cases in which sentences had been
imposed pursuant to revised post-Furman sentencing procedures.49
The Justices authoring the lead opinions in these caseso stressed the
constitutional necessity of capital procedures that "focus the jury's
attention on the particularized nature of the crime and the
particularized characteristics of the individual defendant."" In order
to provide the individualized sentencing constitutionally required in
capital cases, these Justices concluded that a capital sentencing system
must allow the sentencer to consider mitigating as well as aggravating
circumstances.52 Because the three-question inquiry in the Texas
sentencing procedures did not expressly address consideration of
mitigating circumstances, these Justices determined that its
constitutionality depended on whether these questions allowed
consideration of "particularized" mitigating factors." Relying almost
exclusively on the Texas Court's interpretive language in the
underlying case regarding the wide range of factors that could be
considered in answering the continuing threat of future violent acts
question,54 these Justices concluded that the Texas Court had
"indicated that it will interpret this second question so as to allow a
defendant to bring to the jury's attention whatever mitigating
circumstances he may be able to show."" As a result, it was
49. In these cases, 1) the Court upheld the constitutionality of capital punishment per
se, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); 2) upheld the "guided discretion" capital
procedures enacted by Georgia, as well as Florida and Texas, id.; Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek, 428 U.S. at 262; and 3) rejected the mandatory capital provisions
enacted by North Carolina and Louisiana, Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
50. Due to shifting majorities in these five cases, joint opinions were offered by
Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens in support of the judgment in each case. See, e.g.,
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
51. Id. at 206. These Justices determined that the revised definitional requirements of
the Texas capital murder statute satisfied the requirement that the capital sentencer focus
on the particularized nature of the crime. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 270-71.
52. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 271.
53. Id. at 272.
54. See Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.2d 934, 939-40 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
55. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 272; see also id. at 273 (noting that the Texas Court's sufficiency
of the evidence review concerning the continuing threat sentencing issue in Smith v. State,
540 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), the only other Texas Court case decided at that
time, included a focus on the existence or absence of mitigating factors); cf id. at 272 n.7
(noting that the Texas Court had not construed the deliberate conduct and response to
provocation sentencing issues, and thus it was not yet determined whether juror
consideration of these issues would include consideration of mitigating circumstances).
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determined that the Texas system provided constitutionally adequate
individualized sentencing."
Two years after the decisions in Jurek and its companion cases, a
Court plurality-and thereafter a Court majority-adopted the
constitutional requirement that a capital sentencer be allowed to
consider mitigating evidence regarding the circumstances of the crime
and the offender's character and record." Nevertheless, in the period
prior to Penry, the Texas Court and Fifth Circuit provided no relief to
offenders claiming that their mental retardation evidence had
received inadequate consideration as a mitigating factor under the
Texas sentencing procedure." The Texas Court determined, in each
case it considered, that the mental retardation evidence did not
render legally insufficient the evidence in support of the jury's
affirmative answers to the punishment issues." The Texas Court also
summarily rejected one offender's claim that the sentencing
procedures applied at his trial did not provide individualized
consideration of his mental retardation, in violation of Furman and
Jurek. The Fifth Circuit similarly concluded that the Texas
56. Id. at 273-74, 276; see id. at 277 (Burger, C.J, concurring in judgment); id. at 277-
79 (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 279
(Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment). But see Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 315-16 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (questioning the lead opinion Justices'
interpretation of the allowance of consideration of mitigating circumstances under the
Texas procedure); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 359 (1976) (White, J., joined by
Burger, C.J., and Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (finding the Texas procedure
constitutionally indistinguishable from the Louisiana mandatory procedure).
57. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1982); id. at 117 (Brennan, J.,
concurring); id. (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978)
(plurality opinion); see also Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987); Skipper v. South
Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (applying this principle in individual cases).
58. See infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 773 S.W.2d 525, 537-38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (noting
that a conclusive finding of mental retardation would not preclude affirmative findings on
the punishment issues and finding sufficient evidence here in a case involving conflicting
evidence of mental retardation); Goodman v. State, 701 S.W.2d 850, 864-67 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1985) (finding sufficient evidence to support affirmative punishment findings despite
agreement of the experts that the offender was within the "mild" range of mental
retardation); Penry v. State, 691 S.W.2d 636, 650-55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (finding
sufficient evidence to support affirmative punishment findings despite contested evidence
of mental retardation and finding no error in the trial court's rejection of proposed
instructions prescribing how the jury should consider mitigating evidence).
60. See Bell v. State, 582 S.W.2d 800, 809-10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); cf Jurek, 428
U.S. at 262; Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). See generally Peggy M.
Tobolowsky, The Road to Atkins and Beyond in Texas-The Tale of One Mentally
Retarded Capital Offender, 59 BAYLOR L. REv. 735 (2007) (describing the offender's
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sentencing procedure did not impermissibly restrict consideration of
mitigating evidence of mental retardation in the cases before it.6'
In some of these cases, offenders also claimed that, due to their
mental retardation, their executions were constitutionally barred as
cruel and unusual punishment.62 Both the Texas Court and Fifth
Circuit summarily rejected these claims.63
C. Penry and the Consideration of Mental Retardation in Capital Cases
In Penry v. Lynaugh," the offender had been found competent to
stand trial, convicted of capital murder, and sentenced to death based
on the jury's affirmative responses to the Texas capital sentencing
issues. 65 The trial court, Texas Court, and Fifth Circuit had rejected
Penry's claims that the Texas capital procedure provided inadequate
consideration of his mitigating evidence of mental retardation and
that the execution of a mentally retarded individual violated the
Constitution.'
The Supreme Court first addressed whether Penry had been
unconstitutionally sentenced to death because the jury had not been
instructed that it could "consider and give effect to" his mitigating
presentation of his mental retardation evidence and related claims during thirty years of
trial, appellate, and collateral review proceedings).
61. See Bell v. Lynaugh, 858 F.2d 978, 984-85 (5th Cir. 1988) (determining that the
offender had not been prevented from presenting his mental retardation evidence as a
mitigating factor in the sentencing determination, noting that the offender's "two-edged"
(i.e., aggravating and mitigating) evidence of mental retardation could not have been
perceived as mitigating here, and acknowledging a hypothetical situation in which the
Texas sentencing procedure would not fully accommodate mental retardation mitigating
evidence); Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915, 924-26 (5th Cir. 1987) (questioning whether
the Texas procedure adequately permitted consideration of the offender's evidence,
including that of mental retardation, as mitigating evidence, but determining that Fifth
Circuit precedent precluded resolution of the issue in the offender's favor), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
62. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
63. See Bell, 858 F.2d at 984; Penry, 832 F.2d at 918; Goodman, 701 S.W.2d at 867;
Penry, 691 S.W.2d at 654-55; see also Tobolowsky, supra note 60, at 768 n.240, 776-77
(describing an offender's unsuccessful attempts to raise the constitutional claim in state
court proceedings).
64. Penry, 492 U.S. at 302.
65. See id. at 307-11; see also supra note 42 and accompanying text (describing these
sentencing issues).
66. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 310-13; Penry, 832 F.2d at 915; Penry, 691 S.W.2d at 636.
Penry's mental retardation evidence included IQ scores ranging between fifty and sixty-
three and evidence that his ability to function in the world was that of a nine- or ten-year
old. State experts contested the diagnosis and extent of Penry's mental retardation. See
Penry, 492 U.S. at 307-10.
evidence of mental retardation in determining his sentence under the
Texas procedure." The Court had recently determined that
mitigating evidence of good prison behavior could be adequately
addressed by the Texas sentencing procedure in Franklin v.
Lynaugh.6 However, in Penry, the five-Justice majority rejected the
State's argument that the jury could consider and give effect to
Penry's mitigating evidence of mental retardation through the
prescribed sentencing issues without any additional instructions
regarding mitigating evidence. 69 Although Penry's mental retardation
was relevant to the special issue regarding deliberate conduct, it was
also relevant to his moral culpability in a manner beyond the scope of
this sentencing issue. Similarly, the Court determined that the
sentencing issue concerning the reasonableness of the offender's
response to provocation did not provide a sufficient vehicle for the
jury to express its determination of Penry's reduced moral culpability
due to his mental retardation. With regard to the sentencing issue
concerning Penry's continuing threat of future violent acts, the Court
determined that Penry's mental retardation, including his inability to
learn from his mistakes, was relevant only as an aggravating factor.
Accordingly, the Court characterized the evidence in this context as a
"two-edged sword," in that it might reduce the defendant's
blameworthiness for the crime as it simultaneously indicated a
probability he would be a continuing threat to society. As such, the
Court determined, the "continuing threat" issue did not allow the jury
to give mitigating effect to Penry's mental retardation evidence.70
These inadequacies in the sentencing issues were not overcome
by the defendant's ability to argue the significance of this mitigating
evidence in the absence of appropriate jury instructions that provided
jurors a vehicle to give effect to the evidence." The Court explained
that, to ensure reliability in capital sentencing and to ensure that the
punishment imposed is directly related to a defendant's "personal
67. Penry, 492 U.S. at 307, 313.
68. Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1987) (determining that the Texas capital
sentencing procedure adequately permitted consideration of this offender's mitigating
evidence); cf id. at 183-88 (O'Connor, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment)
(raising the possibility that the Texas procedure might not adequately permit jurors to
consider and give effect to all types of mitigating evidence). Contra id. at 189-200
(Stevens, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (finding that the offender's
mitigating evidence could not adequately be addressed by the Texas procedure).
69. Penry, 492 U.S. at 319-22.
70. Id. at 322-25.
71. Id. at 325-26.
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culpability," juries must be able to both consider and give effect to
any mitigating evidence that is relevant to a defendant's background
or character or the circumstances of the crime.72 In Penry's case, the
Court concluded that, in the absence of instructions indicating the
jury could consider and give effect to Penry's mitigating evidence of
mental retardation by declining to impose the death penalty, the jury
had not been provided a mechanism by which it could express its
"reasoned moral response" to this mitigating evidence. As a result of
this unconstitutional application of the Texas capital sentencing
procedure, the Court overturned Penry's death sentence.73
The Court next addressed Penry's claim that the execution of a
mentally retarded individual like himself constituted cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.74 A five-Justice
majority disagreed, determining that the execution of mentally
retarded offenders was not constitutionally prohibited." The Court
noted that the Eighth Amendment prohibited punishments
considered cruel and unusual as of the adoption of the Bill of Rights,
as well as those punishments currently considered cruel and unusual
under the concept of the "evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society" utilized by the Court in its Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence." The Court had previously considered
objective evidence to determine these evolving standards of
decency-the "clearest and most reliable" of which was the
legislation enacted by American legislatures, as well as data regarding
the action of sentencing juries.
72. Id. at 326-28.
73. Id. at 328; see id. at 341-42 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); id. at 349-50 (Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); cf id. at 308-10, 312-13 (addressing this issue also regarding
Penry's mitigating evidence of childhood abuse). The four Justices who dissented to this
portion of the Penry opinion maintained their position that the Texas procedure had been
upheld in Jurek with the understanding that it would allow broad consideration of
mitigating evidence, the use of which evidence would be limited to answering the three-
part sentencing inquiry. Because Penry's mental retardation evidence was relevant to at
least the deliberate conduct issue, the Texas procedure adequately allowed his sentencing
jury to consider and give effect to his mitigating evidence. Id. at 353-58 (Scalia, J., joined
by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Kennedy, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
74. Id. at 328.
75. Id. at 328-35; id. at 351 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and
Kennedy, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
76. Id. at 330-31 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion));
see id. at 351 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Kennedy, JJ., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
77. Id. at 331.
The Court determined that, although "idiots" and "lunatics"
were not subject to punishment for their criminal acts at common law,
neither of these terms encompassed mentally retarded offenders
comparable to Penry." In contemporary practice, the circumstances
of persons comparable to those protected from punishment at
common law were addressed through the requirement of criminal
competency and the availability of the insanity defense, as well as the
previously recognized constitutional prohibition of the execution of
insane offenders." Moreover, as the Court explained, these common
law terms would only arguably apply to a person within the "severe"
or "profound" modern categories of mental retardation, rather than
the "mild" or "moderate" categories." Given Penry's less extreme
level of mental retardation, taken together with the jury's finding of
his criminal competency and rejection of his insanity defense, he (and
presumably other offenders like him) would not fall within the
common law prohibition of criminal punishment for "idiots" and
"lunatics." 8'
The Court then assessed the proffered "objective" evidence of an
emerging national consensus against the execution of mentally
retarded offenders reflective of the evolving standards of American
society. The Court found that the statutory prohibition of the
execution of mentally retarded offenders enacted by Congress and
two states, even when added to the fourteen states that prohibited
capital punishment entirely, fell short of the evidence of national
consensus presented in support of the categorical exclusions from
execution previously recognized by the Court.' Penry failed to offer
evidence as to relevant responses of sentencing juries and prosecutors
regarding the execution of mentally retarded offenders. The Court
found the proffered results of public opinion polls and resolutions of
professional organizations insufficient evidence of a national
78. Id. at 331-32. The term "idiot" referred to persons manifesting, from birth, a total
absence of reason or understanding, or an inability to distinguish between good and evil.
Id. The term "lunatic" referred to individuals with a partial derangement of intellectual
capabilities with a restoration of capabilities at uncertain intervals. Id.
79. Id. at 332-33; see generally Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (prohibiting
the execution of insane offenders who lack the competency to be executed).
80. Penry, 492 U.S. at 332-33; see id. at 308 n.1 (referring to classifications of mental
retardation based on IQ scores, as described supra note 5).
81. Id. at 333.
82. Id. at 333-34; see, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 826-33 (1988)
(plurality opinion) (addressing young offenders); Ford, 477 U.S. at 408-10 (regarding
insane offenders).
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consensus. Thus, although mental retardation was clearly a factor
that could reduce or mitigate an offender's culpability for a capital
offense, the Court concluded that Penry had failed to establish the
existence of a national consensus against the execution of mentally
retarded offenders warranting the requested categorical exclusion
from capital punishment.'
D. The Texas Response to Penry Regarding Mental Retardation as a
Mitigating Circumstance
In the wake of the Penry decision, the Texas Legislature, Texas
Court, and Fifth Circuit addressed the deficiency that the Supreme
Court identified in the Texas capital procedure regarding the
consideration of mitigating evidence of mental retardation." In 1991,
at its next legislative session following Penry, the Texas Legislature
revised the State's capital sentencing procedure to expressly
incorporate consideration of mitigating circumstances. More
83. Penry, 492 U.S. at 334-35; see id. at 340 (opinion of O'Connor, J.). In a portion of
the opinion reflecting only her views, Justice O'Connor also evaluated Penry's claim under
the proportionality and punishment purpose standards used by the Court in previous cases
considering categorical exclusions from the death penalty. Based on the evidence
presented, however, she was unable to conclude that mentally retarded offenders
comparable to Penry, as a class, and without individualized consideration of their
particular circumstances, lacked sufficient culpability to make a death sentence a
proportionate punishment or to serve the punishment goal of retribution. Id. at 335-40
(opinion of O'Connor, J.). Contra id. at 351 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
White and Kennedy, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting Justice
O'Connor's proportionality and punishment purpose analysis and concluding that this
analysis had "no place" in the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence).
Although they agreed with the conceptual framework of Justice O'Connor's
proportionality and punishment purpose analysis, the dissenting Justices disagreed with
the result of her analysis. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concluded that all
mentally retarded offenders had insufficient intelligence and adaptive behavior skills to
provide a level of culpability proportionate to a death sentence or to further the
punishment goals of retribution or deterrence. They further concluded that the
individualized sentencing mechanisms designed to consider mitigating evidence during
capital punishment proceedings were inadequate to prevent mentally retarded offenders
with limited culpability from nevertheless being sentenced to death. Id. at 342-49
(Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); cf id. at 350
(Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing
with Justice O'Connor's presentation of the competing arguments regarding the issue, but
concluding that the execution of mentally retarded offenders was unconstitutional).
84. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text (describing Penry); see infra notes
85-109 and accompanying text (describing the Texas response to Penry).
85. See Act of May 17, 1991, 72d Leg., Reg. Sess., ch. 838, § 1, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws
2898, 2898-900 (codified at TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (West Supp. 1992)).
The Texas Legislature also made other changes to the capital punishment provisions.
While retaining the continuing threat of future violent acts punishment issue, the
specifically, the Texas Legislature expressly included mitigating
evidence as a category of evidence that is relevant to and must be
considered in the determination of punishment." The Texas
Legislature also added a new mitigating circumstances sentencing
issue that a capital jury must answer if it has unanimously answered
the "aggravating circumstances" punishment issues (e.g., the
continuing threat of future violent acts issue) affirmatively:
Whether, taking into consideration all of the evidence,
including the circumstances of the offense, the defendant's
character and background, and the personal moral culpability
of the defendant, there is a sufficient mitigating circumstance or
circumstances to warrant that a sentence of life imprisonment
rather than a death sentence be imposed."
Under this analysis, "mitigating" evidence is evidence that a juror
"might regard as reducing the defendant's moral blameworthiness."8
In order to answer the issue affirmatively, ten or more jurors must
agree that a sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances exist,
although the jurors need not agree on what particular evidence
supports an affirmative response to this issue. A negative response,
on the other hand, requires unanimous agreement. Under the revised
sentencing procedure, a sentencing jury's unanimous affirmative
findings regarding the aggravating circumstances punishment issues
and unanimous negative finding concerning the mitigating
circumstances issue result in a death sentence. However, a negative
finding by ten or more jurors regarding one of the aggravating
circumstances issues, an affirmative finding by ten or more jurors
regarding the mitigating circumstances issue, or an inability by the
jury to answer any sentencing issue submitted, results in a sentence of
life imprisonmentS9 (and now life imprisonment without parole).'
Legislature eliminated the deliberate conduct and response to provocation issues and
added a new punishment issue requiring the finding of a specified degree of intent or
causation in instances in which an offender was charged under the broad "party"
definition. Id. at ch. 838, § 1, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2899.
86. Id. at ch. 838, § 1, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2898-99 (defining this evidence as
"evidence of the defendant's background or character or the circumstances of the offense
that mitigates against the imposition of the death penalty").
87. Id. at ch. 838, § 1, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2899.
88. Id.
89. Id. at ch. 838, § 1, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2899-900.
90. In 2005, the Texas Legislature changed the alternative punishment in capital
felony cases from life imprisonment to life imprisonment without parole. See Acts 2005,
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Almost two years after the Penry decision was announced and
shortly after the Texas Legislature adopted its revisions to the capital
sentencing procedure, the Texas Court articulated its most
comprehensive response to Penry and to those who might raise
similar claims concerning the inadequate consideration of mitigating
evidence under the previous Texas sentencing procedure ("Penry
claims").91 The Texas Court restrictively interpreted the scope of
Penry in its initial substantive rulings on Penry claims.92 The Texas
Court acknowledged that, contrary to its prior rulings,93  Penry
required an additional instruction to jurors to permit them to consider
and give effect to presented mitigating evidence that had mitigating
79th Leg., Reg. Sess., ch. 787, § 1, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 2705 (currently codified at TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31 (West Supp. 2010)).
91. Although the Texas Court had responded to some Penry-related claims
previously, it articulated its most comprehensive response in a series of decisions
announced on May 29, 1991. Boggess v. State, 855 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Ex
parte Herrera, 819 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Lackey v. State, 819 S.W.2d 111
(Tex. Crim. App. 1991 (rehearing opinion)); Selvage v. Collins, 816 S.W.2d 390 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1991); Ex parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Ex parte
Earvin, 816 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Black v. State, 816 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991); Ex parte Baldree, 810 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Ex parte Ellis, 810
S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). In addition to its substantive response to Penry, the
Texas Court waived the procedural default of Penry claims on direct appeal by capital
defendants who had not objected to the punishment instructions at trial and in the
collateral review process by those who had not raised the claim on direct review or at trial.
See generally Tobolowsky, Penry, supra note 1, at 366-69 (describing the Texas Court's
procedural default approach regarding Penry claims). The Texas Court's expansive
approach regarding procedural default potentially authorized re-examination of every
death sentence imposed under the three-question sentencing inquiry prior to Penry.
92. See generally Tobolowsky, Penry, supra note 1, at 369-79 (describing initial Texas
Court rulings addressing Penry claims).
93. Prior to Penry, the Texas Court had consistently rejected claims that the Texas
capital punishment procedure did not adequately incorporate consideration of mitigating
evidence. See generally Tobolowsky, Penry, supra note 1, at 364-65 (describing the Texas
Court's pre-Penry approach regarding mitigating evidence). Instead, the Texas Court
often observed that the Texas procedure permitted broad consideration of mitigating
evidence, the use of which was limited to answering the prescribed punishment questions.
See, e.g., Penry v. State, 691 S.W.2d 636, 654 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (noting that a capital
defendant could present a wide range of relevant mitigating evidence to aid the jury in
answering the punishment issues); cf. Hovila v. State, 562 S.W.2d 243, 249 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1978) (finding the exclusion of the defendant's mitigating evidence proper or
harmless error because it was irrelevant to the continuing threat issue). The Texas Court
had also repeatedly rejected claims that additional instructions beyond the three-question
sentencing inquiry were required to tell jurors to consider or how to consider mitigating
evidence in answering the punishment issues. See, e.g., Cordova v. State, 733 S.W.2d 175,
189-90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (finding that no additional instruction was required
regarding the mitigating effect of proffered evidence). This interpretation of the Texas
punishment procedure obviously affected how capital defendants presented and used
mitigating evidence at their trials and punishment proceedings.
value different from or beyond its tendency to prompt a negative
response to one of the punishment issues.94 However, the Texas
Court consistently reiterated that the Supreme Court in Penry had
not declared the Texas capital sentencing system itself
unconstitutional and accordingly rejected Penry claims that directly
or indirectly challenged the facial constitutionality of the capital
punishment procedure."
More importantly, in reviewing dozens of initial Penry claims,
the Texas Court adopted restrictive evidentiary standards to evaluate
whether proffered mitigating evidence qualified as "Penry evidence,"
which was necessary to support a Penry claim. In this connection, the
Texas Court required not only that the evidence be mitigating in
nature, but also that it be relevant to a defendant's "moral
culpability" or "deathworthiness."" In addition, the evidence had to
be of the "same or similar character and quality" as the mitigating
evidence of mental retardation (and childhood abuse) considered in
Penry-it should not simply provide jurors an opportunity to express
sympathy or emotion toward a defendant.7 Finally, to be eligible for
consideration as Penry evidence, the mitigating evidence must have
actually been presented during the trial proceedings." On these
bases, the Texas Court rejected many Penry claims due to their
failure to present sufficient "Penry evidence.""
The Texas Court rejected the greatest number of Penry claims,
however, based on its own broad interpretation of the Court's
decision in Franklin v. Lynaugh," and its narrow interpretation of
Penry, in determining whether presented mitigating evidence could
adequately be considered and given effect by the previous three-
question sentencing procedure. The Texas Court denied relief in
94. See, e.g., James v. State, 805 S.W.2d 415, 417 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
95. See, e.g., Ellis, 810 S.W.2d at 212-13.
96. See, e.g., Lackey, 819 S.W.2d at 130-34.
97. See, e.g., Trevino v. State, 815 S.W.2d 592, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), rev'd on
other grounds, 503 U.S. 562 (1992).
98. Ex parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383, 385 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (refusing to
consider evidence submitted in collateral review proceedings that was not presented at the
defendant's punishment proceedings for tactical reasons reflecting the concerns raised in
Penry).
99. See, e.g., Trevino, 815 S.W.2d at 621-22; see also Lackey, 819 S.W.2d at 134
(finding evidence that only had mitigating value rather than the "two-edged"
characteristics of Penry's mitigating evidence of mental retardation was not comparable to
Penry's mitigating evidence).
100. Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988); see supra note 68 and accompanying
text (describing this decision).
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virtually all of its initial post-Penry cases based on its determination
that the presented mitigating evidence (e.g., defendant's youthful age,
religious devotion, kindness and service to family or others, military
service, and employment) had been adequately considered within the
context of the pre-Penry punishment issues."' The one exception to
this response concerned Penry claims regarding significant evidence
of mental retardation or childhood abuse comparable to that
presented in Penry. In these initial cases alone did the Texas Court
generally determine that there was "Penry error" due to the absence
of an instruction indicating that jurors could consider and give effect
to the presented mitigating evidence.
In its initial post-Penry cases, the Fifth Circuit took a similar
substantive approach to that of the Texas Court, i.e., finding that
mitigating evidence-other than that of the same nature as that
presented in Penry-could be adequately considered by the previous
101. See, e.g., Ex parte McGee, 817 S.W.2d 77, 80-81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (finding
that the defendant's youthful age (nineteen) could be considered regarding the continuing
threat issue and did not independently establish that he was less morally culpable than
others, with similar findings regarding evidence of the defendant's family and religious
devotion and the aberrational nature of the crime given his otherwise non-violent
character); Black v. State, 816 S.W.2d 350, 364-65 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (finding that
evidence of the defendant's military service and employment were relevant to the
continuing threat issue); see also Richardson v. State 886 S.W.2d 769, 773 (Tex. Crim. App.
1991) (indicating that a broad application of Penry would create an "automatic reversal"
rule).
102. See, e.g., Richard v. State, 842 S.W.2d 279, 281-83 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)
(including testimony as to the defendant's 10 of sixty-two, status in the "upper limits" of
the mentally defective range, and characterization as "slow," but not retarded that
supported a finding of Penry error); Ex parte Williams, 833 S.W.2d 150, 151-52 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1992) (finding that evidence of IQ scores of fifty-three and sixty-seven (despite
conflicting diagnoses regarding the defendant's mental retardation) raised a fact issue of
mental retardation); McGee, 817 S.W.2d at 79-80 (regarding evidence of mental
retardation, including a recent IQ score of sixty-six, and childhood abuse); Ex parte
Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383, 385-86 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (regarding evidence of mild to
moderate mental retardation, including an IQ score of fifty-six); Ramirez v. State, 815
S.W.2d 636, 655-56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (regarding evidence of mental deficiencies,
including an 10 score of fifty-seven, and childhood abuse); Gribble v. State, 808 S.W.2d
65, 75-76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (regarding evidence of childhood abuse and mental
impairments); see also Ex parte Sterling, No. 71,385 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 29, 1992)
(including evidence of the defendant's IQ of sixty-nine and poor school record); Ex parte
Modden, No. 71,312 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 12, 1992) (including evidence of the
defendant's IQ of sixty-four); Ex parte Bell, No. 70,946 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 6, 1991)
(including evidence of the defendant's IQ of fifty-four). Contra Lackey, 819 S.W.2d at
129-36 (finding that the defendant's evidence of mental limitations, including IQ scores
between sixty-seven and eighty, could be adequately considered through the continuing
threat punishment issue).
sentencing questions. 0 ' The Fifth Circuit subsequently adopted its
own analytical approach for determining Penry claims. In its view,
Penry evidence (and hence Penry error) was limited to that regarding
a defendant's "uniquely severe permanent handicaps" which had a
nexus to the crime and had a "major mitigating thrust" substantially
beyond the scope of all of the punishment issues." The Fifth Circuit
applied this restrictive analytical approach to reject most Penry claims
based on mitigating evidence of mental retardation (as well as other
evidence). In these cases, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
offenders' mental retardation evidence either did not establish a
"uniquely severe permanent handicap" or a nexus to the crime, or
both. o
The Texas Court also added a "nexus to the crime" requirement
in its Penry claim analysis regarding other types of mitigating
evidence, but it initially expressly refused to apply such a requirement
to Penry claims based on mental retardation.' Subsequently, a
plurality of the Texas Court appeared to adopt a nexus requirement
between mitigating evidence and the crime in a case involving an
103. Compare Mayo v. Collins, 920 F.2d 251, 251 (5th Cir. 1990), and Mayo v.
Lynaugh, 893 F.2d 683, 688 (5th Cir. 1990) (granting collateral relief regarding a Penry
claim based on childhood abuse), with Russell v. Lynaugh, 892 F.2d 1205, 1214 (5th Cir.
1989) (finding that evidence of the defendant's lengthy crime-free period could be
considered through the continuing threat punishment issue), and DeLuna v. Lynaugh, 890
F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding that the defendant's youthful age (twenty-one) and
"borderline" mental capacity were not of the type of mitigating evidence requiring
application of Penry).
104. Graham v. Collins, 950 F.2d 1009, 1027, 1029, 1033 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc), aff'd
on other grounds, 506 U.S. 461 (1993). Contra id. at 1034-35 (Reavley, J., joined by Politz,
King, Davis, and Weiner, JJ., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for its narrow
interpretation of Penry).
105. See, e.g., Smith v. Cockrell, 311 F.3d 661, 671-74, 677-83 (5th Cir. 2002); Tennard
v. Cockrell, 284 F.3d 591, 593, 595-97 (5th Cir. 2002), rev'd sub nom. Tennard v. Dretke,
542 U.S. 274 (2004); Jones v. Johnson, 171 F.3d 270, 275-76 (5th Cir. 1999); Boyd v.
Johnson, 167 F.3d 907, 911-12 (5th Cir. 1999); Harris v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 535, 538-39 (5th
Cir. 1996); Lackey v. Scott, 28 F.3d 486, 488-90 (5th Cir. 1994); Andrews v. Scott, 21 F.3d
612, 624, 629-30 (5th Cir. 1994); cf. Cuevas v. Collins, 932 F.2d 1078, 1083 (5th Cir. 1991)
(reaching the same result in a pre-Graham Penry case). But see Blue v. Cockrell, 298 F.3d
318, 319-22 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that the offender's categorization as "mild to
borderline" mentally retarded, with IQ scores between sixty-four and ninety and
participation in special education classes, constituted adequate Penry evidence).
106. See Earhart v. State, 877 S.W.2d 759, 766 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Compare
Nobles v. State, 843 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (reflecting the adoption of
the nexus requirement by a majority of the Texas Court), with Richard, 842 S.W.2d at 283
(noting that the Texas Court had not required an express showing of a nexus between
evidence of "mental defectiveness" and the crime in Penry claims, even after its decision
in Nobles, supra).
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offender's intelligence quotient ("IQ") score that was within the
range of mental retardation.'" In a post-Atkins case rejecting a Penry
claim based on evidence of an offender's mental impairment, if not
mental retardation, the Texas Court more fully adopted and applied
the Fifth Circuit's analysis requiring Penry evidence that established a
severe, permanent handicap with a nexus to the crime.i Finally, the
Texas Court changed its characterization of Penry evidence of mental
retardation. It moved from a determination based primarily on IQ
scores alone to a requirement that an offender must also present
evidence of adaptive behavior deficits and developmental period
onset as generally required in clinical definitions of the term.'*
Ultimately, the Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's
restrictive analysis of Penry claims in Tennard v. Dretke,"o a post-
Atkins case. The Tennard Court criticized the Fifth Circuit's
adoption of "its own restrictive gloss" on Penry and stated that the
Fifth Circuit's analysis was an "improper legal standard" and had "no
foundation" in the Court's decisions."' The Court specifically held
that the Fifth Circuit's "uniquely severe permanent handicap" and
nexus tests for ascertaining Penry evidence were "incorrect" and
explicitly rejected them."2  Instead, the Court contemplated an
"expansive" concept of relevant mitigating evidence subject to its
Penry holding that would include the mitigating evidence of the
107. See Ex parte Tennard, 960 S.W.2d 57, 61-63 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (plurality
opinion); cf. id. at 67 n.9 (Meyers, J., joined by Price, J., concurring in judgment)
(indicating no clear disagreement with the plurality's reasoning, but noting that this
portion of the opinion was dicta, unnecessary to support the resolution of the appellate
claim, and overruled prior Texas Court precedent without acknowledgment). But see id.
at 72 (Baird, J., dissenting) (criticizing the plurality for ignoring consistent precedent that
did not require a nexus between mitigating evidence of mental retardation and the crime
in Penry claims).
108. See Ex parte Smith, 132 S.W.3d 407, 409-17 (Tex. Crim. App.), rev'd sub nom.
Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37 (2004) (addressing an offender who had been in special
education and had an IQ of seventy-eight and possible organic learning disabilities, as well
as other mitigating circumstances).
109. See Tennard, 960 S.W.2d at 60-61 (plurality opinion) (referring to the three-part
definition adopted by professional organizations, referenced by the Court in Penry, and
included in the state mental retardation law); id. at 63-67 (Meyers, J., joined by Price, J.,
concurring in judgment); cf supra note 5; infra notes 159, 177 (containing the referenced
three-part definition of mental retardation).
110. Tennard, 542 U.S. at 274.
111. Id. at 283-87.
112. Id. at 289.
offender's low IQ presented in this case."' The following term, the
Court rejected the Texas Court's adoption of the Fifth Circuit's Penry
evidence standards in Smith v. Texas,"4 another case involving an
offender with mental disabilities."5 The Smith Court found that the
Texas Court had "erroneously relied on a [Penry evidence] test we
never countenanced and now have unequivocally rejected."".. The
Tennard and Smith Court rulings have permitted the reconsideration
of scores of Penry claims resolved by the Texas Court or Fifth Circuit
on the basis of insufficient Penry evidence, including claims involving
mental retardation and low IQ evidence. 17
E. The Texas Post-Penry Response Regarding Mental Retardation as a
Categorical Exception to the Death Penalty
In the period between Penry and Atkins, several offenders raised
the claim that, due to their mental retardation, their executions were
barred as cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments."' As in the cases decided prior to Penry,
both the Texas Court"' and Fifth Circuit'20 summarily rejected these
113. Id. at 288-89. Contra id. at 289-93 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 293-94
(Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 294-95 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
114. Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37 (2004) (per curiam).
115. See id. at 41 (involving the mitigating evidence described supra note 108).
116. Id. at 45; see also id. at 45-49 (finding that the jury nullification instruction given
did not cure the Penry error). Contra id. at 49 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting).
117. See Tobolowsky, Texas, supra note 1, at 103-04 & nn.285-86 (citing sources
estimating that between fifty and one hundred cases could be affected by these rulings).
After Tennard and Smith, the Court further found fault with the Texas Court's and Fifth
Circuit's application of Penry principles in Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286 (2007), and
Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233 (2007). The Court specifically found that the
Fifth Circuit had "mischaracterized the law" by adopting a "sufficient" mitigating effect
standard in its review of Penry claims and that, once again, the "sufficient effect" standard
had "no foundation" in the Court's decisions. Brewer, 550 U.S. at 295-96 (quoting
Tennard, 542 U.S. at 284). Contra Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. at 265-80 (Roberts, C.J., joined
by Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting); id. at 280-85 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas
and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
Prior to Atkins, the Court also found that the supplemental "nullification" jury
instruction that the Texas Court and Fifth Circuit had concluded satisfied the concerns
identified in Penry regarding the consideration of mitigating evidence was a
constitutionally inadequate means to achieve this requirement. See Penry v. Johnson, 532
U.S. 782 (2001). This Court ruling also permitted the reconsideration of prior cases in
which such a nullification instruction was utilized. See Tobolowsky, Texas, supra note 1, at
103-04 & nn.285-86 (describing such cases).
118. See infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text (describing these cases).
119. See, e.g., Hall v. State, 67 S.W.3d 870, 877-79 (Tex. Crim. App.), vacated, 537 U.S.
802 (2002), affd, 160 S.W.3d 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Bell v. State, 938 S.W.2d 35, 41,
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claims based on their own precedent and Supreme Court precedent,
which then included the Penry Court's rejection of this claim.121
In most of the biennial legislative sessions in the period between
Penry and Atkins, the Texas Legislature considered proposed bans on
the execution of mentally retarded offenders. 22  In the sessions
between 1989 and 1995, these legislative proposals included both
pretrial judicial determinations of mental retardation and sentencing
determinations by the jury.123 None of these proposals proceeded past
124
committee review. In the 1999 session, a proposal prescribing a
pretrial judicial determination of mental retardation was adopted by
the Texas Senate and a committee of the Texas House of
Representatives; however, it did not receive final consideration by the
entire House of Representatives.125 In 2001, the Texas Senate
adopted a pretrial judicial mental retardation determination
procedure and the Texas House of Representatives adopted a
procedure permitting a jury determination during capital punishment
proceedings. Both legislative chambers agreed to a compromise,
hybrid system permitting a jury determination of mental retardation
during punishment proceedings, with a defendant option for a post-
trial judicial proceeding and determination of mental retardation if
55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 726 n.2, 766-67 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1995); Ramirez v. State, 815 S.W.2d 636, 654-56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
120. See, e.g., Bell v. Cockrell, 31 F. App'x 156 (5th Cir. 2001); Penry v. Johnson, 215
F.3d 504, 512 (5th Cir. 2000), affd in part, rev'd in part, 532 U.S. 782, vacated by 261 F.3d
541 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 351 n.61 (5th Cir. 1998);
Andrews v. Scott, 21 F.3d 612, 632 (5th Cir. 1994).
121. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328-35 (1989).
122. See infra notes 123-28 and accompanying text. All of these proposals that defined
mental retardation used the three-part definition of mental retardation involving
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, adaptive behavior deficits, and
developmental period onset contained in the state mental retardation law. See TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 591.003 (West 2010). Some proposals included a
presumption of mental retardation based on a stated IQ score of sixty-five or seventy or
less. See generally Tobolowsky, Texas, supra note 1, at 83-86 (describing these legislative
proposals).
123. Compare H.R. 573, 74th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1995), and H.R. 527, 74th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1995) (including a pretrial determination in which the defendant had the
burden of proof to establish mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence), with
H.R. 1784, 73d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1993), and H.R. 55, 71st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1989)
(including a sentencing determination).
124. See generally TEXAS LEGISLATURE ONLINE, http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/ (last
visited Oct. 3, 2010) (describing the legislation and legislative action).
125. See S. 326, 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1999); see also H.R. 3069, 76th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Tex. 1999); cf H.R. 2121, 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1999) (describing additional
legislation introduced during the session that did not proceed past committee review).
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the issue was determined adversely by the sentencing jury.'26 The
Texas Governor, however, vetoed this legislation, stating his concern
about its potential use of two different decision makers to make the
mental retardation determination based on different evidence and its
potential to undermine confidence in the jury process.127 Thus, as of
the Atkins decision, Texas had no legislative ban on the execution of
mentally retarded offenders.'28
F. Conclusion Regarding Texas Mentally Retarded Capital Offenders
in the Pre-Atkins Period
In the period prior to Atkins, there was significant legislative and
judicial action concerning the consideration of mental retardation as a
mitigating factor in Texas capital proceedings.'29 Following the
Court's decision in Penry,'o the Texas Legislature modified its capital
punishment procedure to expressly incorporate the consideration of
mitigating evidence, including that of mental retardation."' In the
process of addressing many claims of Penry error for more than a
decade, the Fifth Circuit adopted a restrictive analytical
interpretation of Penry that it applied to mitigating evidence of
mental retardation (and other mitigating evidence).'3 2 Although the
Texas Court initially found that mitigating evidence of mental
126. See H.R. 236, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2001); Sarah Gail Tuthill, Comment, The
Texas-Size Struggle to Implement Atkins v. Virginia, 14 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 145,
149-52 (2007). This legislation used the state mental retardation law definition of mental
retardation. In the post-sentencing proceeding, mental retardation had to be established
by a preponderance of the evidence, but the legislation did not expressly place the burden
of proof on either party. See H.R. 236, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2001).
127. See Gaiutra Bahadur, Governor Vetoes Execution Ban, Mental Retardation
Sentencing Bill Would Undercut Juries, Perry Says, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN,
June 18, 2001, at Al; Rick Perry, Statement of Gov. Rick Perry on U.S. Supreme Court
Decision, http://www.governor.state.us/divisions/press/pressreleases/PressRelease.2002-06-
20 (last visited June 18, 2003) (discussing the veto rationale); TEXAS LEGISLATURE
ONLINE, http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2010) (describing the veto
action).
128. See S. 686, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2001); H.R. 1247, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Tex. 2001); H.R. 242, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2001) (describing additional legislation
proposed in the 2001 session that did not proceed past committee review). See generally
TEXAS LEGISLATURE ONLINE, http://www.capitol. state.tx.us/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2010)
(describing the legislation and legislative action during the session).
129. See supra notes 84-109 and accompanying text.
130. Penry v. Lynaugh , 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
131. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
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retardation generally survived its own restrictive Penry analysis,'3 it
ultimately adopted the Fifth Circuit's even narrower Penry
interpretation and applied it to cases of mental retardation and other
mental impairments."' In post-Atkins rulings, the Supreme Court
ultimately rejected these narrow Penry interpretations as incorrect,'
opening the way for renewed Penry-related litigation by Texas
mentally retarded (and other) capital offenders.'36 As of the Supreme
Court's decision in Atkins, however, neither the Supreme Court, the
Fifth Circuit, the Texas Court, nor Texas law generally prohibited the
execution of mentally retarded offenders.'37
II. The Supreme Court Prohibits the Execution of
Mentally Retarded Offenders in Atkins
In Atkins v. Virginia,"' the Supreme Court revisited its Penry
decision rejecting a categorical ban on the execution of mentally
retarded offenders.' 9 Most of the legal issues raised in Atkins were
similar to those presented in Penry.'" Arguments in support of a ban
on the execution of mentally retarded offenders focused on the
133. See supra notes 91-102, 106 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
135. See Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37 (2004); Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004);
see supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 118-28 and accompanying text.
138. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). The Atkins case involved a murder
committed by an offender who, according to defense evidence, had an IQ of fifty-nine, a
"mental age" between nine and twelve, and a limited capacity for adaptive behavior-all
of which placed him in the "mild" range of mental retardation. Id. at 307-09; Atkins v.
Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312, 318-21 (Va. 2000), rev'd, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); id. at 321-
24 (Hassell, J., joined by Koontz, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
government presented evidence that Atkins had at least "average intelligence." Atkins,
536 U.S. at 309; Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 319. The Court granted Atkins' certiorari petition
on the question regarding "[w]hether the execution of mentally retarded individuals
convicted of capital crimes violates the Eighth Amendment." Atkins v. Virginia, 534 U.S.
809 (2001); Atkins v. Virginia, 533 U.S. 976 (2001); see McCarver v. North Carolina, 533
U.S. 975 (2001) (dismissing a petition previously granted on this issue as moot after the
state legislature enacted a ban on the execution of mentally retarded offenders).
139. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328-35 (1989); id. at 351 (Scalia, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Kennedy, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
see supra notes 74-83 and accompanying text (describing this decision). Contra Penry, 492
U.S. at 342-49 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 350 (Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
140. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-21. But see id. at 348-54 (Scalia, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., dissenting).
impact of the limited intellectual and behavioral functioning of
mentally retarded offenders as a class. For example, concerns were
raised that an offender's mental retardation decreased the reliability
of the outcome in the proceedings and increased the risk of error to a
level unacceptable in a capital case. It was argued that the available
consideration of mental retardation as a mitigating circumstance in
capital sentencing had proven an inadequate vehicle for the
consideration of this condition. Finally, the contention was expressed
that mental retardation limited these offenders' culpability to a
degree that rendered the death penalty a disproportionate and
excessive punishment that served no valid penological purpose.141
Arguments in opposition to the ban expressed support for the current
consideration of mental retardation through criminal competency and
criminal insanity proceedings, as well as through individualized
capital sentencing in which the issue of mental retardation was
already considered as a mitigating circumstance. In addition,
concerns were raised about the unnecessary interference and
disruption that a constitutional ban would have on states'
administration of the death penalty.142
The most critical difference between the Penry and Atkins
arguments involved the significance attributed to the dramatic
increase in the number of states that had enacted bans on the
execution of mentally retarded offenders in the intervening years.
The parties vigorously debated whether the prohibitions by the
federal government and now eighteen states-in addition to the
twelve states that totally prohibited capital punishment-represented
the national consensus against the execution of mentally retarded
offenders deemed lacking in Penry. The resolution of this debate, in
turn, would inform the Court's determination whether the execution
of mentally retarded offenders was constitutionally prohibited as
cruel and unusual punishment under the "evolving standards of
decency" concept embodied in the Court's Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence.143  In an opinion utilizing a decisional framework
reminiscent of several prior categorical exception capital cases,4 a
141. See id. at 311-21.
142. See id. at 348-54 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., dissenting).
143. Compare id. at 313-16, with id. at 341-46 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
Thomas, J., dissenting).
144. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 826-38 (1988) (plurality opinion); Ford
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405-10 (1986); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797-801
(1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592-600 (1977) (plurality opinion); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182-87 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
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six-Justice Court majority concluded that the Eighth Amendment
does constitutionally prohibit the execution of mentally retarded
offenders.'4 5
At the outset, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its interpretation,
articulated in prior cases, that the Eighth Amendment prohibits "all
excessive punishments, as well as cruel and unusual punishments that
may or may not be excessive" and requires that punishments be
"graduated and proportioned" to the offense.'" Moreover, the
excessive nature of a punishment is judged under the "evolving
standards of decency" that currently prevail rather than those
prevalent at common law or the adoption of the Bill of Rights.
Proportionality review under these evolving standards is informed by
objective factors, the "clearest and most reliable" of which is enacted
legislation; however, such objective evidence does not wholly
determine the constitutional analysis.'47 Rather, the "Constitution
contemplates that in the end, [the Court's] own judgment will be
brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death
penalty under the Eighth Amendment."148 The Court, therefore,
began its Atkins analysis with a review of the legislative treatment of
the death penalty for mentally retarded offenders before considering
whether there were reasons to agree or disagree with the "judgment
reached by the citizenry and its legislators."149
In reviewing the legislative changes during the years since the
Penry decision, the Supreme Court noted not only the number of
states that had enacted bans on the execution of mentally retarded
offenders, but also the "consistency of the direction" of the legislative
changes and the high levels of support for the enactment of the
individual statutory prohibitions. Even among capital punishment
states without legislative bans, only five such states had executed
offenders with known IQs in the mentally retarded range since the
Penry decision. The Court thus concluded that the practice of
executing mentally retarded offenders had become "truly unusual,
and it is fair to say that a national consensus has developed against
it."'s0 The Court further noted that additional evidence, supplied by
national professional and religious organizations, polling data, and
145. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 305, 321.
146. Id. at 311 & n.7 (citation omitted).
147. Id. at 311-12 (citations omitted).
148. Id. at 312 (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 (plurality opinion)).
149. Id. at 313.
150. Id. at 316; see id. at 313-16.
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international authorities, "makes it clear that this legislative judgment
[to bar the execution of mentally retarded offenders] reflects a much
broader social and professional consensus.".
The Court determined that the national consensus it had found
against the execution of mentally retarded offenders reflected a
judgment about the relative culpability of these offenders and the
relationship between mental retardation and the punishment
purposes served by the death penalty. It also reflected a concern
about the potential for the characteristics of mental retardation to
undermine the strength of procedural protections required in capital
cases.152 Accordingly, though many of the limitations associated with
mental retardation would not by themselves warrant a total
exemption from criminal responsibility and punishment, the Court
concluded that the impairments inherent in mental retardation
nevertheless had the effect of diminishing the personal culpability of
all mentally retarded offenders. In turn, this reduced personal
culpability rendered mentally retarded offenders inappropriate
subjects to serve the retributive punishment goals of capital
punishment. In addition, the cognitive and behavioral impairments
associated with mental retardation prevented the execution of such
offenders from significantly serving the capital punishment goal of
deterrence.' Finally, these same impairments tended to limit the
effectiveness of mentally retarded offenders' defenses against the
imposition of the death penalty and to increase the risk of wrongful
execution.'54
Thus, the Court's independent evaluation revealed no reason to
disagree with the post-Penry legislative judgment that the death
penalty is not a "suitable" punishment for mentally retarded
offenders. The Court therefore concluded that the execution of
mentally retarded offenders is a constitutionally "excessive"
punishment barred by the Eighth Amendment.'
151. Id. at 316 n.21.
152. Id. at 317.
153. Id. at 318-20.
154. Id. at 320-21.
155. Id. at 321. The dissenting Justices attacked the jurisprudential and factual bases
for the majority's holding. In these Justices' view, the determination regarding whether a
punishment is constitutionally cruel and unusual is limited to those punishments
considered so at the time of the Bill of Rights and those deemed so by contemporary
standards as reflected solely by enacted legislation and sentencing jury determinations.
Restricting their analysis to these factors only and further restricting it to the actions of
capital punishment states only, the dissenting Justices concluded that the execution of
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As it had done previously regarding the prohibition of the
execution of insane offenders,"' the Court entrusted the states with
the "'task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the
constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences." "'
The Court, however, did not leave the states without guidance in their
task of identifying mentally retarded capital offenders in order to
enforce the constitutional ban on their execution. Indeed, the Court
recognized that
[t]o the extent there is serious disagreement about the
execution of mentally retarded offenders, it is in determining
which offenders are in fact retarded. In this case, for instance,
the Commonwealth of Virginia disputes that Atkins suffers
from mental retardation. Not all people who claim to be
mentally retarded will be so impaired as to fall within the range
of mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national
consensus.
As it had done in Penry,15 9 the Atkins Court referred to the definition
of mental retardation adopted by the American Association on
"mildly" mentally retarded persons, such as Atkins, was not unconstitutionally cruel and
unusual. The dissenting Justices also rejected the constitutional relevance of the
majority's excessive punishment determination and the factual conclusions that the
majority had reached pursuant to it. Id. at 321-28 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia and
Thomas, JJ., dissenting); id. at 337-54 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas,
J., dissenting).
156. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416-17 (1986) (plurality opinion).
157. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 416-17).
158. Id.
159. Although the Penry Court members divided five-to-four in declining to recognize
a constitutional exclusion from capital punishment for mentally retarded offenders, the
Justices unanimously adopted the portion of the majority opinion in which they defined
mental retardation by reference to the American Association on Mental Retardation (now
American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities) classification text:
Persons who are mentally retarded are described as having "significantly
subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with
deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the developmental
period." American Association on Mental Deficiency (now Retardation)
(AAMR), Classification in Mental Retardation 1 (H. Grossman ed. 1983).
To be classified as mentally retarded, a person generally must have an IQ of
70 or below. Id., at 11. Under the AAMR classification system, individuals
with IQ scores between 50-55 and 70 have "mild" retardation. Individuals
with scores between 35-40 and 50-55 have "moderate" retardation.
"Severely" retarded people have IQ scores between 20-25 and 35-40, and
"profoundly" retarded people have scores below 20 or 25. Id., at 13.
Mental Retardation ("AAMR," now American Association on
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities), as well as that of the
American Psychiatric Association ("APA"), in describing the
category of capital offenders it was addressing in its constitutional
ruling."
For example, in explaining defense evidence that Atkins was
"mildly mentally retarded, 161 the Court provided the AAMR's
definition of mental retardation, which had been further refined since
the Penry decision. Although this definition had eliminated the
classification system based on IQ score, the Court also provided the
similar mental retardation definition adopted by the APA, which still
retained the IQ score classifications:
The American Association of Mental Retardation (AAMR)
defines mental retardation as follows: "Mental retardation refers
to substantial limitations in present functioning. It is
characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual
functioning, existing concurrently with related limitations in two
or more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas:
communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community
use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics,
leisure, and work. Mental retardation manifests before age 18."
Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of
Supports 5 (9th ed. 1992).
The American Psychiatric Association's definition is similar:
"The essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly
subaverage general intellectual functioning (Criterion A) that is
accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 308 n.1 (1989) (quoting AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL
DEFICIENCY, supra note 5, at 1, 11, 13). The Penry Court characterized the American
Association on Mental Retardation as the "country's oldest and largest organization of
professionals working with the mentally retarded." Id. at 335. In addition, several
references were made in the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor's separate portion of the
opinion, and the dissenting opinions to this professional organization's definition of
mental retardation and to the arguments made and positions taken in its amicus curiae
brief submitted to the Court in the case. See id. at 333, 335; id. at 336, 337, 338, 339
(opinion of O'Connor, J.); id. at 344-46, 348-49 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 350 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In
fact, Justice Stevens' dissent, joined by Justice Blackmun, on the merits of the execution
prohibition issue was virtually limited to the statement: "In my judgment, . . . that
explication-particularly the summary of the arguments advanced in the Brief for
American Association on Mental Retardation et al. as Amici Curiae--compels the
conclusion that such executions are unconstitutional." Id. at 350 (citation omitted).
160. See infra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
161. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308.
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in at least two of the following skill areas: communication, self-
care, home living, sociallinterpersonal skills, use of community
resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work,
leisure, health, and safety (Criterion B). The onset must occur
before age 18 years (Criterion C). Mental Retardation has
many different etiologies and may be seen as a final common
pathway of various pathological processes that affect the
functioning of the central nervous system." Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 41 (4th ed. 2000).
"Mild" mental retardation is typically used to describe people
with an IQ level of 50-55 to approximately 70. Id., at 42-43.2
Later in the majority opinion, the Court summarized these
definitions of mental retardation: "clinical definitions of mental
retardation require not only subaverage intellectual functioning, but
also significant limitations in adaptive skills such as communication,
self-care, and self-direction that became manifest before age 18."163
Significantly, after noting that not all offenders with mental
retardation claims will fall "within the range of mentally retarded
offenders about whom there is a national consensus,"'6 which
consensus the Court had found based largely on the action of state-
enacted bans, the Court further noted that the states' "statutory
definitions of mental retardation are not identical, but generally
conform to the clinical definitions set forth in [the quoted definitional
material above]."'6  Finally, the Court noted that an IQ "between 70
and 75 or lower" is "typically considered the cutoff IQ score for the
intellectual function prong of the mental retardation definition."16
Thus, the Atkins Court imposed its constitutional ban on the
execution of mentally retarded offenders with express reference to
the parallel clinical definitions of mental retardation provided by the
162. Id. at 308 n.3 (quoting AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL
RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (9th ed.
1992); APA, supra note 5, at 41, 42-43); see supra note 5 (describing subsequent
modification of the AAMR definition). The referenced AAMR and APA adaptive skill
areas are essentially the same. However, the APA divided the AAMR's health and safety
area into separate skill areas regarding health and safety. This subdivision accounts for
ten skill areas in the AAMR definition and eleven skill areas in the APA definition.
163. Id. at 318.
164. Id. at 317.
165. Id. at 317, n.22.
166. Id. at 309 n.5; cf id. at 316 (referring to infrequent executions of offenders with
known IQs less than seventy since Penry).
AAMR and the APA."' Mentally retarded offenders who meet these
criteria certainly appear to be the offenders about whom the Court
determined there exists a national consensus against their
execution.1' While entrusting enforcement of the constitutional ban
to the states, the Atkins Court provided clear guidance that
definitional provisions in a state's capital punishment exclusion
provisions should be at least as comprehensive as the clinical
definitions referenced by the Atkins Court. 9
III. The Texas Legislature Fails to Respond to Atkins
During its 2001 session, the Texas Legislature had reached
consensus on a procedure to identify mentally retarded offenders and
exclude them from execution; but, as discussed above, the Governor
subsequently vetoed this legislation.' One might think that, with the
impetus of the Supreme Court's constitutional ban on such executions
in Atkins in 2002, the Texas Legislature would have finalized a
legislative ban in one of its biennial sessions since the Atkins decision.
However, the Texas Legislature has failed to do so.
The post-Atkins bill progressing the farthest in the Texas
Legislature was passed by the Texas House of Representatives in
167. See id. at 308 n.3; see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 308 n.1 (1989) (using
the AAMR mental retardation definition in rejecting a constitutional ban); cf Heller v.
Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1993) (referring to the AAMR and APA definitional materials
in discussing the nature of mental retardation); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 n.9 (1985) (referring to the AAMR definition of mental
retardation).
168. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317; see also id. at 339, 353 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J., and Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's application of the execution ban to
all capital offenders who are "even slightly mentally retarded" and warning of offenders
feigning the symptoms identified in the AAMR and APA mental retardation definitions
quoted by the majority); id. at 328 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia and Thomas, JJ.,
dissenting) (referring to the Court's finding of a national consensus against executing "all
mentally retarded offenders").
169. See, e.g., Blume et al., supra note 21, at 693-94; Richard J. Bonnie & Katherine
Gustafson, The Challenge of Implementing Atkins v. Virginia: How Legislatures and
Courts Can Promote Accurate Assessments and Adjudications of Mental Retardation in
Death Penalty Cases, 41 U. Rich. L. Rev. 811, 818-19, 822-23 (2007); infra note 712 and
accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
171. See Graham Baker, Note, Defining and Determining Retardation in Texas Capital
Murder Defendants: A Proposal to the Texas Legislature, 9 SCHOLAR 237, 267-69 (2007);
Tuthill, supra note 126, at 152-55. See generally TEXAS LEGISLATURE ONLINE,
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2010) (describing post-Atkins legislative
proposals).
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2003, the first legislative session following Atkins.17 2 This 2003 bill
differed from the 2001 hybrid compromise in some important
respects."' Under the 2001 legislation, the sentencing jury
determined mental retardation with the opportunity for a post-trial
judicial proceeding and "re-determination" in the event of an adverse
jury finding.174 The 2003 House of Representatives bill, however, only
provided for a jury determination of mental retardation during the
punishment proceeding, if the issue had been properly requested and
actually raised by the evidence."' In this sentencing proceeding, the
defendant had the burden to prove his mental retardation by a
preponderance of the evidence."' In addition, the proposed statutory
definitions concerning mental retardation were somewhat more
restrictive than those in the state mental retardation statute that had
been utilized in the 2001 legislation."'
172. See H.R. 236, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2001).
173. Compare H.R. 614, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003), with H.R. 236, 77th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2001).
174. See H.R. 236, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2001).
175. See H.R. 614, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003). The jury would respond to this
issue only after answering the aggravating factor punishment issues affirmatively and
before it addressed the mitigating circumstances punishment issue. A unanimous jury
finding was required to reject the mental retardation issue. An affirmative vote by ten
jurors or an inability to agree on the issue resulted in a sentence of life imprisonment. Id.
176. Id. In the 2001 hybrid procedure, neither the burden nor standard of proof was
designated regarding the sentencing jury determination of mental retardation. In the post-
sentencing judicial proceeding, the standard of proof was preponderance of the evidence,
but the burden of proof was not expressly placed on either party. See H.R. 236, 77th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2001).
177. As in previously proposed legislation, the 2001 compromise legislation defined
mental retardation by reference to the state mental retardation law definition of the term.
See H.R. 236, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2001); Tobolowsky, Texas, supra note 1, at 83-86.
The state mental retardation law used the three-part clinical definition of mental
retardation: "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning that is concurrent
with deficits in adaptive behavior and originates during the developmental period." TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 591.003 (Vernon 2010). The mental retardation statute
further defined "subaverage general intellectual functioning" as "measured intelligence on
standardized psychometric instruments of two or more standard deviations below the age-
group mean for the tests used." Id. It also defined "adaptive behavior" as "the
effectiveness with or degree to which a person meets the standards of personal
independence and social responsibility expected of the person's age and cultural group."
Id.
The 2003 proposed legislation required the adaptive behavioral deficits to be
"significant" and they were not "normed" to the person's age and cultural group. See
H.R. 614, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003). The legislative proposal also expressly stated
that "[e]vidence regarding mental retardation may include evidence of the circumstances
of the offense or other crimes, wrongs, or acts." Id.
Although adopted by the House of Representatives, this bill was
not considered by the Texas Senate during the session.' 8 In the 2003
session, additional proposed legislation did not proceed past
committee review."9 This included a House of Representatives bill
that was substantially the same as the 2001 compromise legislation.so
It also included a Senate bill proposing a pretrial jury or court
resolution of mental retardation at a proceeding at which the
defendant had the burden to prove his mental retardation by a
preponderance of the evidence.81 In the 2005 legislative session, both
procedures-the pretrial jury or judicial procedure and the jury
punishment issue procedure-were re-introduced, but neither
procedure proceeded past committee review.8' In the 2007 session,
only the pretrial jury or judicial procedure was introduced, but again
it did not proceed past committee review.'8
In 2009, the legislation proposing a pretrial jury or judicial
procedure was re-introduced in both the Texas House of
Representatives and Senate.'" However, during the committee
review process in the House of Representatives, the proposal was
178. See TEXAS LEGISLATURE ONLINE, http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/ (last visited
Oct. 18, 2010) (describing action on the legislation). A companion bill to this legislation
did not proceed past committee review in the Senate. See S. 332, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Tex. 2003).
179. See generally TEXAS LEGISLATURE ONLINE, http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/ (last
visited Oct. 18, 2010) (describing the legislation and legislative action).
180. See H.R. 664, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003).
181. See S. 163, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003) (including provisions regarding
previously convicted offenders as well). This proposal used the state law's definition of
mental retardation and contained a presumption of mental retardation if the offender's IQ
was seventy or less. Id.; cf S. 389, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003) (proposing a
procedure to raise mental retardation issues by previously convicted capital offenders).
Almost all the proposals introduced during the 2003 regular legislative session were
introduced again during a specially called legislative session in 2003, but none proceeded
past committee review. See S. 57, 78th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Tex. 2003); S. 14, 78th Leg.,
1st Spec. Sess. (Tex. 2003); S. 13, 78th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Tex. 2003); H.R. 18, 78th Leg.,
1st Spec. Sess. (Tex. 2003).
182. Compare S. 85, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2005) (pretrial procedure), with S. 65,
79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2005), and H.R. 419, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2005)
(punishment proceeding procedure); cf S. 231, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2005) (re-
introducing the post-conviction procedure). See generally TEXAS LEGISLATURE
ONLINE, http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2010) (describing the
legislation and legislative action).
183. See S. 249, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007). See generally TEXAS LEGISLATURE
ONLINE, http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2010) (describing the
legislation and legislative action).
184. See S. 167, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009); H.R. 1152, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex.
2009).
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modified to permit a defendant to request a pretrial judicial
determination of mental retardation as well as a jury determination
during the punishment proceeding. This proposal used the state
mental retardation law definition of mental retardation. The
defendant had the burden to establish mental retardation in the
pretrial proceeding by a preponderance of the evidence. The
punishment proceeding determination also required a finding of
mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence.' The
reviewing committee unanimously approved the proposal, as
modified, but the proposal was not further considered by the House
of Representatives in its entirety." The original pretrial jury or
judicial procedure proposed in the Senate did not proceed past
committee review." Proposals re-introducing the 2001 compromise
sentencing jury/post-sentencing judicial procedure and a pretrial
judicial procedure also did not proceed past committee review.
Thus, as of the writing of this Article, the Texas Legislature has not
enacted a statutory procedure to address Atkins claims. 9
IV. The Texas State and Federal Courts
Address Atkins Claims on Collateral Review
A. Overview
In the absence of legislative action prescribing procedures for the
review of Atkins claims, the Texas state and federal courts have
adopted standards and procedures to address these claims.8 Once
185. See H.R. 1152, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009); TEXAS LEGISLATURE ONLINE,
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2010) (describing the legislation and
legislative action).
186. See TEXAS LEGISLATURE ONLINE, http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/ (last visited
Oct. 18, 2010) (describing the legislative action).
187. See id.; see also S. 167, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009).
188. See S. 1139, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009) (pretrial proposal); H.R. 4466, 81st
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009) (compromise proposal); TEXAS LEGISLATURE ONLINE,
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2010) (describing the legislative action).
189. In addition to its failure to enact a statutory procedure to address Atkins claims
during the trial process, the Texas Legislature has not enacted a specific statutory process
for Atkins claims raised on collateral review. See, e.g., S. 231, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex.
2005); see also infra note 945 (describing proposed legislation in the 2011 Texas legislative
session). See generally Brief of Texas State Senator Rodney Ellis et al., as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 5-10, Hall v. Thaler, No. 10-37 (U.S. Sept. 13, 2010) (describing
unsuccessful attempts to enact Atkins legislation).
190. See infra notes 217-80, 295-350 and accompanying text. The Texas Court
opinions described in this Article include authored and per curiam opinions, as well as
published and unpublished opinions. Those Texas Court opinions cited to electronic
the Supreme Court established the constitutional ban on the
execution of mentally retarded offenders in Atkins,'9' Texas capital
offenders could raise the claim during future state trial proceedings"
and challenge any adverse findings on direct appeal in the Texas
Court.'9 Moreover, in a unanimous finding when the Court first
addressed the issue in Penry on collateral review, the Court had
concluded that this constitutional ban would constitute the type of
"new rule" of law that could be considered, announced, and applied
retroactively to a case on collateral review.94 Following Atkins, both
the Texas Court and Fifth Circuit expressly recognized that Atkins
would apply retroactively to offenders on collateral review.195
In the years since Atkins, most Texas Atkins claims have been
litigated by convicted capital offenders on collateral review in the
Texas state and federal courts."' In this connection, as of the writing
of this Article, over eighty-five Texas capital offenders have initiated
collateral review proceedings raising Atkins claims in the Texas state
databases only or not appearing in any external database have generally been designated
by a majority of the Texas Court Judges as unpublished opinions, without precedential
authority. See TEX. R. APP. P. 77.2, 77.3; cf infra note 296 (regarding federal unpublished
opinions). These unpublished opinions nevertheless are an important resource because
they have resolved Atkins issues in individual cases and articulated aspects of the Texas
Court's implementation of the Atkins mandate.
191. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
192. See infra notes 626-27, 629 and accompanying text.
193. See infra notes 623, 628 and accompanying text.
194. Prior to addressing th'e constitutional ban on execution claim on the merits, the
Penry Court first addressed whether this claim sought the announcement or application of
a "new rule" of law generally prohibited in a collateral review case-and determined that
it did so. However, the Court unanimously concluded that Penry's claim could be
considered and applied retroactively to defendants on collateral review because it satisfied
one of the exceptions to nonretroactivity established by the Court. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302, 329-30 (1989); id. at 341-42 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); id. at 349-50 (Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); id. at 350-51 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
White and Kennedy, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); cf. Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288, 299-310 (1989) (plurality opinion) (articulating the retroactivity doctrine).
Although the Court did not establish the constitutional ban on execution in Penry, the
Court had already addressed the retroactivity issue when it subsequently established the
ban in Atkins, a direct appeal case.
195. See, e.g., Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330, 332 (5th Cir. 2002); Ex parte Briseno, 135
S.W.3d 1, 3 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Ex parte Rivera, No. 27065-02, 2003 WL 21752841
(Tex. Crim. App. July 25, 2003) (per curiam); Ex parte Williams, No. 43907-02, 2003 WL
1787634 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 26, 2003) (Cochran, J., joined by Meyers, J., concurring).
196. Compare infra Table 1 (describing collateral review litigation), with infra Table 2
(describing litigation in the trial courts and on direct appeal).
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courts.'" The Texas Court (or Texas Governor) has resolved the
Atkins claims of seventy-eight capital offenders on collateral review.19
The Fifth Circuit or Texas federal trial courts have completed their
review of the Atkins claims of thirty-eight of these offenders," as well
as three offenders who first raised their Atkins claims in federal
court.2m The volume of these Texas Atkins collateral review claims
far exceeds that of any other capital punishment state.201 Despite the
high volume of such Texas Atkins claimants, however, relatively few
such claimants have been successful in asserting their claims on
collateral review. Only fourteen previously convicted Texas capital
offenders have thus far been deemed to be mentally retarded for
purposes of the Atkins ban on their execution." This reflects a
"success" rate (seventeen percent of resolved collateral review
claims) 203 lower than and, in some instances, substantially lower than
197. See infra Table I (describing the resolution of seventy-eight Texas Atkins
collateral review claims by the Texas Court or Texas governor). Additional Atkins claims
are pending at various stages of the collateral review procedure. See, e.g., Ex parte
Cathey, No. WR-55,161-02, 2008 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 850 (Tex. Crim. App.
Nov. 18, 2008) (per curiam); Ex parte Lim, No. WR-56,297-01, 2008 Tex. Crim. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 407 (Tex. Crim. App. June 4, 2008) (per curiam); Ex parte Martinez, No.
WR-58,358-02, 2008 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 185 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 12, 2008)
(per curiam). While pending, other Atkins claims have been resolved on other grounds.
See, e.g., Ex parte Dixon, No. WR-56,822-01, 2005 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 281
(Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 2005) (per curiam) (dismissing the offender's remanded Atkins
claim as moot due to the Texas Governor's commutation of his death sentence because he
was seventeen at the time of the crime).
198. See infra Table 1 (describing the resolution of Atkins claims by the Texas Court
and Texas Governor).
199. See id. (describing the resolution of Atkins claims by the Fifth Circuit and Texas
federal trial courts).
200. See Hernandez v. Thaler, 398 F. App'x 81, 89-90 (5th Cir. 2010); Green v.
Quarterman, No. H-07-827, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11457 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2009);
Amador v. Dretke, No. SA-02-CA-230-XR, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6072, at *102-09
(W.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2005), affd on other grounds, 458 F.3d 397 (5th Cir. 2006); see also
infra Table 1.
201. Cf. Blume et al., supra note 26, at 637 (identifying forty-six Texas Atkins claims
versus twenty-six in the next highest state and representing twenty percent of the national
total, as of May 2008).
202. These fourteen offenders include ten whose mental retardation was determined
by the Texas Court, two whose mental retardation led to death penalty commutations by
the Texas Governor, and two whose mental retardation was determined by the Fifth
Circuit. See infra Table 1.
203. These fourteen cases represent approximately seventeen percent of the eighty-
one Atkins collateral review claims resolved thus far. Conversely, twenty-five of these
Atkins claimants (thirty-one percent) have been executed as of January 1, 2011. See
Searchable Execution Database, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions (last visited Jan. 1, 2011); infra Table 1.
other capital punishment states addressing a significant volume of
Atkins claims.20 4
The success or failure of these Atkins collateral review claims is,
of course, a product of both the nature and strength of the mental
retardation claim made and the standards by which it is assessed. In
addition to the state and federal procedural rules governing collateral
review claims generally,20s the Texas Court and Fifth Circuit have
adopted specific standards and procedures regarding Atkins claims
raised on collateral review.206 The following sections examine these
standards and procedures and their application to Atkins claims in
illustrative collateral review cases.207
B. The Texas Collateral Review Process
In 1995, the Texas Legislature added death penalty-specific
collateral review procedures to the state's habeas corpus provisions.208
These provisions place certain restrictions on the initial and
subsequent filing of these habeas corpus applications. Time limits,
relatively close in time to the entry of judgment in the underlying
capital case, restrict the filing of initial habeas corpus applications.2
Unless the Texas Court permits an untimely initial habeas corpus
filing for good cause shown, all claims available to an offender as of
the final expiration date for a timely filing are waived.210
204. Based on research reflecting the number of successful Atkins claims in various
capital punishment states, as of May 2008, state "success" rates in states that had resolved
at least ten claims ranged from twelve to eighty percent, and the national average success
rate was thirty-eight percent. See Blume et al., supra note 26, at 628-29, 637; John Blume,
Sentence Reversals in Intellectual Disability Cases, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION
CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/sentence-reversals-intellectual-disability-cases
(last updated May 8, 2008). Although the Texas success rate was twenty-six percent at the
time of this research, this was based on the successful resolution of twelve of only forty-six
resolved cases at that time. See id.
205. See infra notes 208-16, 281-94 and accompanying text.
206. See infra notes 217-80, 295-350 and accompanying text.
207. See also infra Table 1 (describing the resolution of Texas collateral review cases).
208. These provisions are codified as TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071 (West
Supp. 2010). When reference is made in this Article to the state collateral review
provisions, the reference refers to these death penalty-specific provisions.
209. Initial applications for habeas corpus writs must be filed in the convicting trial
court within 180 days after the appointment of counsel following the entry of judgment in
the underlying capital case or within forty-five days after the state's original brief is filed
on direct appeal, whichever is later. One ninety-day extension of the filing date is
permitted for good cause shown. See id.
210. See id.
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There are no filing deadlines for subsequent writ applications.
However, subsequent applications may not be considered or serve as
the basis for a grant of relief unless a subsequent application contains
"sufficient specific facts" establishing specified statutory factors.21 1
These factors include an allegation that a claim has not been and
could not have been pursued in a previous initial or subsequent writ
because the factual or legal basis of the claim was not available at the
time of a previous application. The unavailability of a legal basis for a
claim can be established if it was not recognized by or could not have
been reasonably discerned from a decision by the Court or federal or
state appellate courts. A claim is factually unavailable if it was not
"ascertainable through the exercise of reasonable diligence" at the
time of the prior filing.212 A second statutory basis for a subsequent
writ is that, by clear and convincing evidence, no rational juror would
have answered one of the capital sentencing issues adversely to the
offender "but for" a violation of the federal Constitution.213 Although
subsequent applications are first filed with the convicting trial court,
they are transmitted to the Texas Court for a determination as to
whether one of the requisite factors permitting their filing has been
satisfied. If the Texas Court does not find that such a factor has been
satisfied, it dismisses the application as an "abuse of the writ." 214
In the case of an initial application or a subsequent application
permitted by the Texas Court, the convicting trial court preliminarily
determines whether material "controverted, previously unresolved
factual issues" exist. In the absence of such factual issues, the
convicting trial court can resolve the writ without an evidentiary
hearing. If such factual matters exist, the convicting trial court
identifies them and determines the manner of their resolution,
including through affidavits, depositions, interrogatories, evidentiary
hearings, and personal recollection. 215 Following the conclusion of the
proceedings in the convicting trial court, the Texas Court reviews the
writ record, including the trial court's factual findings and legal
216
conclusions, and takes final action on the writ application.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See id. The third factor involves a constitutional violation raising doubt about the
guilt finding. See id.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See id. The Texas Court may request additional briefing and permit oral
argument as part of its review. See id.
C. Texas Court Collateral Review Standards for Atkins Claims
In the absence of legislative guidance regarding procedures to
implement Atkins' constitutional ban on the execution of mentally
retarded offenders, the Texas Court ultimately was required to
develop interim procedures to address the growing number of Atkins
claims it was receiving through the collateral review process.217 The
Texas Court first defined its eligibility screening role regarding Atkins
claims raised through the subsequent writ application process.218
Then, approximately a year and a half after Atkins, the Texas Court
articulated its interim substantive procedures for Atkins claims in Ex
parte Briseno,219 a subsequent writ case, and applied them soon
thereafter in Ex parte Simpson,220 an original habeas corpus
proceeding.
The Texas Court began remanding to the convicting trial courts
subsequent writ applications raising Atkins claims soon after the
Atkins decision was announced on June 20, 2002.221 Atkins claims
generally appeared to satisfy one of the eligibility criteria for
subsequent writ applications, i.e., the legal basis for the claim
invoking the ban on executing the mentally retarded was not
available prior to the Atkins ruling and thus could not have been
*222meaningfully raised in a prior writ application. However, a majority
of the Texas Court determined that its eligibility screening role also
included an assessment whether a subsequent writ applicant had
alleged "sufficient specific facts" that would support the applicant's
Atkins claim, as required by the writ statute. 223  The Texas Court
equated this factual requirement to the presentation of a prima facie
217. See infra notes 227-46 and accompanying text.
218. See infra notes 222-25 and accompanying text.
219. Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
220. Ex parte Simpson, 136 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
221. See Ex parte Williams, No. 43907-02, 2003 WL 1787634, at *6 (Tex. Crim. App.
Feb. 26, 2003) (Price, J., joined by Johnson and Holcomb, JJ., dissenting) (identifying
several Atkins subsequent writ applications that had been remanded).
222. See id. at *1 (Cochran, J., joined by Meyers, J., concurring in application
dismissal); id. at *3 (Price, J., joined by Johnson and Holcomb, JJ., dissenting). See
generally TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071 (West Supp. 2010).
223. Compare Williams, 2003 WL 1787634, at *1 (Cochran, J., joined by Meyers, J.,
concurring in application dismissal) (quoting TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071
(West Supp. 2010)), with id. at *4-6 (Price, J., joined by Johnson and Holcomb, JJ.,
dissenting) (stating that the writ statute only permits the Texas Court to conduct the legal
basis eligibility screening and that all factual determinations should be made by the
convicting trial court on remand).
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showing of mental retardation. 24  Thus, even if a subsequent writ
applicant established the legal basis for his Atkins claim, his failure to
meet this "threshold factual burden" resulted in a dismissal of his
application as an abuse of the writ.225 Pursuant to this legal and
factual eligibility screening process, the Texas Court had remanded
thirty-five subsequent writ applications in which applicants had made
a prima facie showing of mental retardation when it announced its
Atkins procedures in Briseno in February 2004."'
In prescribing its interim Atkins procedures in Briseno,22 7 the
Texas Court first defined mental retardation for purposes of the
constitutional ban. For guidance, the Texas Court noted that the
Texas Legislature had used the clinical definition of mental
retardation contained in the state mental retardation law in the pre-
Atkins execution ban legislation it passed in 2001 and the Governor
subsequently vetoed.2" The Texas Court also noted that it had itself
used this definition and the AAMR definition in defining mental
224. See id. at *2 (Cochran, J., joined by Meyers, J., concurring in application
dismissal). These concurring Judges cited the AAMR and APA mental retardation
definitions quoted by the Court in Atkins and stated that these mental retardation criteria
provided "appropriate guidance" in the absence of legislative direction. Id. at *3 n.6
(quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2002)). To establish a prima facie case,
these concurring Judges stated that an applicant, "at a bare minimum," should supply
evidence of at least one IQ test, preferably taken before age eighteen, supporting a mental
retardation claim. A "better" showing would include several IQ test results, supporting
school and medical records, and appropriate evidence from expert or lay witnesses raising
an issue regarding the applicant's adaptive skill deficits and onset before age eighteen. Id.
at *2. In a subsequent pre-Briseno per curiam opinion, the Texas Court adopted and
combined these elements of a prima facie showing of mental retardation, requiring at least
one IQ test supporting a mental retardation claim and preferably taken before age
eighteen (or equivalent supporting evidence of limited intellectual functioning) "coupled
with" the above-described evidence raising an issue regarding the applicant's adaptive skill
deficits and onset before age eighteen. Ex parte Rivera, No. 27065-02, 2003 WL 21752841,
at *2 (Tex. Crim. App. July 25, 2003) (per curiam); accord Ex parte Williams, No. 50,662-
02 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 8, 2003) (per curiam).
225. See Williams, 2003 WL 1787634, at *2, *3 (Cochran, J., joined by Meyers, J.,
concurring in application dismissal).
226. Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 5 n.7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); see id. at 1 (stating
that the applicant had made a prima facie showing of mental retardation resulting in a
remand of his subsequent writ application).
227. Although the Texas Court expressed reluctance to establish Atkins standards
rather than await legislative action, it stated that the volume of pending collateral review
cases with Atkins claims required the establishment of "temporary" judicial standards for
the disposition of these collateral review claims. Id. at 4-5.
228. See id. at 6. The Texas Court also noted the use of a similar definition in ban
legislation proposed in the 2003 legislative session. See id. at 6-7 & n.22. See generally
supra notes 122, 177 (containing these definitions).
retardation in capital cases.2 29 The Texas Court determined that, until
the Texas Legislature provided an alternative statutory definition, it
would follow the three-part definition of the AAMR230 or the Texas
mental retardation law231 in addressing Atkins claims in the collateral
review context. These definitions required an individual's
significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning with
accompanying adaptive functioning deficits and developmental
period onset.232
With regard to the intellectual functioning component of the
standard, the Texas Court referred to definitions that defined this as
an IQ of approximately seventy or below or approximately two
standard deviations below the mean. The Texas Court, however, also
recognized some flexibility in assessments of mental retardation
based on IQ test scores, as well as differences in the content and
accuracy of various IQ tests.233 Regarding the third prong of the
mental retardation definition, the Texas Court stated that the AAMR
definition characterized the developmental period onset as occurring
before age eighteen.234
In terms of the adaptive functioning component, the Texas Court
referenced a pre-Atkins AAMR definition that referred to significant
limitations in meeting "maturation, learning, personal independence,
and/or social responsibility" standards expected of the person's age
level and cultural group, as clinically assessed 35 The Texas Court
229. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 7; see Ex parte Tennard, 960 S.W.2d 57, 60-61 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1997) (plurality opinion); id. at 63-67 (Meyers, J., joined by Price, J., concurring in
judgment) (adopting a definition of mental retardation for the review of Penry claims).
The Texas Court also noted that the parties and trial court in the instant collateral review
proceedings had used the AAMR definition of mental retardation. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at
8.
230. The Texas Court referenced elements of the definition contained in the AAMR's
1983 and 1992 manuals: "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning"
accompanied by "related limitations in adaptive functioning" with an onset prior to age
eighteen. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 7; see AM. ASs'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra
note 5, at 22-23 (describing the mental retardation definitions in these and the 2002
manuals).
231. The referenced three-part definition in the Texas mental retardation law is
"significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning that is concurrent with deficits in
adaptive behavior and originates during the developmental period." Briseno, 135 S.W.3d
at 6 (quoting TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 591.003 (13) (West 2010)).
232. See id. at 6-8.
233. See id. at 7 n.24.
234. See id. at 7.
235. See id. at 7 n.25 (indicating that the clinical assessment usually included
standardized scales); AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 5, at 22
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also referred to the state mental retardation law's definition of the
adaptive behavior element regarding the degree to which one meets
the "personal independence and social responsibility" standards
expected of the person's age and cultural group. 236 Noting that the
adaptive behavior criteria are "exceedingly subjective," the Texas
Court identified some additional evidentiary factors that Atkins fact-
finders "might also focus upon in weighing evidence as indicative of
mental retardation or of a personality disorder": 237
Did those who knew the person best during the developmental
stage-his family, friends, teachers, employers, authorities-
think he was mentally retarded at that time, and if so, act in
accordance with that determination?
Has the person formulated plans and carried them through or is
his conduct impulsive?
Does his conduct show leadership or does it show that he is led
around by others?
Is his conduct in response to external stimuli rational and
appropriate, regardless of whether it is socially acceptable?
Does he respond coherently, rationally, and on point to oral or
written questions or do his responses wander from subject to
subject?
Can the person hide facts or lie effectively in his own or others'
interests?
(reflecting that this definition was last used in the AAMR's 1983 manual and was
subsequently changed to the adaptive skill area deficit criteria in the AAMR's 1992
manual); cf. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2002) (providing the AAMR and
APA mental retardation definitions that identified ten specific adaptive skill areas, such as
communication, self-care, and functional academics, and required limitations in at least
two of these skill areas for a finding of mental retardation); supra note 162 and
accompanying text (providing these definitions).
236. See Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 7 n.25.
237. Id. at 8.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 39:1
Putting aside any heinousness or gruesomeness surrounding the
capital offense, did the commission of that offense require
forethought, planning, and complex execution of purpose?23
Thus, while generally adopting recognized clinical definitions of
mental retardation for Atkins purposes,239 the Texas Court added a
unique component to its definition through these "Briseno factors."240
The Texas Court also resolved a variety of procedural and
evidentiary matters concerning the collateral review of Atkins claims
in Briseno.24 It assigned the defendant the burden to prove his
mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence.2 42 Based on
the existing statutory framework for collateral review proceedings,
the Texas Court determined that there was no mechanism for and no
243
requirement of a jury resolution of the mental retardation issue.
The Texas Court characterized the determination of mental
retardation for Atkins purposes as an issue for the fact-finder in
collateral review proceedings, based on the evidence and credibility
determinations. Accordingly, the judge of the convicting trial court
would determine the factual merit of an Atkins claim.2" As under the
existing collateral review procedures, the convicting trial court could
require affidavits, interrogatories, and evidentiary hearings, and use
personal recollection in resolving any controverted, previously
238. Id. at 8-9; accord Ex parte Modden, 147 S.W.3d 293, 296 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App.
2004).
239. See Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 5-6, 8 (identifying potential questions about the
adoption of this definition crafted for a clinical and social services context, but reserving
any subsequent alteration of the definition for legislative action).
240. See infra notes 805-88 and accompanying text (discussing the Briseno factors).
241. See Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 4-13.
242. Id. at 12 (noting the use of this burden and standard of proof in Atkins-related
proposed legislation in Texas and in other state procedures, the traditional offender
burden of proof in collateral review proceedings, and its use regarding Texas's statutory
affirmative defenses); see Escamilla v. State, 143 S.W.3d 814, 827-28 (Tex. Crim. App.
2004) (finding that the State does not have to affirmatively prove that a capital defendant
is not mentally retarded).
243. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 9-11 (rejecting the contention that a jury resolution of a
post-conviction Atkins claim was required under the Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona,
536 U.S. 584 (2002)); see Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (concluding that Ring
is not retroactive). Contra Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 18-22 (Holcomb, J., dissenting) (finding
that a jury resolution of an Atkins claim is required).
244. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 9, 11. The Texas Court noted that experts could offer
"insightful opinions" regarding the satisfaction of the diagnostic criteria for mental
retardation, but the ultimate determination of mental retardation for Atkins purposes was
for the fact-finder. Id. at 9. The Texas Court also noted that mental retardation diagnoses
could vary depending on the experts' academic backgrounds and approach. Id. at 13.
44
Fall 2011] TEXAS'S POST-ATKINS CLAIMS OF MENTAL RETARDATION 45
unresolved factual issues.245 As with other collateral review
applications, the Texas Court would review the convicting trial court's
Atkins-related findings of fact and conclusions of law, with almost
total deference given to the convicting trial court's factual findings if
supported by the record, especially those reflecting assessments of
credibility and demeanor, and would make a final determination
whether to grant or deny collateral relief on any Atkins claim. 46
The Texas Court applied the Briseno procedures for the review
of subsequent writ applications regarding Atkins claims to original
habeas corpus applications raising this claim in Ex parte Simpson.247
In this case, the Texas Court reiterated the key role of the convicting
trial court in resolving Atkins claims, including collecting evidence,
deciding the necessity of live testimony, resolving disputed facts and
applying the law to those facts, entering factual findings and legal
conclusions, and recommending the grant or denial of collateral
relief. Reflecting this primary fact-finding role of the convicting trial
court, the Texas Court generally declined to consider any evidentiary
materials not previously submitted to the convicting trial court,
absent compelling and extraordinary circumstances.2 48  The Texas
Court applied an abuse of discretion standard to its review of the
factual findings of the convicting trial court regarding mental
retardation.24 9
The Texas Court subsequently authorized another collateral
review opportunity for capital offenders who fail to raise an Atkins
claim in their first post-Atkins subsequent writ applications in Ex
parte Blue. As applied in Briseno,25 1 most Texas Atkins collateral
review claims have been raised under the statutory provision that
permits subsequent writ applications when the legal basis of the claim
was not available at the time an applicant's original writ application
was filed.252 However, the Texas collateral review statute also permits
245. See id. at 11 n.41 (describing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071 (West
Supp. 2010)).
246. See id. at 4, 11, 12-13, 18.
247. Ex parte Simpson, 136 S.W.3d 660, 666 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (noting that the
convicting trial court had followed the procedure and legal standards established in
Briseno in resolving this pre-Briseno original writ application).
248. See id. at 667-69.
249. See id. at 667.
250. Ex parte Blue, 230 S.W.3d 151 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
251. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 1.
252. See id. at 3 (noting the subsequent writ application's filing after Atkins). See
generally TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071 § 5(a)(1) (West Supp. 2010).
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subsequent writ applications when an applicant can establish, by clear
and convincing evidence, that no rational juror would have answered
one or more of the capital sentencing issues adversely to the applicant
"but for" a federal constitutional violation.253  The Texas Court
construed this provision to incorporate concepts of "fundamental
miscarriage of justice" and, more specifically here, "actual innocence
of the death penalty" established in federal habeas corpus
jurisprudence at the time the Texas Legislature enacted the
provision.254 This provision would address constitutional errors
affecting eligibility for a death sentence under state statutory law, as
well as "absolute" constitutional prohibitions against execution, such
as Atkins established.255
Despite the absolute nature of the Atkins execution prohibition,
however, the Texas Court held that the Texas Legislature could
require a higher evidentiary showing of mental retardation for
offenders who failed to raise their Atkins claim in their initial post-
Atkins writ application. 25 6  Thus, in order to proceed with a
subsequent writ application of this nature, an applicant must present
to the Texas Court a "threshold showing of evidence that would be at
least sufficient to support an ultimate conclusion, by clear and
convincing evidence, that no rational factfinder would fail to find
253. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071 § 5(a)(3) (West Supp. 2010).
254. See Blue, 230 S.W.3d at 154-61. The Texas Courtcourt referred to several Court
decisions that applied these concepts in the context of federal successive or abusive writ
petitions. See id. at 157-59 (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995); Sawyer v. Whitley,
505 U.S. 333 (1992); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986)). The Court construed the
"actual innocence of the death penalty" form of "fundamental miscarriage of justice" to
require a showing "by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error at his
sentencing hearing, no reasonable juror would have found [the petitioner] eligible for the
death penalty under [applicable] law." Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 348-50; see Blue, 230 S.W.3d at
158 n.30. This Court habeas corpus jurisprudence developed prior to Congress'
modification of the federal habeas corpus laws in 1996. See generally 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2241-
2255, 2261-2266 (West 2006 & Supp. 2010) (containing amendments to the federal habeas
corpus provisions made by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act).
255. The Texas Court construed the statutory language regarding constitutional errors
that would render an applicant ineligible for a death sentence pursuant to one or more of
the statutory sentencing issues to include factors that would render an applicant
constitutionally ineligible for a death sentence (and hence even the submission of the
sentencing issues), such as mental retardation or juvenile status. See Blue, 230 S.W.3d at
159-62.
256. The Texas Court rejected the argument that the absolute nature of the Atkins ban
on execution exempts Atkins claims from regulation through the collateral review process
established by the Texas Legislature, including its standards for subsequent writ
applications. See id. at 154-59 (citing its own and Court precedent).
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mental retardation." 257  To prevail on the merits, proof establishing
mental retardation by clear and convincing evidence would actually
have to be presented in the collateral review proceedings.258 The
Texas Court subsequently interpreted this collateral review provision
to be available not only to capital offenders who fail to raise an
Atkins claim in their initial post-Atkins writ applications, but also to
applicants who present sufficient additional evidence of mental
retardation following an initial denial of an Atkins claim to satisfy the
clear and convincing evidence standards.259
In other cases, the Texas Court has continued to flesh out the
substantive and procedural guidelines it established in Briseno for the
collateral review of Atkins claims. The Texas Court has continued to
use the three-part clinical definition of mental retardation, embodied
in the AAMR and state mental retardation law definitions, plus the
additional Briseno factors.2 6 With regard to the "significantly
subaverage intellectual functioning" component, the Texas Court
continues to define this as an IQ of approximately seventy or below,
as determined by standardized IQ tests, and has recognized an
assessment measurement error of approximately five points that
could vary based on the IQ testing instrument. 26' Although the Texas
Court has permitted clinical assessment evidence to explain why a full
scale IQ score is within this measurement error zone, it recently
refused to permit clinical assessment to be used as a replacement for
262full scale IQ scores in determining intellectual functioning. The
257. Id. at 163. The Texas Court found that the offender here failed to satisfy this
threshold evidentiary showing and dismissed his application as an abuse of the writ. See
id. at 167-68.
258. Id. at 163.
259. See Ex parte Woods, 296 S.W.3d 587, 605-06 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (recognizing
the potential to pursue such a subsequent writ application, but dismissing the instant
application). But see Ex parte Taylor, Nos. WR-48,498-02, WR-48,498-04 (Tex. Crim.
App. Nov 6, 2008) (per curiam) (finding that Taylor was not in the "same procedural
posture" as Woods in his attempt to raise an Atkins claim in a subsequent writ application
after its rejection in a previous subsequent writ application and declining to reconsider the
prior denial of his Atkins claim).
260. See, e.g., Woods, 296 S.W.3d at 589-90; Blue, 230 S.W.3d at 163.
261. Ex parte Hearn, 310 S.W.3d 424, 427-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing AAMR,
APA, and state mental retardation law definitions). The Texas Court has interpreted "the
'about 70' language of the AAMR's definition of mental retardation to represent a rough
ceiling, above which a finding of mental retardation in the capital context is precluded."
Id. at 430 (citing several of its Atkins cases).
262. See id. at 429-31 (rejecting the offender's attempts to establish this element of the
definition based on neuropsychological deficits and a fetal alcohol syndrome diagnosis
despite full scale IQ scores between eighty-seven and ninety-three).
Texas Court has not endorsed the scientific validity of the "Flynn
effect," which theorizes that the "norms" of the IQ testing
instruments have not adequately addressed the general rise in IQ
scores over time and thus an offender's IQ score may be erroneously
inflated based on when in the testing instrument cycle his test was
administered.263
The Texas Court has continued to explore the contours of the
adaptive behavior component of the mental retardation definition.2 6
In describing this element in a recent case, the Texas Court selected
several characteristics from the clinical definitions.265 It identified the
required showing as one of "significant limitations in adaptive
functioning" as reflected in conceptual, social, and practical skill
areas, referencing the AAMR's current consolidated adaptive skill
area categories. "Significant" limitations are demonstrated by
standardized test scores at least two standard deviations below the
mean in one of the three skill areas or an overall score on all three
areas, as prescribed by the AAMR.26 The Texas Court has stated
that although adaptive functioning standardized test scores are not
263. See Blue, 230 S.W.3d at 166 (referring to the Flynn effect as an "unexamined
scientific concept" and declining to address its scientific validity). However, in late 2008,
the Texas Court remanded an Atkins subsequent writ claim with directions to the trial
court to receive and evaluate evidence concerning the "scientific validity and reliability" of
the Flynn effect, its use by clinical practitioners in diagnosing mental retardation outside
the Atkins context, its general acceptance in the professional community, and its known or
potential "error rate." Ex parte Cathey, No. WR-55,161-02, 2008 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 850, at *2-3 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 18, 2008) (per curiam). But see Ex parte
Johnson, No. WR-56,947-02, 2009 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 666, at *2-3 (Tex.
Crim. App. Apr. 29, 2009) (Price, J., joined by Womack and Holcomb, JJ., dissenting to
the application dismissal) (criticizing the Texas Court's failure to find prima facie evidence
of mental retardation based on the offender's assertion of the Flynn effect despite its
previous remand to examine the Flynn effect in Cathey). See Bethany Young et al., Four
Practical and Conceptual Assessment Issues That Evaluators Should Address in Capital
Case Mental Retardation Evaluations, 38 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC., no. 2, 2007 at
169, 175-76 (describing survey of Texas psychologists and psychiatrists who had evaluated
mental retardation in a capital case, regarding their knowledge and use of the Flynn
effect). See generally Stephen J. Ceci et al., The Difficulty of Basing Death Penalty
Eligibility on IQ Cutoff Scores for Mental Retardation, 13 ETHICS & BEHAV., no. 1, 2003 at
11; James R. Flynn, Tethering the Elephant: Capital Cases, IQ, and the Flynn Effect, 12
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L., no. 2, 2006 at 170 (describing the Flynn effect).
264. See AAIDD, supra note 5, at 43-55.
265. See Hearn, 310 S.W.3d at 427-29 (referencing the AAMR, APA, and state mental
retardation definitions).
266. Id. at 428 (referencing aspects of the AAMR and APA definitions); see AAIDD,
supra note 5, at 8, 10, 43, 44, 47. Each of these three skill areas includes specific skills such
as self-direction, occupational skills, interpersonal relationships, reading and writing, and
avoiding victimization. Hearn, 310 S.W.3d at 428 n.9; see AAIDD, supra note 5, at 44.
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the "sole measure" of adaptive functioning, they may be "helpful to
the factfinder" in determining mental retardation for Atkins
purposes.267 Indeed, a wide range of conflicting expert and lay
evidence has been presented regarding the adaptive behavior
component in Atkins claims.268 Finally, the Texas Court has required
a linkage between the intellectual and adaptive functioning elements,
i.e., "the adaptive limitations must be related to a deficit in
intellectual functioning and not a personality disorder." 269 In order to
"help distinguish the two," the Texas Court provided the Briseno
factors for possible use by Atkins fact-finders. 270 The Texas Court has
generally upheld convicting trial courts' use of the Briseno factors,
including when their application has been contrary to adaptive
functioning assessment test results.271
In addition to addressing definitional matters, the Texas Court
has also addressed some procedural matters as it has considered post-
Briseno Atkins collateral review claims. In fact, on the same day that
Briseno was announced, the Texas Court responded to Atkins
collateral review litigation by revising a long-standing "two forum"
rule that it had created to prevent collateral review litigants from
pursuing a claim in state court while a parallel claim was pending in
federal court, even if the federal proceedings were stayed for the
pursuit of the state claim.272 This rule had been impeding Atkins
subsequent writ claimants from exhausting their claims in state court
while complying with the strict time limits for filing an Atkins claim in
267. Hearn, 310 S.W.3d at 428 & n.10 (identifying several adaptive functioning
assessment instruments).
268. See, e.g., Ex parte Woods, 296 S.W.3d 587, 598-600 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Ex
parte Van Alstyne, 239 S.W.3d 815, 818-23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
269. Hearn, 310 S.W.3d at 428.
270. Id. at 428-29 (referencing Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8-9 (Tex. Crim. App.
2004)); see supra note 238 and accompanying text (stating the Briseno factors).
271. See, e.g., Matamoros v. Thaler, Civ. Action H-07-2613, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
35425, at *31-32 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2010) (describing state court application of Briseno
factors and other evidence rather than assessment scores regarding adaptive functioning);
Ex parte Chester, No. AP-75,037, 2007 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1852, at *10.27 (Tex.
Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2007) (finding no error in trial court's conclusion that the offender
failed to establish adaptive functioning deficits based on its application of the Briseno
factors despite an adaptive functioning assessment reflecting such deficits). But see infra
notes 826-88 and accompanying text (describing criticism of the Briseno factors).
272. See Ex parte Soffar, 143 S.W.3d 804 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (per curiam); cf Ex
parte Powers, 487 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (establishing the "two forum" rule).
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federal courts.2 73 The Texas Court modified the "two forum" rule to
permit state court consideration of a subsequent writ claim as long as
the federal court stays all proceedings involving any parallel writ
while the offender exhausts his state remedies regarding the claim.274
The Texas Court has also addressed issues related to the nature
of the Atkins proceedings. The collateral review statute does not
absolutely require an evidentiary hearing to resolve factual issues.
Although the Texas Court has stated that it is "advisable" for the trial
court to hold an evidentiary hearing if mental retardation claims are
raised for the first time in post-Atkins collateral review proceedings,276
it has declined to make an evidentiary hearing on Atkins claims an
absolute requirement.277 On occasion, however, the Texas Court has
"re-remanded" an Atkins claim for an evidentiary hearing, when it
deemed such was necessary to the resolution of the claim.78 In
addition, the Texas Court has made clear that the presentation of
evidence of mental retardation regarding the mitigating evidence
273. Soffar, 143 S.W.3d at 806-07 (noting the one-year limitations period for filing
federal petitions under the federal habeas corpus provisions, as revised in 1996, as well as
the federal exhaustion requirement).
274. Id. at 804, 807; see id. at 805-07 (noting that some of the comity and repetitious
collateral review considerations underlying the original "two forum" rule had been
legislatively addressed at the state and federal levels).
275. See supra note 215 and accompanying text (describing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 11.071 (West Supp. 2010)).
276. See Ex parte Simpson, 136 S.W.3d 660, 662-63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
277. Compare Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (involving a
five-day evidentiary hearing regarding the applicant's Atkins claim), with Simpson, 136
S.W.3d at 662-63 (approving the trial court's resolution of the mental retardation issue
here based on the trial record and the voluminous writ materials submitted in a case where
the offender primarily relied on trial testimony and attorneys were consulted), and Hall v.
State, 160 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (noting that the Atkins habeas corpus
proceeding in the case was conducted via affidavits); cf id. at 40-41 (Price, J., joined by
Cochran, J., concurring) (observing that an evidentiary hearing is the "best course" to
resolve a contested post-conviction Atkins claims); id. at 41-44 (Johnson, J., joined by
Holcomb, J., dissenting) (criticizing the reliance on affidavit evidence and punishment
hearing testimony regarding the mental retardation finding); Ex parte Modden, 147
S.W.3d 293, 300-01 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (Hervey, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
convicting trial court's entry of agreed factual findings rather than conducting an
evidentiary hearing); Ex parte Hines, No. WR-40,347-02 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 23, 2005)
(per curiam) (noting that a "live hearing" is the "better practice" in cases like this, but
finding the trial court's findings and conclusions supported by "extensive" affidavit and
trial record evidence).
278. See, e.g., Ex parte Hernandez, No. WR-63,282-01 (Tex. Crim. App. May 3, 2006)
(per curiam) (finding that the parties heavily relied on affidavit evidence); Ex parte
Taylor, No. WR-48,498-02, 2005 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 265, at *1-2 (Tex. Crim.
App. Mar. 23, 2005) (per curiam).
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sentencing issue and any adverse finding on this issue do not
constitute a prior litigation of the issue for Atkins purposes.279 Finally,
although expressing sympathy for offenders who raise their Atkins
claims through subsequent writ applications, the Texas Court has
stated that the collateral review statute does not provide for the
appointment of counsel or investigative or expert assistance for
subsequent writs in capital cases, as it does regarding initial writ
applications-and only the Texas Legislature can remedy this
*280
situation.
D. The Federal Collateral Review Process Regarding State Court
Claims
State offenders' pursuit of Atkins collateral relief in federal court
is subject to all of the procedural and substantive restrictions
concerning federal collateral review established in the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA").81 Absent
tolling during the pendency of state post-conviction proceedings or
equitable tolling, state offenders must file their federal habeas corpus
279. See Modden, 147 S.W.3d at 298.
280. See Ex parte Blue, 230 S.W.3d at 166-67 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In 2009, the
Texas Legislature established an office of capital writs designed to be the primary group to
represent offenders in their initial writ proceedings in capital cases instead of the prior
system of appointment of individual attorneys. This legislation, however, did not change
prior law regarding the appointment of counsel in subsequent writ cases. See TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071 (West Supp. 2010); TEXAS LEGISLATURE ONLINE,
http://www.capitol.state. tx.us/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2010) (describing action on S. 1091,
81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009)). But cf infra note 945 (describing legislation, enacted in
the 2011 legislative session, providing appointed counsel regarding eligible subsequent
writ applications filed on or after January 1, 2012).
281. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1217, 1218, 1220 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2244,
2254 (West 2006)) (containing the primary operational provisions for state offenders). See
generally 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2241-2255 (West 2006 & Supp. 2010) (containing amendments to
the federal habeas corpus provisions made by this legislation). This legislation also
included specific provisions regarding federal collateral review of claims by state offenders
subject to capital sentences. These provisions generally have not yet been applied to
Texas capital offenders with Atkins claims due to their specified requirements for the
provision of counsel during the state collateral proceedings. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2261-2266
(West 2006); Office of the Attorney General; Certification Process for State Capital
Counsel Systems; Removal of Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 71,353 (Nov. 23, 2010) (to be
codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 26). This legislation also amended certain provisions specifically
regarding federal offenders seeking federal collateral review of their claims. See, e.g., 28
U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2010). As of the writing of this Article, only one Texas
federal offender has pursued federal collateral review of his Atkins claim. In re Webster,
605 F.3d 256 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Webster v. United States, No. 10-50, 2010
U.S. LEXIS 9507 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2010); United States v. Webster, 421 F.3d 308 (5th Cir.
2005). Discussion of the collateral review standards for federal offenders and their
application to Atkins claims is beyond the scope of this Article.
applications within one year from the latest of the date the challenged
state court judgment became final on direct review, any unlawful state
impediment to filing was removed, the Court recognized and made
retroactive the right asserted, or the factual predicate for the claim
could have been discovered through due diligence&2  Equitable
tolling of the limitations period requires the applicant's showing that
he has been "diligently" pursuing his rights and "some extraordinary
circumstance stood in his way" and prevented the application's timely
filing.23
Federal courts cannot grant collateral relief to a state offender
unless he has first exhausted available state remedies or state
remedies are unavailable or ineffective.2 In addition, if the state
courts have resolved the offender's claim on an "independent" (of the
merits of the federal claim) and "adequate" state law procedural
ground, federal collateral relief is precluded." If a claim was
adjudicated on the merits in state court, a federal court cannot grant
collateral relief unless the state court decision was "contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law," as determined by the Court, or was based on an "unreasonable"
factual determination of the evidence presented in the state
proceedings.' State court factual determinations have a presumption
282. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244 (West 2006); see also Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549,
2560 (2010) (holding that the AEDPA's statute of limitations is subject to equitable
tolling, as had all of the federal courts of appeals).
283. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2562 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418
(2005)).
284. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 2006). Federal courts can deny collateral relief on
the merits even if a state court claim has not been exhausted. See id.
285. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262 (1989); Rocha v. Thaler, 626 F.3d 815, 820-
821 (5th Cir. 2010). If a state offender procedurally defaults his federal claim by a failure
to exhaust his state remedies or by its resolution on independent and adequate state
procedural grounds, the federal courts are prohibited from reviewing the merits of his
claim. See Magwood v. Patterson, 130 S. Ct. 2788, 2801-02 (2010); Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991). The Court has recognized exceptions to the procedural
default bar if the offender can establish "cause" for and "prejudice" from the default or a
fundamental miscarriage of justice by the failure to consider the claim, such as
establishment of the offender's actual innocence of the crime or the death penalty. See
Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 388 (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325-27 (1995);
Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 336 (1992); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96
(1986); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977). A claim asserting actual innocence of
the death penalty requires proof by clear and convincing evidence. Sawyer, 505 U.S. at
336.
286. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 2006); see also Wood v. Allen, 130 S. Ct. 841, 849
(2010); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007); Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141
(2005); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 660-61 (2004); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.
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of correctness unless the offender rebuts them by clear and
convincing evidence.2" The federal court will not hold an evidentiary
hearing if the offender has not developed a factual basis for his claim
in state proceedings unless 1) the claim is based on a previously
unavailable, retroactive Court rule of constitutional law or the claim's
factual predicate could not have reasonably been previously
discovered and 2) the facts underlying the claim establish by clear and
convincing evidence that "but for constitutional error" the offender
would not have been convicted on the underlying crime.m State
offenders challenging their death sentences in federal court are
entitled to counsel and also investigative and expert assistance, if
reasonably necessary."
Appeals from federal trial court resolution of collateral
proceedings are permitted only if the applicable appellate court
grants a certificate of appealability. To obtain such a certificate, the
applicant must make a "substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right."'2 On appeal, the court reviews the federal trial
court's factual findings with a clearly erroneous standard and its legal
conclusions with a de novo standard.291
If a state offender presents a previously presented claim in a
successive federal collateral review application, it will be dismissed.29
Successive habeas corpus applications presenting claims not
previously presented shall also be dismissed unless 1) the claim is
510, 520-21 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402-13 (2000) (interpreting these
provisions); cf. St. Aubin v. Quarterman, 470 F.3d 1096, 1100 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that
the federal court review should address the state court's ultimate decision rather than the
written opinion supporting it).
287. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 2006); see also Wood, 130 S. Ct. at 845, 848-49;
Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 473-74; Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338-39 (2006); Miller-El v.
Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005); Fields v. Thaler, 588 F.3d 270, 278-80 (5th Cir. 2009)
(interpreting this provision).
288. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 2006); see also Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 473-75; Pierce
v. Thaler, 355 F. App'x 784, 788 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Hall v. Quarterman, 534 F.3d
365, 367-69 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (interpreting this provision).
289. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3599 (West Pamp. 2010) (adding this provision in 2006 and
repealing a previous similar provision (21 U.S.C. § 848(q)); see also McFarland v. Scott,
512 U.S. 849 (1994); In re Hearn, 376 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 2004).
290. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253 (West 2006); see also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,
327, 335-38 (2003); Pierce v. Thaler, 355 F. App'x 784, 787 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)
(interpreting this provision).
291. See Moore v. Quarterman, 342 F. App'x 65, 67 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam);
Eldridge v. Quarterman, 325 F. App'x 322, 325 (5th Cir. 2009); St. Aubin, 470 F.3d at
1100-11.
292. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244 (West 2006).
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based on a previously unavailable, retroactive Court rule of
constitutional law or 2) the claim's factual predicate could not have
reasonably been previously discovered and the facts underlying the
claim establish by clear and convincing evidence that "but for
constitutional error" the offender would not have been convicted on
the underlying crime. 293 A state offender seeking to file a successive
federal collateral review application must make a prima facie
showing, to a three-judge panel of the applicable appellate court, that
his application satisfies these requirements. Even if the state offender
is granted filing authorization by the appellate court, the assigned
federal trial court also must determine if the filing requirements have
been satisfied.294
E. Fifth Circuit Collateral Review Standards for Atkins Claims by
Texas State Offenders
Pursuant to the AEDPA's deferential treatment of state court
proceedings,295 the Fifth Circuit has addressed a number of procedural
as well as substantive issues in its resolution of Atkins claims by Texas
state offenders.296 These issues include factors that preclude federal
court consideration of the merits of an offender's Atkins claim, such
as exhaustion and other procedural default, limitations, and
successive petition bars.2 " They also include matters relevant to the
resolution of Atkins claims on the merits, such as the opportunity to
further investigate and present additional evidence regarding Atkins
claims in federal court and to have an evidentiary hearing.298 Finally,
the Fifth Circuit and Texas federal trial courts have applied Texas
293. See id.
294. See id.; see also In re Thomas, 225 F. App'x 222, 225 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam);
In re Morris, 328 F.3d 739, 740-41 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (interpreting these
provisions).
295. See, e.g., Wood v. Allen, 130 S. Ct. 841, 849 (2010); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 402-13 (2000).
296. The Fifth Circuit opinions described in this Article include authored and per
curiam panel opinions, as well as published and unpublished opinions. Those opinions
appearing in the Federal Appendix have been designated by the panel as unpublished
opinions, with restricted precedential weight pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.3, 47.5.4; cf
supra note 190 (regarding Texas Court unpublished opinions). New Fifth Circuit opinions,
cited in electronic data bases pending reporter designation, include published and
unpublished opinions.
297. See infra notes 300-12 and accompanying text.
298. See infra notes 313-23 and accompanying text.
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Court standards regarding mental retardation as they have reviewed
dozens of Atkins claims by Texas offenders on the merits.299
The AEDPA clearly precludes the grant of federal habeas
corpus relief to a state offender unless he has first exhausted his
available, effective state remedies."o0 In a case the Court remanded to
the Fifth Circuit for reconsideration following Atkins, the appellate
court made clear that the exhaustion principles were especially
pertinent in the Atkins context:
[I]nferior federal courts have no useful role to play until and
unless following Atkins, a death sentence is reaffirmed or again
imposed on [the offender] by the state courts. Just how the
state courts will implement Atkins, we cannot say. Clearly,
however, the state must be given the first opportunity to apply
the Supreme Court's holding in order to insure consistency
among state institutions and procedures and to adjust its
prosecutorial strategy to the hitherto unforeseen new rule.301
The Fifth Circuit dismissed this offender's federal suit without
prejudice so that he could pursue his Atkins claim in state court.302
Although the principles of the exhaustion requirement appear clear,
their application to Texas offenders raising Atkins claims has been
somewhat more challenging.303 In dismissing a federal application on
299. See infra notes 324-50 and accompanying text.
300. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 2006). Of course, the federal court can deny an
unexhausted Atkins claim on the merits. See id.; Amador v. Dretke, No. SA-02-CA-230-
XR, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6072, at *102-09 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2005) (denying
unexhausted Atkins claim).
301. Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330, 332-33 (5th Cir. 2002).
302. See id. at 333; see also Smith v. Cockrell, 311 F.3d 661, 684-85 (5th Cir. 2002)
(declining to consider an unexhausted Atkins claim raised for the first time on appeal
before Texas has had an opportunity to determine its Atkins procedures).
303. See, e.g., Rivera v. Quarterman, 505 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2007) (affirming a finding
of mental retardation, but remanding for a determination of equitable tolling of the
limitations period); Chester v. Cockrell, 62 F. App'x 556 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam)
(vacating a trial court's grant of habeas corpus relief on an unexhausted Atkins claim). To
comply with the Texas Court's previous "two forum" rule that prevented pursuit of a state
collateral review claim while a federal claim was pending, federal courts typically
dismissed unexhausted Atkins federal claims without prejudice. This, however, sometimes
created limitations issues when exhausted Atkins claims were subsequently pursued in
federal court. Following the Texas Court's modification of the two forum rule in 2004,
federal courts are permitted to stay and abate their proceedings while an offender
exhausts his claim in state court. See Hearn v. Quarterman, No. 3:04-CV-0450-D, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61735, at *19-24 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2008) (staying and abating federal
proceeding for exhaustion purposes); see also Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 274-78
exhaustion grounds, a Texas federal trial court found that the absence
of an express statutory right to counsel or expert assistance to
develop an Atkins successive writ claim did not render the Texas
remedy automatically "ineffective" and thus exempt from the
exhaustion requirement.sc State offenders have sometimes
encountered exhaustion challenges when they have obtained
appointed counsel and investigative and expert services in their
federal collateral proceedings and have developed additional
evidence of mental retardation not presented in the state proceedings.
Some of these offenders have faced the risk of now having claims that
are deemed "fundamentally altered" and thus no longer exhausted
versus having exhausted claims in which the state evidence has simply
been permissibly "supplemented.""o5 Finally, in one case, the Fifth
Circuit en banc determined that an offender had established "cause"
and "prejudice" that would exempt him from any alleged failure to
exhaust his Atkins claim in state court. This offender's Atkins claim
had initially been filed and rejected as an abuse of the writ in state
court before the Texas Court's articulation of Atkins procedures and
had been substantially developed in federal collateral proceedings.30
Federal collateral relief is also precluded if an offender's claim
has been resolved on an "adequate" state procedural ground that is
"independent" of the merits of the federal claim.3 07  Because the
Texas Court's abuse of the writ review of Atkins subsequent writ
applications includes a determination of whether prima facie evidence
(2005) (discussing the rationale for stay and abatement actions); cf supra notes 272-74
and accompanying text (describing the two forum rule and its modification).
304. Bradford v. Cockrell, No. 3:00-CV-2709-P, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21898, at *4-15
(N.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2002, as adopted at 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 554 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 15,
2003) (acknowledging the offender's concerns about the lack of appointed counsel and
investigative services to develop an Atkins claim in the state courts, but dismissing the
claim without prejudice on exhaustion grounds with a possible subsequent federal review
to determine whether the state courts' resolution satisfied due process).
305. Compare Lewis v. Quarterman, 541 F.3d 280, 284-85 (5th Cir. 2008) (describing
the distinction between evidence that supplements rather than alters a claim and finding
that the affidavit in question supplemented an exhausted claim), and Morris v. Dretke, 413
F.3d 484, 490-99 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding additional evidence strengthened, but still
supplemented rather than altered the offender's claim presented in state court), with
Hearn, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61735, at *9-24 (staying and abating federal proceeding in
which evidence concerning mental retardation was developed so that it could first be
presented in state proceedings).
306. See Moore v. Quarterman, 533 F.3d 338 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (per curiam);
supra note 285 regarding the "cause and prejudice" exception to the procedural default
bar due to a failure to exhaust state remedies.
307. See Moore v. Quarterman, 454 F.3d 484, 489 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Emery v.
Johnson, 139 F.3d 191, 194-95 (5th Cir. 1998)).
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of mental retardation has been presented, the Fifth Circuit has held
that such abuse of the writ dismissals (for lack of such evidence) are
not purely procedural and are sufficiently merits-based to permit
308federal court review.
The AEDPA generally prescribes a one-year limitations period
for the filing of federal collateral review applications by state
offenders, triggered, as described above, by a variety of events in state
litigation.'0 The Fifth Circuit has held that Atkins claims are subject
to the AEDPA's limitations period.31 o Unless the limitations period
was tolled during the pendency of state collateral proceedings or
equitably tolled, pre-Atkins claims generally must have been filed in
federal court within one year of the Atkins decision recognizing this
new rule of constitutional law (i.e., by June 20, 2003)." In
determining whether the limitations period for filing an Atkins claim
has expired or has been equitably tolled, the Fifth Circuit and Texas
federal trial courts have considered factors including the offender's
diligence in pursuing his collateral remedies, his representation by
308. Although there was some initial disagreement in the Fifth Circuit regarding
whether these Atkins subsequent writ dismissals, pursuant to TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 11.071 § 5(a)(1) (West Supp. 2010), were procedural or merits-based for
procedural bar purposes, this issue has been definitively resolved in the Fifth Circuit. See
Rocha v. Thaler, 626 F.3d 815, 829-33 (5th Cir. 2010) (reviewing the evolution of the Fifth
Circuit's treatment of Texas Court abuse of the writ dismissals of Atkins claims pursuant
to art. 11.071 § 5(a)(1)). Because a Texas Court threshold evidentiary review is also
incorporated into the review of Atkins subsequent writ claims brought pursuant to TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071 § 5(a)(3) (West Supp. 2010), federal court review of
these claims should also be permissible. See Rocha, 626 F.3d at 826 (stating that an
examination of an Atkins claim's eligibility under this provision "substantially" overlaps
with a determination of the merits of the claim); Guevara v. Thaler, No. H-08-1604, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14781 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2010) (examining an asserted procedural bar
of an Atkins claim under this provision); Ex parte Blue, 230 S.W.3d 151, 163 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2007) (establishing the review standards for Atkins claims under this provision).
309. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244 (West 2006); supra note 282 and accompanying text.
310. See, e.g., Henderson v. Thaler, 626 F.3d 773, 779-81 (5th Cir. 2010) (rejecting an
"actual innocence of the death penalty" exception to the AEDPA statute of limitations for
Atkins claims); Hernandez v. Thaler, 398 F. App'x 81, 89 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding Atkins
claims are subject to the AEDPA limitations period); Mathis v. Thaler, 616 F.3d 461 468
(5th Cir. 2010) (finding Atkins claims are subject to the AEDPA limitations period); cf.
Lee v. Lampert, 610 F.3d 1125, 1133-36 (9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting an actual innocence
regarding guilt exception to the statute of limitations and noting the similar position of
other circuits). But see Henderson, 626 F.3d at 782-89 (Wiener, J. dissenting) (finding
Atkins claims, as a categorical exception to the death penalty, are not subject to the
AEDPA limitations period under the miscarriage of justice doctrine).
311. See Henderson, 626 F.3d at 777.
counsel, and the operation of the previous Texas Court "two forum"
rule on the pursuit of his claim.312
With regard to successive writ applications, the applicant must
initially make a prima facie showing to a three-judge appellate panel
that he satisfies the statutory requisites for filing the application."'
The Fifth Circuit developed a three-part analysis for its prima facie
review of a successive writ application based on an Atkins claim. The
Atkins successive writ applicant must make a prima facie showing that
1) his Atkins claim has not been presented in a prior federal habeas
corpus application; 2) the claim relies on a previously unavailable,
retroactive new rule of constitutional law, i.e., the Atkins ruling; and
3) the applicant should be "categorized as 'mentally retarded,"' as
defined in Atkins and Penry.314 A prima facie showing of mental
retardation is "simply a sufficient showing of possible merit to
312. Compare In re Wilson, 442 F.3d 872 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam), and In re Hearn,
389 F.3d 122 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding equitable tolling), with Mathis, 616 F. 3d at 473-76, In
re Johnson, 325 F. App'x 337 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam), and In re Lewis, 484 F.3d 793
(5th Cir. 2007) (finding no equitable tolling). See In re Hearn, 376 F.3d 447, 455-57 (5th
Cir. 2004) (identifying factors supporting equitable tolling in the case); see also supra note
303 (describing the potential impact of the two forum rule on the federal statute of
limitations). The Fifth Circuit reviews the trial court's decision that a collateral
application is time-barred de novo and its decision denying equitable tolling for abuse of
discretion. See Mathis, 616 F.3d at 473-74.
313. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244 (West 2006).
314. In re Morris, 328 F.3d 739, 740-41 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). Compare In re
Henderson, 462 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2006), and Morris, 328 F.3d at 741 (finding prima facie
evidence of mental retardation), with In re Salazar, 443 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 2006), and In re
Johnson, 334 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (finding no prima facie evidence of
mental retardation). Although most of its prima facie determinations have been based on
a finding of prima facie evidence of mental retardation (or not), the Fifth Circuit recently
affirmed a Texas federal trial court's dismissal of a successive writ application on the
ground that Atkins was "available" to the offender when he filed his initial federal writ
application and thus he did not meet the eligibility requirements for filing a successive writ
under the AEDPA. Mathis, 616 F. 3d at 467-73. The Fifth Circuit recently declined to
permit a successive writ filing based on newly discovered evidence of mental retardation
because it found that the second AEDPA ground for filing a successive writ based on
newly discovered evidence pertains only to evidence regarding factual guilt rather than
evidence establishing innocence of the death penalty, such as an Atkins claim. See In re
Webster, 605 F.3d 256, 257-59 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Webster v. United States,
No. 10-50, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 9507 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2010) (making this decision regarding a
federal offender, but noting that the successive writ requirement regarding newly
discovered evidence also applies to state offenders); cf Rocha v. Thaler, 626 F.3d 815, 840
(5th Cir. 2010) (stating that actual innocence of the death penalty established by a clear
and convincing showing of an Atkins claim can overcome a procedural bar regarding an
initial federal collateral review application, but a successive application is restricted to the
eligibility requirements specified in the AEDPA).
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warrant a fuller exploration by the district court."315 The state court
findings on the Atkins claim are "wholly irrelevant" to this threshold
inquiry, and this threshold inquiry is distinct from the offender's
ultimate burden in obtaining federal collateral relief.316 Even if the
Fifth Circuit panel determines that an applicant has made such a
prima facie showing regarding his Atkins claim, a Texas federal trial
court must conduct its own review to determine the applicant's
satisfaction of this prima facie showing before considering the merits
of the successive writ claim."'
For Texas state offenders who can overcome all of these
AEDPA restrictions and present their Atkins claims in federal court,
federal statutes provide an entitlement to counsel regarding both
initial and successive writ applications, as well as investigative and
expert assistance if reasonably necessary.318 If an evidentiary hearing
is not otherwise precluded by the AEDPA, the grant of an
evidentiary hearing on an Atkins claim is entrusted to the discretion
of the federal trial court.319 If the state court failed to provide a "full
and fair hearing," the federal trial court's failure to hold an
315. Morris, 328 F.3d at 740 (quoting Bennett v. United States, 119 F.3d 468, 469-70
(7th Cir. 1997)).
316. In re Wilson, 442 F.3d 872, 878 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
317. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244 (West 2006). The Fifth Circuit has referred to this trial
court assessment as the "second gate" for the filing of a successive writ application.
Morris, 328 F.3d at 741. A trial court's dismissal is reviewed by the Fifth Circuit de novo.
Mathis, 616 F. 3d at 466 (affirming the trial court's subsequent dismissal of the offender's
successive writ application after the appellate court had initially permitted it to be filed).
318. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3599 (West Pamp. 2010) (adding this provision in 2006 and
repealing a previous similar provision (21 U.S.C. § 848(q)); see also McFarland v. Scott,
512 U.S. 849 (1994); cf. In re Hearn, 376 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 2004) (requiring a "colorable
claim" of mental retardation for the appointment of counsel to investigate and prepare a
successive writ application). A trial court's denial of investigative and expert assistance is
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Additional discovery requires a showing
of good cause that is established when an offender has presented prima facie evidence of
his Atkins claim. See Campbell v. Dretke, 117 F. App'x 946, 959 (5th Cir. 2004). Compare
Sells v. Quarterman, No. SA-08-CA-465-OG, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78172 (W.D. Tex.
Aug. 4, 2008), and Williams v. Dretke, No. H-04-2945, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34438 at
*17-19 (S.D. Tex. July 15, 2005) (approving expert and investigative assistance), with
Campbell, 117 F. App'x at 959, and Simpson v. Dretke, No. 1:04cv485, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21873 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2006) (denying expert or investigative assistance).
319. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 2006); Pierce v. Thaler, 355 F. App'x 784, 788 (5th
Cir. 2009) (per curiam); supra note 288 and accompany text. If the record contradicts the
offender's factual allegations, the trial court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.
Thomas v. Quarterman, 335 F. App'x 386, 388 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (citing Schriro
v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007)).
evidentiary hearing on the claim constitutes an abuse of discretion.320
In resolving an Atkins claim, the federal trial court can consider
evidence not previously presented in the state court proceedings as
long as the evidence merely supplements and does not fundamentally
alter the claim presented in state court.32' Even if additional evidence
is introduced and an evidentiary hearing is held in federal court, the
federal court still reviews the Texas Court judgment on the Atkins
claim pursuant to the AEDPA's deferential standards.322 If the
federal court, however, determines that the Texas Court's Atkins
judgment was "contrary to" or involved an "unreasonable"
application of clearly established federal law, the AEDPA deferential
review standard does not govern the federal review of the claim.323
In their substantive review of Atkins claims, the Fifth Circuit and
Texas federal trial courts have generally endorsed the procedural and
definitional mechanisms the Texas Court has adopted to implement
Atkins on collateral review.324 The Fifth Circuit has found that the
definitions and procedures the Texas Court adopted in Briseno are
not contrary to clearly established federal law as articulated in Court
320. See Thomas, 335 F. App'x at 387-88 (upholding the trial court's denial of a
request for an evidentiary hearing); cf. Simpson v. Quarterman, 291 F. App'x 622, 623 (5th
Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (finding that the trial court erred by failing to conduct an
evidentiary hearing on the Atkins claim).
321. See Lewis v. Quarterman, 541 F.3d 280, 284-86 (5th Cir. 2008).
322. See Rivera v. Quarterman, 505 F.3d 349, 355-56 (5th Cir. 2007).
323. See id. at 356 (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 2006) and finding that the Texas
Court's subsequent writ dismissal based on a failure to present prima facie evidence of
mental retardation was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law); see
also supra note 286 and accompanying text (describing the statutory provision); cf.
Bridgers v. Quarterman, No. 4:07cv479, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75652 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 30,
2008) (finding that the offender did not receive a "full and fair" hearing in state court and
thus the AEDPA's deferential standard did not apply and he could obtain and present
additional evidence of his mental retardation).
324. See, e.g., Rosales v. Quarterman, 291 F. App'x 558, 562 (5th Cir. 2008) (per
curiam) (noting that the appellate court has "repeatedly" approved Briseno's framework
and rejecting the need to use subsequently developed definitions of intellectual disability);
Simpson v. Quarterman, 593 F. Supp. 2d 922, 931-32 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (noting the Fifth
Circuit's citation of Briseno in dozens of cases without disapproval and applying its
framework in the instant case); Rodriguez v. Quarterman, No. SA-05-CA-659-RF, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49376, at *37-54 (W.D. Tex. July 11, 2006) (reviewing the challenge of
applying a clinical definition of mental retardation in a legal context, and finding the
Briseno criteria an "objectively reasonable" application of Atkins' constitutional
standard). See generally Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)
(articulating the Texas Court's definitional and procedural implementation of Atkins in
collateral review proceedings and described supra notes 227-246 and accompanying text).
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precedent-one of the considerations of federal collateral review.325
Regarding the Texas Court's Atkins collateral review procedure, the
Fifth Circuit has approved 1) placing the burden on the offender to
prove his mental retardation in collateral review proceedings by a
preponderance of the evidence3 26 and 2) authorizing the court rather
than a jury to serve as the fact-finder regarding mental retardation.327
Although the Supreme Court referenced the clinical definitions of
mental retardation in Atkins,328 the Fifth Circuit has stated that the
Court did not adopt "particular criteria" for determining mental
retardation for Atkins purposes.329 In reviewing Texas Court mental
retardation findings, the Fifth Circuit has generally echoed the
definitional aspects articulated by the Texas Court.330
Regarding the significantly subaverage intellectual functioning
component of mental retardation, the Fifth Circuit has stated that this
definitional element is typically established by an IO test score of
325. See, e.g., Taylor v. Quarterman, 498 F.3d 306, 308 n.4 (5th Cir. 2007); cf. Woods v.
Quarterman, 493 F.3d 580, 587 n.6 (5th Cir. 2007) (regarding the adaptive behavior
aspects).
326. See Lewis v. Quarterman, 272 F. App'x 347, 352 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)
(denying a certificate of appealability on this issue that had been resolved by the Texas
Court, pursuant to Atkins' instruction to the states to develop enforcement mechanisms
for the ruling); Woods v. Quarterman, 493 F.3d 580, 585 n.3 (5th Cir. 2007) (rejecting
burden of proof challenge); In re Johnson, 334 F.3d 403, 404-05 (5th Cir. 2003) (rejecting
the notion that the State must prove the absence of mental retardation beyond a
reasonable doubt, as the functional equivalent of an element of a crime).
327. See Esparza v. Thaler, 408 F. App'x 787,795-96 (5th Cir. 2010); Woods, 493 F.3d
at 585 n.3; Johnson, 334 F.3d at 404-05. Supporting the Fifth Circuit's position is the
Court's opinion in Schriro v. Smith, 546 U.S. 6 (2005), vacating a Ninth Circuit judgment
that preemptively required Arizona's resolution of an Atkins collateral review claim
through use of a jury rather than initially permitting resolution of the claim through
procedures adopted by the state in response to Atkins. See In re Woods, 155 F. App'x 132,
135-36 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (rejecting a claim based on the jury as fact-finder and
citing Smith). The Fifth Circuit has also rejected claims for jury resolution of Atkins claims
premised on Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), based on the Court's ruling in Schriro v.
Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004), that Ring was not retroactive to cases on collateral
review. See Woods, 155 F. App'x at 136; cf. Johnson, 334 F.3d at 404-05.
328. See Garcia v. Thaler, No. SA-08-CA-62-XR, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116390, at
*29-35 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2009) (noting Atkins' provision of clinical rather than legal
definitions of mental retardation and resulting definitional challenges).
329. Moore v. Quarterman, 454 F.3d 484, 493 (5th Cir. 2006); see Clark v. Quarterman,
457 F.3d 441, 445 (5th Cir. 2006).
330. See supra notes 228-40, 260-71 and accompanying text (describing the Texas
Court's definitional standards); infra notes 331-43 and accompanying text (describing the
Fifth Circuit's application of these standards).
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seventy or below.33' The appellate court has also noted, however, that
an IQ score of seventy is an approximate and flexible standard for
this definitional element.332  It has stated that this prong can be
established despite an IQ score over seventy or rejected despite an IQ
score below seventy3 and that evidence of intellectual functioning in
addition to IQ scores can be considered.3 3 Like the Texas Court, the
Fifth Circuit has not adopted the "Flynn effect" regarding IQ score
inflation based on when in an IQ test's norming cycle the test was
administered.
With regard to the adaptive functioning component, the Fifth
Circuit has endorsed review of the ten adaptive skill areas specified
by the AAMR and identified in Atkins, such as self-care, work,
331. See Thomas v. Quarterman, 335 F. App'x 386, 388 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); cf
Moore v. Quarterman, 342 F. App'x 65, 79-81 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (Smith, J.
dissenting) (describing a "bright-line cutoff of 70" for this element under Texas law and
Fifth Circuit application of it); Taylor, 498 F.3d at 308 (referring to a "mild retardation cut
off [IQ score] of 70").
332. See Moore, 342 F. App'x at 70 n.5; Williams v. Quarterman, 293 F. App'x 298,
308-09 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); Morris v. Dretke, 413 F.3d 484, 497-98 (5th Cir.
2005).
333. See Williams, 293 F. App'x at 308, 311; Clark, 457 F.3d at 444-46. In Moore, the
Fifth Circuit upheld the Texas federal trial court's finding of significantly subaverage
intellectual functioning based on 1) the offender's IQ scores that averaged at seventy-two
and to which the trial court applied a five-point standard measurement error, 2) expert
testimony that characterized mental retardation encompassing IQ scores of seventy-five
and below, and 3) governmental expert testimony that agreed, on cross-examination, that
this element was satisfied. See Moore, 342 F. App'x at 68-71; cf Clark, 457 F.3d at 444-46
(finding that Atkins did not mandate an application of the measurement error to the
offender's IQ score above seventy and that the state court's evaluation of his IQ scores
above and below seventy, in addition to related testimony, and its "flexible" determination
of his intellectual functioning was not unreasonable).
334. See Williams, 293 F. App'x at 308, 310-11 (declining to only consider IQ scores to
the exclusion of all other measures of intelligence, such as classroom performance,
standardized achievement test scores, writing ability, and lay witness testimony);
Maldonado v. Thaler, 662 F. Supp. 2d 684, 723-27 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (including lengthy
review of varied evidence regarding intellectual functioning), affd, No. 10-70,003, 2010
U.S. App. LEXIS 22590 (5th Cir. Oct. 29, 2010). The Fifth Circuit has thus far rejected
challenges to mental retardation findings that include the assessment of an expert
testifying for the State whose assessment methods were rejected by the Texas Court in one
case and are the subject of a professional review process. Maldonado, 2010 U.S. App.
LEXIS 22590, at *39; Pierce v. Thaler, 604 F.3d 197, 213-15 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding
sufficient other evidence to support the Texas Court's rejection of mental retardation).
335. See Maldonado, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 22590, at *20-21; Thomas, 335 F. App'x
at 390-91; In re Mathis, 483 F.3d 395, 398 n.1 (5th Cir. 2007); supra note 263 and
accompanying text (describing the Flynn effect and the Texas Court's position regarding
it).
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functional academics, and social skills,336 as well as the consolidated
grouping of those skill areas subsequently developed by the AAMR
and also endorsed by the Texas Court.3 In determining the required
presence of adaptive behavior deficits,3 the Fifth Circuit has
approved the consideration of evidence of an offender's adaptive
strengths as well as weaknesses,3" and evidence beyond standardized
test results and expert opinions?. The Fifth Circuit has also found
that the Texas Court's Briseno factors are not inconsistent with
Atkins regarding the evaluation of adaptive behavior3 4' and has
approved their use by the Texas state courts in determining adaptive
functioning,3  but not required their use."
336. See Williams, 293 F. App'x at 308, 311; Thomas, 335 F. App'x at 389 (citing Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 309 n.3 (2002)); supra note 162 and accompanying text
(providing these skill areas).
337. See Moore v. Quarterman, 342 F. App'x 65, 71-72 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam);
supra notes 264-66 and accompanying text (identifying conceptual, social, and practical
skill areas and some illustrative, specific skill areas included in each area); cf. Matamoros
v. Thaler, No. H-07-2613, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35425, at *30-31 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31,
2010) (rejecting challenge based on state court use of earlier clinical mental retardation
definition versus later version).
338. To establish the required deficits in adaptive functioning under the clinical
definitions, deficits must be shown in at least two of the ten skill areas identified in Atkins
or standardized test scores at least two standard deviations below the mean in one of the
three subsequently adopted skill areas or an overall score on all three areas. See supra
notes 162, 266 and accompanying text.
339. See Williams, 293 F. App'x at 308, 313-14 (noting that courts are not prohibited
from considering adaptive strengths as they assess weaknesses); Clark v. Quarterman, 457
F.3d 441, 447 (5th Cir. 2006) (stating that evidence of a strength in an area reflects an
absence of a weakness in the area); Briseno v. Dretke, No. L-05-08, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23603, at *35-51 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2007) (deferring to the state court's adaptive
functioning finding that considered the offender's adaptive strengths and weaknesses),
affd sub nom, Briseno v. Quarterman, 278 F. App'x 340 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
340. See Maldonado, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 22590, at *32.
341. See Woods v. Quarterman, 493 F.3d 580, 587 n.6 (5th Cir. 2007); see also Simpson
v. Quarterman, 593 F. Supp. 2d 922, 932-33 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (describing how the Briseno
factors correspond to the AAMR adaptive skill areas); Chester v. Quarterman, No.
5:05cv29, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34936, *17-18 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 2008) (citing Woods);
cf. Maldonado v. Thaler, 662 F. Supp. 2d 684, 730 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (finding consideration
of evidence of adaptive behavior occurring after the developmental period pursuant to the
Briseno factors is not inconsistent with Atkins), affd, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 22590.
342. See Maldonado, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 22590, at *31-37; Williams, 293 F. App'x
at 312-14; Moreno v. Dretke, 450 F.3d 158, 164-65 (5th Cir. 2006); see also Chester, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34936, at *2(-21 (noting that an affirmative finding regarding the final
Briseno factor, pertaining to the commission of the capital offense, is sufficient by itself to
deny federal collateral relief).
343. See Moore v. Quarterman, 342 F. App'x 65, 73 n.7 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)
(finding that the Texas federal trial court did not abuse its discretion in not explicitly
considering the Briseno factors because the Texas Court indicated that the application of
In their substantive rulings on Atkins claims, the Fifth Circuit
and Texas federal trial courts have applied the deferential AEDPA
standard governing federal collateral review of state offender
claims.'" This standard precludes the grant of federal habeas corpus
relief on an Atkins claim adjudicated on the merits in state court
unless the state court decision was "contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law," as
determined by the Supreme Court, or was based on an
"unreasonable" factual determination of the evidence presented in
the state proceedings.345 State court factual determinations have a
presumption of correctness unless the offender rebuts them by clear
and convincing evidence."6 A federal court's determination that it
would have reached a different factual conclusion than the state court
or even a determination that the state court's resolution was incorrect
is not sufficient to conclude that the state court's factual
determination was "unreasonable.""7 The Fifth Circuit has deemed
the determination of an offender's mental retardation pursuant to
Atkins to be a question of fact."8 In these fact-intensive cases, one
Texas federal trial court described the role of federal collateral review
in Atkins cases: "Against the backdrop of dueling expert opinions, it
must be remembered that the habeas writ exists only for
constitutional violations. Federal habeas review does not make
certain that a state court ruling complies perfectly with the standards
created by professional organizations-though psychological
standards certainly inform the Atkins inquiry."3 49 As described in the
next section of this Article, this limited federal collateral review role
the factors is discretionary); Simpson, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 932 (noting Fifth Circuit case law
that courts have the "option" to consider the Briseno factors).
344. See Hines v. Thaler, No. 3:06-CV-0320-G, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85564, at *6
(N.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2010) (citations omitted).
345. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 2006); see also Wood v. Allen, 130 S. Ct. 841, 849
(2010); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
402-13 (2000) (interpreting these provisions).
346. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 2006); see also Wood, 130 S. Ct. at 845, 848-49;
Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 473-74; Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338-39 (2006); Miller-El v.
Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) (interpreting this provision).
347. See Wood, 130 S. Ct. at 849; Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 473; Rice, 546 U.S. at 341-42;
cf. Williams, 529 U.S. at 410-11.
348. See Maldonado, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 22590, at *14-15; Williams, 293 F. App'x
at 308; Clark v. Quarterman, 457 F.3d 441, 444-47 (5th Cir. 2006).
349. Maldonado v. Thaler, 662 F. Supp. 2d 684, 704-05 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (citation
omitted), affd, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 22590.
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has led to limited collateral relief on Texas Atkins claims by the Fifth
Circuit and Texas federal trial courts.5 o
F. Resolution of Atkins Claims on Collateral Review in Texas State
and Federal Courts
1. Overview
As of the writing of this Article, the Texas Court (or Texas
Governor) has resolved the Atkins claims of seventy-eight capital
offenders on collateral review.351 The Fifth Circuit or Texas federal
trial courts have completed their review of the Atkins claims of thirty-
eight of these offenders352 and three offenders who first raised their
Atkins claims in federal court.353 Thus far, the Texas Court has
granted collateral relief to ten offenders and reformed their death
sentences to life imprisonment on Atkins grounds.354 The Texas
Governor has granted commutations to two offenders.3 " The Fifth
Circuit has found two offenders to be mentally retarded for Atkins
purposes."' The actions of the Texas Governor and state and federal
courts regarding these successful and unsuccessful Atkins claimants
can be categorized more specifically.5
For capital offenders pursuing Atkins claims in their original
habeas corpus applications, the Texas courts substantively review
these claims on the merits.5 For offenders pursuing Atkins claims
through subsequent writ applications, the Texas Court has an initial
350. See infra Table 1 (describing federal collateral review action on Atkins claims).
351. See infra Table 1 (describing the resolution of Atkins claims by the Texas Court
and Texas Governor).
352. See infra Table 1 (describing the Texas federal courts' resolution of Atkins
collateral review claims).
353. See Hernandez v. Thaler, 398 F. App'x 81, 89-90 (5th Cir. 2010) (denying relief on
statute of limitations grounds); Green v. Quarterman, No. H-07-827, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11459 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2008) (denying relief on the merits and on procedural
bar grounds); Amador v. Dretke, No. SA-02-CA-230-XR, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6072, at
*102-09 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2005) (denying relief on the merits), aff'd on other grounds
sub nom., Amador v. Quarterman, 458 F.3d 397 (5th Cir. 2006); see also infra Table 1.
354. See infra notes 407-55, 467-500 and accompanying text (describing these cases);
see also infra Table 1.
355. See infra notes 456-66 and accompanying text (describing these cases); see also
infra Table 1.
356. See infra notes 501-17 and accompanying text (describing these cases); see also
infra Table 1.
357. See infra Table 1; infra notes 358-72 and accompanying text.
358. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071 (West Supp. 2010); supra notes
209-10, 247-49 and accompanying text (describing this provision and related case).
screening role prior to any substantive review of the Atkins claim by
the convicting trial court and its own final review."9 Following an
evidentiary review in the convicting trial court, the Texas Court has
denied collateral relief to nine offenders who asserted Atkins claims
in their original habeas corpus proceedings." In its subsequent writ
screening role, the Texas Court has found no prima facie evidence of
mental retardation in twenty offenders' cases, and has denied their
subsequent applications as an abuse of the writ.361  For six offenders
who have asserted Atkins claims in their second post-Atkins writ
applications (and two offenders who reasserted their Atkins claim
after a previous denial of the claim on collateral review), the Texas
Court has found insufficient evidence to indicate that the offenders
could establish their mental retardation by clear and convincing
evidence, the screening standard for these cases, and has dismissed
their writ applications as an abuse of the writ.3 62 For thirty-one
offenders whose Atkins subsequent writ claims the Texas Court
remanded to the convicting trial court for an evidentiary review, the
Texas Court has denied collateral relief based on the factual findings
and legal conclusions of the convicting trial court.3 63  Regarding the
359. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071 (West Supp. 2010); Ex parte Blue,
230 S.W.3d 151, 163 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (establishing the threshold showing and clear
and convincing evidence standard regarding second post-Atkins writ applications filed
pursuant to TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071 § 5(a)(3) (West Supp. 2010)); Ex
parte Rivera, No. 27065-02, 2003 WL 21752841, at *2 (Tex. Crim. App. July 25, 2003) (per
curiam) (describing the prima facie evidence screening standard regarding Atkins
successive writ applications filed pursuant to TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071 §
5(a)(1) (West Supp. 2010)); supra notes 222-25, 256-57 and accompanying text (describing
these provisions and cases).
360. See, e.g., Ex parte Simpson, 136 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); see also infra
Table 1.
361. See, e.g., Ex parte Hearn, 310 S.W.3d 424 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Ex parte
Johnson, No. WR-56,947-02, 2009 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 666 (Tex. Crim. App.
Apr. 29, 2009) (per curiam); Ex parte Johnson, No. WR-57,854-02 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb.
11, 2009) (per curiam); Ex parte Salazar, No. WR-49,210-02, 2006 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 507 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 9, 2006) (per curiam); Rivera, 2003 WL 21752841; see
also infra Table 1.
362. See, e.g., Ex parte Bustamante, No. WR-58,927-02, 2010 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 250 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 26, 2010) (per curiam); Ex parte Sells, No. WR-62,552-
02, 2007 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1847 (Tex. Crim. App. May 23, 2007) (per curiam); Blue,
230 S.W.3d at 167-68 (describing initial attempt to assert an Atkins claim that was
available at the time of a previous writ application); see also Ex parte Woods, 296 S.W.3d
587 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Ex parte Taylor, Nos. WR-48,498-02, WR-48,498-04 (Tex.
Crim. App. Nov. 6, 2008) (per curiam) (describing attempt to re-assert an Atkins claim
that was denied in a previous writ proceeding); see also infra Table 1.
363. See, e.g., Ex parte Jones, No. WR-45,979-02, 2010 WL 653701 (Tex. Crim. App.
Feb. 24, 2010) (per curiam); Ex parte Matamoros, No. WR-50,791-02, 2007 Tex. Crim.
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ten offenders whose Atkins subsequent writ claims were successful in
the Texas Court, six of the claims followed agreed or stipulated
mental retardation findings in the convicting trial courts and the
remaining four followed contested proceedings.3M Both of the Texas
Governor's Atkins commutations followed agreed findings of mental
retardation.365
The Fifth Circuit and Texas federal trial courts have resolved
Texas state offenders' Atkins claims on both procedural and
substantive grounds.3" The Fifth Circuit has denied five claims on
statute of limitations grounds .36  The appellate court has denied
authorization to file five successive writ claims after finding no prima
App. LEXIS 1861 (Tex. Crim. App. June 13, 2007) (per curiam); Ex parte Pierce, No. WR-
15,859-04, 2007 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1846 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 18, 2007); Ex parte
Lewis, 223 S.W.3d 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Ex parte Rodriguez, 164 S.W.3d 400 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005) (per curiam); see also infra Table 1. Some capital offenders who have
been unsuccessful in their Atkins claims have also raised claims that they should receive
new sentencing hearings because their mitigating evidence of mental retardation was not
properly considered in their sentencing proceedings pursuant to Penry (and subsequent
related cases). Some of these unsuccessful Atkins claimants have received new sentencing
hearings on this basis. See, e.g., Ex parte Briseno, No. AP-76,132, 2010 Tex. Crim. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 338 (Tex. Crim. App. June 9, 2010); Ex parte Davis, No. AP-76,263, 2009
Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 750 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 18, 2009) (per curiam).
364. Compare Ex parte Carr, No. AP-75,627, 2007 WL 602816 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb.
28, 2007) (per curiam) (involving agreed or stipulated mental retardation findings), with
Ex parte Bell, 152 S.W.3d 103, 104 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (per curiam) (resolving
contested evidence); see infra notes 407-55, 467-500 and accompanying text (describing
these cases).
365. See Ex parte Lane, Nos. WR-67,161-01, WR-67,161-02, 2009 Tex. Crim. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 102 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 4, 2009) (per curiam); Ex parte Smith, No.
40,874-02 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 21, 2004) (per curiam) (describing Texas Governor's
commutations on Atkins grounds and dismissing the writ applications as moot); infra notes
456-66 and accompanying text (describing these cases).
366. See infra Table 1; infra notes 367-72 and accompanying text (describing resolution
of these claims).
367. See Hernandez v. Thaler, 398 F. App'x 81, 89-90 (5th Cir. 2010) (denying stay);
Mathis v. Thaler, 616 F.3d 461 (5th Cir. 2010) (denying authorization to file successive
federal habeas corpus application based on timeliness and claim's availability when
previous federal writ was filed); In re Johnson, 325 F. App'x 337 (5th Cir. 2009) (per
curiam) (denying stay and authorization to file successive federal habeas corpus
application); In re Lewis, 484 F.3d 793 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (denying authorization
to file successive federal habeas corpus application); Nealy v. Quarterman, 223 F. App'x
366 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (denying stay on grounds including timeliness); see also
infra Table 1; cf. Henderson v. Thaler, 626 F.3d 773 (5th Cir. 2010) (remanding time-
barred Atkins claim for a consideration of equitable tolling); In re Salazar, 443 F.3d 430,
434 n.2 (5th Cir. 2006) (describing as an "open question" whether authorization to file a
successive writ application based on Atkins could be denied solely on timeliness grounds).
facie evidence of mental retardation.3 ' The Fifth Circuit has affirmed
or declined a certificate of appealability regarding Texas federal trial
369 thecourts' denial of collateral relief in twenty Atkins cases and three
additional offenders waived or otherwise did not seek appellate relief
from a federal trial court denial of their Atkins claims.7 o In six cases,
subsequent Fifth Circuit action is pending following Texas federal
trial courts' denial of collateral relief.37' Finally, in two cases, the Fifth
Circuit has affirmed the mental retardation findings by Texas federal
trial courts conducting de novo reviews of offenders' Atkins claims.372
Texas state and federal actions on Atkins claims in individual
collateral review cases are described in the table below.
Table 1. Texas State and Federal Actions on Atkins Collateral
Review Claims
368. See, e.g., In re Brown, 457 F.3d 392, 396-97 (5th Cir. 2006); Salazar, 443 F.3d at
430; In re Johnson, 334 F.3d 403, 404 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); see also infra Table 1.
369. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Thaler, No. 10-70003, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 22590 (5th
Cir. Oct. 29, 2010) (affirming denial of collateral relief); Hall v. Thaler, 587 F.3d 746 (5th
Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (denying certificate of appealability); Moreno v. Dretke, 450 F.3d
158 (5th Cir. 2006) (affirming the denial of collateral relief and denying certificate of
appealability); see also Hines v. Thaler, No. 3:06-CV-0320-G, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
85564, at *9-12 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2010) (citing cases in which Atkins claims had been
denied pursuant to the AEDPA's deferential review standard); see also infra Table 1.
370. See Simpson v. Quarterman, 341 F. App'x 68 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)
(involving waiver of appeal); Green v. Quarterman, 312 F. App'x 635 (5th Cir. 2009) (per
curiam) (describing appellate action in the case on non-Atkins claims); Rodriguez v.
Quarterman, No. SA-05-CA-659-RF, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49376 (W.D. Tex. July 11,
2006) (granting collateral relief on Penry claim).
371. See, e.g., Hines, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85564; Butler v. Quarterman, 576 F. Supp.
2d 805 (S.D. Tex. 2008); see also infra Table 1.
372. The Fifth Circuit reviews the Texas federal trial courts' factual findings regarding
mental retardation for clear error. See Williams v. Quarterman, 293 F. App'x 298, 308 (5th
Cir. 2008) (per curiam). Neither of the two cases in which the Fifth Circuit has affirmed
the mental retardation finding in an Atkins claim involved the AEDPA's deferential
review standards. Both involved the de novo consideration of evidence by the Texas
federal trial court to determine whether the offender had established mental retardation
by the preponderance of the evidence and the Fifth Circuit's review of this factual
determination for clear error. See Moore v. Quarterman, 342 F. App'x 65, 67 (5th Cir.
2009) (per curiam) (citing Moore v. Quarterman, 533 F.3d 338, 341-42 (5th Cir. 2008) (per
curiam) (en banc) (finding cause and prejudice regarding the offender's failure to exhaust
his Atkins claim when it was dismissed as an abuse of the writ prior to the Texas Court's
development of Atkins procedures and thus no application of the deferential review
standards)); Rivera v. Quarterman, 505 F.3d 349, 356-61 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding that the
Texas Court's dismissal of the offender's claim as an abuse of the writ was an
"unreasonable" application of "clearly established" federal law and thus not entitled to
deferential treatment); cf. Simpson v. Quarterman, 593 F. Supp. 2d 922, 926-27, 941-42
(E.D. Tex. 2009) (denying the Atkins claim under de novo and deferential review
standards). These cases are described infra notes 501-17 and accompanying text.
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Last Name Texas Court Texas Federal Federal Executed
Dismissal or Court/ Denial Mental
Denial Governor Retardation
Relief Finding






Briseno No MR No MR
Brown No PF No PF *
Bustamante No CCE *
Butler No MR No MR*
Campbell No PF No PF
Carr Texas
Court
Chester No MR No MR*






Eldridge No PF No MR
Elizalde No PF No PF *
Escobedo No MR
Esparza 1st HC No MR
Garcia 1st HC No MR
Green No MR
Guevara No CCE







Hines No MR No MR*
Hunter 1st HC
Ibarra No MR
Jackson No PF *
D. Johnson No PF SL *
J. Johnson No PF *
K. Johnson No PF No PF *




D. Lewis No MR SL
R. Lewis No MR No MR*
Maldonado No MR No MR
Matamoros No MR No MR*




C. Moore No MR No MR *
E. Moore No PF 5th Circuit
Moreno No PF No MR
Morris No PF No MR *
Nealy No CCE SL *
Neville No PF *
Perkins 1st HC No MR *
Pierce No MR No MR
Plata Texas
Court
Reese 1st HC No MR *
Richard No MR *
Riley No MR *
Rivera No PF 5th Circuit
Rivers No MR
Robinson No MR
Rodriguez No MR No MR
Rosales No PF No MR *
Salazar No PF No PF *
Sells No CCE








Taylor No MR; No No MR *
CCE___ _
Thomas No MR No MR
Valdez Texas
I _ Court
70 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OUARTERLY [Vol. 39:1





C. Williams 1st HC
J. Williams No PF No MR
R. Williams No PF *
Wilson No MR No MR*
Woods No MR; No No MR *
CCE
Wooten No MR No MR *
Legend: Texas Court Dismissal or Denial: 1st HC = denial of the offender's original
habeas corpus application; No PF = no prima facie evidence of mental retardation in
subsequent writ application and dismissal as abuse of writ; No CCE = insufficient
indication of clear and convincing evidence of mental retardation in second post-Atkins
writ application and dismissal as abuse of writ; No MR = subsequent writ denial following
remand for evidentiary review.
Federal Denial: SL = denial based on statute of limitations; No PF = no prima facie
evidence of mental retardation in successive writ application and denial of filing
authorization; No MR = denial of collateral relief by the federal trial court regarding
which the Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial or denied a certificate of appealability or the
offender waived or otherwise did not pursue an appeal on his Atkins claim; No MR*
denial of collateral relief by the Texas federal trial court pending Fifth Circuit action.
Thus, despite the significant volume of Atkins collateral review
litigation in Texas state and federal courts, only seventeen percent of
the Texas Atkins claimants have been successful on collateral
review.373 This "success rate" is significantly lower than the "national
average" success rate of thirty-eight percent identified in a 2008 study
of states that had resolved Atkins claims.374 To help distinguish
between the successful Texas Atkins claims and unsuccessful ones, the
following sections present the evidence of mental retardation both in
the successful cases and in some illustrative unsuccessful cases in
which the issue was vigorously contested.'
Of course, as Texas state and federal courts have addressed
Atkins claims, they (like courts reviewing Atkins claims in other
capital punishment states) have confronted the challenges of
373. This percentage reflects fourteen successful Atkins claimants of the eighty-one
offenders whose collateral review claims have been resolved in Texas state and federal
proceedings. See supra Table 1.
374. See Blume et al., supra note 26, at 628-29, 637; supra note 204 (describing this
aspect of the study).
375. See infra notes 402-597 and accompanying text.
determining the mental retardation of these capital offenders."' One
Texas federal trial court described the general nature of Atkins
claims:
This case, like most involving Atkins claims, requires
consideration of testimony from competing experts who
disagree about the nature of mental retardation, the means by
which it may be identified, the manner in which it manifests in a
criminal defendant's life, and the psychological profession's role
in making the legal decision of whether mental capacity
precludes execution.
Although the Texas Court has provided a definitional and procedural
framework for the resolution of Atkins claims, as described previously
in this Article,3 78 challenges in the application of this framework
remain.
Application challenges concerning both the intellectual
functioning and adaptive behavior components of the mental
retardation determination include the selection of the assessment
instrument used to measure these aspects of mental retardation.
According to the AAMR, the IQ test used should be an "individually
administered, standardized instrument that yields a measure of
general intellectual functioning" and is selected based on factors such
376. See generally Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 169, at 811; Stanley L. Brodsky &
Virginia A. Galloway, Ethical and Professional Demands for Forensic Mental Health
Professionals in the Post-Atkins Era, 13 ETHICS & BEHAV., no. 1, 2003 at 3; Julie C.
Duvall & Richard J. Morris, Assessing Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases: Critical
Issues for Psychology and Psychological Practice, 37 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. AND PRAC.
658 (2006); Caroline Everington & J. Gregory Olley, Implications of Atkins v. Virginia:
Issues in Defining and Diagnosing Mental Retardation, 8 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC.,
no. 1, 2008 at 1; John M. Fabian, State Supreme Court Responses to Atkins v. Virginia:
Adaptive Functioning Assessment in Light of Purposeful Planning, Premeditation, and the
Behavioral Context of the Homicide, 6 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC., no. 4, 2006 at 1
[hereinafter Fabian, State]; John M. Fabian, Life, Death, and IQ; It's Much More Than Just
a Score: The Dilemma of the Mentally Retarded on Death Row, 5 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL.
PRAC., no. 4, 2005 at 1 [hereinafter Fabian, Life]; Douglas Mossman, Atkins v. Virginia: A
Psychiatric Can of Worms, 33 N.M. L. REv. 255 (2003); James R. Patton & Denis W.
Keyes, Death Penalty Issues Following Atkins, 14 EXCEFTIONALITY 237 (2006); Kay B.
Stevens & J. Randall Price, Adaptive Behavior, Mental Retardation, and the Death Penalty,
6 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC., no. 3, 2006 at 1; Lois A. Weithorn, Conceptual Hurdles to
the Application of Atkins v. Virginia, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1203 (2008).
377. Maldonado v. Thaler, 662 F. Supp. 2d 684, 704 (S.D. Tex. 2009), aff'd, No. 10-
70,003, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 22590 (5th Cir. Oct. 29, 2010).
378. See supra notes 217-80 and accompanying text (describing Briseno and
subsequent cases).
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as the person's "social, linguistic, and cultural background." 9  The
AAMR states that the "Wechsler and [Stanford-Binet] scales are
perhaps the most widely used and accepted measures to assess
intelligence." 380 These scales include the Wechsler Adult Intelligence
Scale (currently in its third edition, "WAIS-III"), the Stanford-Binet
Intelligence Scale (currently in its fifth edition, "SB5"), and the
Wechsler Intelligence Scales for Children (currently in its fourth
edition, "WISC-IV").38 ' According to the AAMR, the current
versions of IQ tests that have been most recently normed should be
utilized.382 Short-form versions of these tests or other screening tests,
such as the Beta test often given in prisons, are not deemed to be as
accurate measures of intelligence assessment. 3
Regarding the adaptive behavior assessment instrument, the
AAMR recommends an instrument that assesses across all of the
domains of adaptive behavior contained in the mental retardation
definition (e.g., areas of functional academics and self-care) and also
utilizes current norms based on a representative sample of the general
population. The AAMR further advises that the instrument be
administered to respondents who know the assessed person very well
and have had the opportunity to observe the person frequently in a
variety of community settings over an extended period of time (e.g.,
family, friends, teachers, employers, and care providers)-and
384cautions against the use of self-ratings by the assessed person.
379. AAIDD, supra note 5, at 41; see id. at 36 (describing the potential impact of
individual characteristics on test results); Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 376, at 828.
380. AAIDD, supra note 5, at 41 (noting also that there may be instances when
another IQ test is a better match for an individual's personal characteristics); see Ex parte
Hearn, 310 S.W.3d 424, 428 n.7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (identifying previous versions of
the WISC and SB IQ tests and the Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children as
"standardized, individually administered" IQ tests and citing APA, supra note 5, at 41);
Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 376, at 826.
381. See Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 376, at 826-27; Everington & Olley, supra
note 376, at 6, 7; cf. Fabian, Life, supra note 376, at 17-19 (noting variations in these tests);
Weithorn, supra note 376, at 1212-19 (describing the history of IQ testing and some
current criticisms of it).
382. See AAIDD, supra note 5, at 25, 41.
383. See AAIDD, supra note 5, at 41; Everington & Olley, supra note 376, at 7; Fabian,
Life, supra note 376, at 18; Patton & Keyes, supra note 376, at 246-47.
384. See AAIDD, supra note 5, at 47-54. The AAMR's mental retardation definition
includes significant limitations in adaptive behavior, as measured by assessment
instruments, and based on the person's "typical" performance. The AAMR recognizes
that "adaptive skill limitations often coexist with strengths" and both should be
"documented within the context of community and cultural environments typical of the
person's age peers." AAIDD, supra note 5, at 45, 47; see Everington & Olley, supra note
376, at 8; Patton & Keyes, supra note 376, at 250, 252.
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Frequently used adaptive behavior scales include the Vineland
Adaptive Behavior Scales ("VABS"), the AAMR Adaptive Behavior
Scale ("ABS"), the Scales of Independent Behavior (current version
"SIB-R"), and the Adaptive Behavior Assessment System (current
version "ABAS-II").
In addition to challenges concerning the selection of appropriate
assessment instruments are issues concerning the accurate
interpretation of results of these assessment instruments. Assessment
instruments in both the intellectual and adaptive functioning areas
have standard errors of measurement, generally between three and
five points regarding IQ tests, which establish a "statistical confidence
interval around the obtained score.",' The identification and
application of the correct measurement error obviously affects the
assessment instrument's results."" The AAMR also cautions that IQ
385. See Hearn, 310 S.W.3d at 428 n.10 (citing APA, supra note 5, at 42); Everington &
Olley, supra note 376, at 12; cf. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 376, at 848 (expressing a
concern about the reliability of these instruments); Brodsky & Galloway, supra note 376,
at 7 (noting the lack of a uniform instrument that measures all aspects of adaptive
functioning); Fabian, Life, supra note 376, at 10-12 (noting the absence of uniform
adaptive behavior assessment tests used by all experts); Patton & Keyes, supra note 376, at
249 (noting limitations of assessment instruments); Stevens & Price, supra note 376, at 7-
14 (comparing aspects of VABS, SIB-R, and ABAS-II). In assessing the adaptive
behavior area of functional academics, standardized achievements tests, such as the Wide
Range Achievement Test or Woodcock Johnson Psychoeducational Battery are
sometimes used. See Everington & Olley, supra note 376, at 13; Fabian, Life, supra note
376, at 14 (noting strengths and weaknesses of these tests). Professionals differ in their
views of the Street Survival Skills Questionnaire, a vocational curriculum development
instrument that focuses on practical skills, as an effective additional indication of adaptive
behavior. See Everington & Olley, supra note 376, at 9; Lisa Kan et al., Presenting
Information About Mental Retardation in the Courtroom: A Content Analysis of Pre-
Atkins Capital Trial Transcripts from Texas, 33 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 15-16, 22 (2009).
But see Stevens & Price, supra note 376, at 17-18.
386. AAIDD, supra note 5, at 36, 48-49 (noting also that the measurement error varies
by test, subgroup, and age group); see Hearn 310 S.W.3d at 428 (noting an IQ
measurement error of approximately five points and citing APA, supra note 5, at 41); Ex
parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 7 n.24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (noting that IQ tests differ in
accuracy); Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 376, at 834-36; Everington & Olley, supra note
376, at 6, 8; Fabian, Life, supra note 376, at 10; Mossman, supra note 376, at 269-70; Patton
& Keyes, supra note 376, at 246.
387. The AAMR states that "[r]eporting an IQ score with an associated confidence
interval is a critical consideration underlying the appropriate use of intelligence tests and
best practices; such reporting must be part of any decision concerning the diagnosis of
[mental retardation]." AAIDD, supra note 5, at 36; see id. at 40; see also Bonnie &
Gustafson, supra note 376, at 835-36 (cautioning against application of the measurement
error only to raise and not lower an IQ score or vice versa). Some have asserted the need
to deduct 2.34 points from WAIS-III IQ scores due to the use of a substandard normative
sample. See Flynn, supra note 263, at 178-79; see also Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note
376, at 841.
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scores can be artificially inflated due to the "practice" effect from
multiple administrations of IQ testing instruments relatively close in
time (as sometimes occurs in Atkins litigation), or inaccurate based
on the "Flynn effect" regarding IQ tests with norms that do not
reflect the general increase in IQ scores over time. " Reflecting the
above considerations, the AAMR cautions against the use of a fixed
cutoff point regarding IQ scores in the determination of mental
retardation." The AAMR further notes that variability in
assessment tests and their administration may result in some
variability in assessment test results.3 " Finally, the test
administrator's experience with the administration of assessment
instruments generally, and for correctional populations specifically, as
well as the application of clinical judgment, can significantly affect the
reliability and validity of the test results and their interpretation.
In addition to challenges related to the assessment tests, Texas
state and federal courts reviewing Atkins claims face other challenges
in their consideration of the testimonial and other evidence presented
388. See AAIDD, supra note 5, at 37, 38; see also Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 376,
at 837-40; Duvall & Morris, supra note 376, at 662-63; Everington & Olley, supra note
376, at 7; Fabian, Life, supra note 376, at 20-21; Patton & Keyes, supra note 376, at 246-
47. The Texas Court has not endorsed the application of the Flynn effect in determining
an offender's IQ for Atkins purposes. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
389. See AAIDD, supra note 5, at 35, 39-40; see also Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note
376, at 841-45; Duvall & Morris, supra note 376, at 659-61; Mossman, supra note 376, at
269. In the 1992 edition of its diagnostic and classification manual, the AAMR adopted an
IQ standard score of "approximately 70 to 75 or below." AAIDD, supra note 5, at 10.
Beginning with the 2002 edition of its manual, the AAMR eliminated reference to a
specific IQ score in its definition of limited intellectual functioning. Instead it defines this
criterion as "approximately two standard deviations below the mean, considering the
standard error of measurement for the specific assessment instruments used and the
instruments' strengths and weaknesses." AAIDD, supra note 5, at 10, 35. The Texas
Court has defined the intellectual functioning component of mental retardation as an IQ
of "about 70 or below." Hearn, 310 S.W.3d at 428; Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 7 n.24.
However, the Texas Court has also noted the standard error of measurement that could
reflect an actual score five points higher or lower than that number, see Hearn, 310 S.W.3d
at 428, and that mental health professionals are "flexible" in their mental retardation
assessments. See Hearn, 310 S.W.3d 430-31 (describing the relationship between
measurement error and the "rough ceiling" of "about 70" IQ for Atkins purposes);
Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 7 n.24 (noting the approximately two standard deviations below the
mean companion standard for mental retardation).
390. See AAIDD, supra note 5, at 38-39 (noting that this variability can even include
some extreme scores); see also Everington & Olley, supra note 376, at 6-7, 8; Fabian, Life,
supra note 376, at 18-19; Patton & Keyes, supra note 376, at 246.
391. See AAIDD, supra note 5, at 40-41, 85-103; Brodsky & Galloway, supra note 376,
at 4-5; Everington & Olley, supra note 376, at 5; Fabian, Life, supra note 376, at 29-30;
Patton & Keyes, supra note 376, at 245.
to them. The reliability of expert testimony is affected not only by
the qualifications of the expert, but also by the thoroughness of the
expert's examination and evaluation of the offender; assessments and
interviews of other persons who know the offender; and review of
relevant records concerning the offender, such as school and
employment records and other mental retardation evaluations.3 " Lay
witnesses who are best acquainted with the offender, such as family
members and friends, may also have a motive to testify in a manner to
help the offender prevail in Atkins proceedings.3 93 Lay witnesses who
only know the offender in connection with his criminal conduct, such
as police and correctional personnel, may not have sufficient
knowledge of his intellectual and adaptive behavior in a community
setting, or may be influenced by their own biases.394 Moreover, as
they characterize an offender as mentally retarded, or not, the
perception of lay witnesses concerning mental retardation may not be
accurate.395
The performance of offenders in post-Atkins mental retardation
assessment can be subject to both the "cloak of competence," often
causing mentally retarded persons to inflate their adaptive behavior
abilities,396 and the obvious motive to underperform in assessments
conducted for Atkins purposes.397 In addition, offenders' intellectual
and adaptive behavior abilities may have been affected by their long-
term incarceration.398 Moreover, the interpretation of criminal
392. See AAIDD, supra note 5, at 47, 85-103; Everington & Olley, supra note 376, at 9,
12-13; Fabian, Life, supra note 376, at 10-11; Stevens & Price, supra note 376, at 14-19,
23-26.
393. See Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 376, at 849; Fabian, Life, supra note 376, at
12-13; Stevens & Price, supra note 376, at 16.
394. See Everington & Olley, supra note 376, at 9, 12; Fabian, Life, supra note 376, at
10, 13-14; Patton & Keyes, supra note 376, at 249-50; Stevens & Price, supra note 376, at
16, 19; Young et al., supra note 263, at 174-75.
395. See Marcus T. Boccaccini et al., Jury Pool Members' Beliefs About the Relation
Between Potential Impairments in Functioning and Mental Retardation: Implications for
Atkins-Type Cases, 34 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 1 (2010); Fabian, Life, supra note 376, at 13;
Patton & Keyes, supra note 376, at 239-40.
396. See Everington & Olley, supra note 376, at 10; Fabian, Life, supra note 376, at 31;
Patton & Keyes, supra note 376, at 249, 252; Stevens & Price, supra note 376, at 17.
397. See Brodsky & Galloway, supra note 376, at 7-8; Fabian, Life, supra note 376, at
24-25; Mossman, supra note 376, at 276-78; Patton & Keyes, supra note 376, at 249;
Stevens & Price, supra note 376, at 17; cf. Everington & Olley, supra note 376, at 15-18
(discussing strategies to detect planful underperformance, if any).
398. See Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 376, at 848; Brodsky & Galloway, supra note
376, at 6-7; Fabian, Life, supra note 376, at 19-20, 31; Patton & Keyes, supra note 376, at
249-50; Stevens & Price, supra note 376, at 19; Young et al., supra note 263, at 171.
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conduct as reflective of adaptive behavior remains a subject of
conflicting opinion in the mental retardation professional and
scholarly communities.'" Finally, courts considering Atkins claims are
often tasked with making a retrospective determination of mental
retardation and its developmental period onset with limited or
inconsistent educational and other records supporting or
controverting the claim.'
Despite all of these challenges, Texas state and federal courts
reviewing Atkins claims must make an assessment of mental
retardation that literally determines whether a Texas capital offender
can be executed or not.40' It is with these challenges in mind that the
cases of the successful Atkins claimants, in conjunction with
illustrative unsuccessful, but vigorously contested, Atkins claims, are
reviewed.
2. Successful Texas State and Federal Atkins Claims on Collateral
Review
As Table 1 reflects, fourteen of the eighty-one capital offenders
whose Atkins collateral review claims have been resolved in Texas
state or federal processes have successfully established their mental
retardation for Atkins purposes." With regard to the ten offenders
whose Atkins subsequent writ claims were successful in the Texas
Court, six of the ten cases followed agreed or stipulated mental
retardation findings in the convicting trial courts and the remaining
399. See Everington & Olley, supra note 376, at 11; Fabian, State, supra note 376, at 1;
Fabian, Life, supra note 376, at 8, 24, 31; Kan et al., supra note 385, at 7-8, 20-21; Stevens
& Price, supra note 376, at 18; Young et al., supra note 263, at 172-74.
400. See AAIDD, supra note 5, at 95-96; Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 376, at 855;
Everington & Olley, supra note 376, at 8-9, 11-12; Fabian, Life, supra note 376, at 13, 14-
17, 21-22; Patton & Keyes, supra note 376, at 248, 250, 251-52; Stevens & Price, supra note
376, at 15-16.
401. See Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 376, at 860; Everington & Olley, supra note
376, at 19; Fabian, Life, supra note 376, at 34-35; Mossman, supra note 376, at 290-91; see
also Kan et al., supra note 385, at 1 (describing transcript analysis regarding presentation
of mental retardation evidence in nineteen pre-Atkins Texas capital cases); Stevens &
Price, supra note 376, at 19-20 (describing survey of over 300 psychologists regarding
adaptive behavior assessment issues in capital cases);Young et al., supra note 263, at 169
(describing survey of twenty Texas psychologists and psychiatrists regarding mental
retardation assessment issues in capital cases); cf. Weithorn, supra note 376, at 1203
(asserting that use of clinical mechanisms to determine mental retardation for Atkins
excludes too many offenders from execution and suggesting alternative criteria).
402. See supra Table 1.
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four cases followed contested proceedings."3 Both of the Texas
Governor's Atkins commutations followed agreed findings of mental
retardation." The findings of mental retardation by the Texas
federal courts regarding two offenders followed contested
proceedings.' The evidence of mental retardation and its
consideration by the reviewing bodies in these cases reflects both
similarities and differences."
a. Texas Court Atkins Relief Based on Agreed Findings of Mental
Retardation
The Texas Court granted relief for two of the Atkins claims
based on stipulated findings of mental retardation, submitted in
conjunction with plea agreements in other cases of the offender and
designed to ensure the offender's incarceration for the remainder of
his life.407 One of these cases, involving Willie Mack Modden,
resulted in the first Atkins sentence reformation granted by the Texas
403. Compare Ex parte Carr, No. AP-75,627, 2007 WL 602816 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb.
28, 2007) (per curiam) (involving agreed or stipulated mental retardation findings), with
Ex parte Bell, 152 S.W.3d 103, 104 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (per curiam) (resolving
contested evidence); see infra notes 407-55, 467-500 and accompanying text (describing
these cases).
404. See Ex parte Lane, Nos. WR-67,161-01, WR-67,161-02, 2009 Tex. Crim. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 102 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 4, 2009) (per curiam); Ex parte Smith, No.
40,874-02 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 21, 2004) (per curiam) (describing Texas Governor's
commutations on Atkins grounds and dismissing the writ applications as moot); infra notes
456-66 and accompanying text (describing these cases).
405. See Moore v. Quarterman, 342 F. App'x 65 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Rivera v.
Quarterman, 505 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2007).
406. See infra notes 407-517 and accompanying text.
407. See Exparte DeBlanc, No. AP-75,113, 2005 WL 768441 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 16,
2005) (per curiam); Ex parte Modden, 147 S.W.3d 293 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). In the
Modden case, the offender agreed to enter guilty pleas to five felonies for which he would
receive consecutive life sentences that would be served consecutively to any life sentence
he would receive for capital murder based on his Atkins claim. In connection with these
guilty pleas, the State agreed to stipulate to a mental retardation finding and present
agreed factual findings and legal conclusions with the defense to the trial court. Although
the Texas Court acknowledged these arrangements between the parties, it made clear that
its determination in the case was based on the trial court's findings of mental retardation
and their support by the record. See Modden, 147 S.W.3d at 294 n.7, 299; Transcript of
Record at 15-17, Modden, 147 S.W.3d at 293 (Nos. 12,145; WR-11,364-05; 74,715)
(containing the State's agreement). In the DeBlanc case, the offender agreed to enter
guilty pleas to three felonies with consecutive life sentences and two felonies with
consecutive twenty-year sentences, all to be served consecutively to the life sentence in the
capital murder case following the entry of agreed findings on the Atkins claim. Transcript
of Record at 11-17, DeBlanc, 2005 WL 768441 (Nos. 15,386-A; 69,850; AP-7511)
(containing Respondent's Original Answer).
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Court. Modden had previously been granted a new trial based on
Penry error involving his mitigating evidence of mental retardation
and had been reconvicted and resentenced to death.4 09 In connection
with his two pre-Atkins trials, two experts had administered WAIS 10
tests to Modden, approximately seven years apart, and he received
full scale IQ scores of sixty-four and fifty-eight on these tests.410
Accompanying Wide Range Achievement Tests ("WRAT") placed
his reading, math, and spelling levels at or below third grade level.41'
These two experts, as well as a third expert, also identified Modden's
adaptive behavior deficits, including significant difficulties with
interpersonal relationships, tendencies to misinterpret or distort
perceptual input from others, an inability to cope with life's daily
demands or function outside of a structured setting, and absence of
cognitive and behavioral controls required to regulate his behavior.412
These three experts characterized Modden as "mildly" mentally
retarded in connection with Modden's pre-Atkins proceedings.413
These facts were included in stipulated factual findings and legal
conclusions that were adopted by the convicting trial judge in the
collateral review proceedings.4 14 This judge had also presided over
408. The Texas Court decided the Modden case approximately two months after it
announced the Atkins collateral review procedures in Briseno. See Modden, 147 S.W.3d at
293; Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Although the proceedings in
the convicting trial court were conducted before the Briseno procedures were announced,
the Texas Court stated that it was reviewing the record and applying the criteria
announced in Briseno to Modden's claim. See Modden, 147 S.W.3d at 296-97; see also
infra note 863 (finding the trial court's determination of mental retardation supported by
the record without the application of the subsequently identified Briseno factors).
409. See Modden, 147 S.W.3d at 294. In subsequent writ proceedings following his
retrial, Modden asserted an Atkins claim while that case was pending in the Court.
Although the Texas Court initially dismissed the writ application, the Court later vacated
that judgment and remanded the writ for reconsideration after the Atkins decision was
announced. See id.
410. See id. at 296-97; Transcript of Record at 20-24, Modden, 147 S.W.3d at 293 (Nos.
12,145; WR-11,364-05; 74,715) (containing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law).
411. See Modden, 147 S.W.3d at 296-97; Transcript of Record at 20-24, Modden, 147
S.W.3d at 293 (Nos. 12,145; WR-11,364-05; 74,715) (containing Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law); see also supra note 385 (describing the WRAT test).
412. See Modden, 147 S.W.3d at 296-97; Transcript of Record at 20-24, Modden, 147
S.W.3d at 293 (Nos. 12,145; WR-11,364-05; 74,715) (containing Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law).
413. See Modden, 147 S.W.3d at 294, 296-98; Transcript of Record at 20-24, Modden,
147 S.W.3d at 293 (Nos. 12,145; WR-11,364-05; 74,715) (containing Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law).
414. See Transcript of Record at 20-24, Modden, 147 S.W.3d at 293 (Nos. 12,145; WR-
11,364-05; 74,715) (containing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law).
both of Modden's pre-Atkins trials and had stated that he was
mentally retarded in connection with these previous proceedings.415
Although the Texas Court, on review, acknowledged the existence of
some conflicting evidence in the record,416 it also noted the
"significant" evidence of and support in the record for the trial
judge's finding of Modden's mental retardation and the "great
deference" owed to it. The Texas Court therefore granted relief on
Modden's Atkins claim and reformed his death sentence to one of life
imprisonment.4 17
The second case accompanied by a plea agreement involved
David DeBlanc. In his case, the agreed factual findings and legal
conclusions were based on expert evidence prepared for his pre-
Atkins trial and documentary evidence and affidavit evidence from
family members submitted in the writ proceedings.418 The defense
expert for DeBlanc's pre-Atkins trial based her diagnosis of mental
retardation on her own examination of the offender and a review of
his school records that included 1) a WISC full scale IQ score of fifty-
six at approximately age fourteen, 2) at least three classifications of
DeBlanc as mentally retarded, and 3) his placement in special
education classes. 419 Hospital records reflected an attending doctor's
characterization of DeBlanc as mentally retarded based on his
evaluation at age fifteen for unrelated injuries.420  Prison records
415. See Modden, 147 S.W.3d at 298. The Texas Court had also noted the evidence of
Modden's mental retardation in granting him relief on his previous Penry claim. See id. at
298-99.
416. See id. at 298. In a lengthy dissent, two Judges of the Texas Court concluded that
a mental retardation finding was not supported by a more complete review of the record,
including testimony of a State expert in the previous proceedings that Modden was not
mentally retarded and that criticized some of the other experts' findings, prison IQ scores
ranging from fifty-seven to eighty-three, evidence indicating that Modden did not satisfy
the Briseno factors, and Modden's previous testimony about his crimes and otherwise that
was inconsistent with the limited abilities of a mentally retarded person. See id. at 299-311
(Hervey, J., joined by Keasler, J., dissenting). These dissenting Judges criticized the trial
court's acceptance of the parties' agreed factual findings, and criticized the majority for
sanctioning the plea agreement in this case through the vehicle of a mental retardation
finding. See id. at 300-01, 311.
417. See id. at 298-99. In addition to the expert reports, the Texas Court noted that
evidence from Modden's educational and prison records also reflected his intellectual and
adaptive behavior deficits. See id. at 297-98.
418. See Transcript of Record at 127-30, 132-39, Ex parte DeBlanc, No. AP-75,113,
2005 WL 768441 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 16, 2005) (per curiam) (Nos. 15,386-A; 69,850;
AP-7511) (containing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law); see also id. at 130-32
(granting DeBlanc's Penry claim based on agreed findings, as well).
419. See id. at 133-34.
420. See id. at 133.
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regarding a prior offense indicated DeBlanc's full scale IQ of sixty
based on an unspecified test and educational achievement measured
at the second grade level.421  Affidavits by family members reflected
his difficulties with academic matters and practical skills (such as
telling time and counting change), comprehension and memory
problems, need for assistance with self-care matters, and tendency to
be easily led by peers, even into problematic situations.422 The Texas
Court found that the record supported the trial court's finding of
mental retardation and granted Atkins relief by reforming DeBlanc's
sentence to life imprisonment.423
In four cases (involving Darrell Carr, Demetrius Simms,
Exzavier Stevenson, and Alberto Valdez),424 the State initially
opposed the offender's Atkins claim, but later agreed to a finding of
mental retardation after its own expert determined in the course of
the Atkins proceedings that the offender was mentally retarded.425 in
Darrell Carr's initial Atkins writ pleadings, he cited two IQ scores of
sixty-eight, based on unspecified tests administered when he was
approximately fourteen and fifteen; a Shipley scale IQ score of
seventy at age fifteen; poor school performance; and an assessment of
psychological immaturity.426 In light of the defense's retention of two
experts, the State reserved the right to conduct its own investigation
to respond to Carr's Atkins claim.427 When the State's expert also
found Carr mentally retarded, the State proposed factual findings and
legal conclusions, based on its expert's assessment, which the trial
court adopted.4' The State's expert had administered the WAIS-III,
WRAT, and ABAS tests.4 29 According to this expert, Carr's full scale
421. See id.
422. See id. at 135-38.
423. See DeBlanc, 2005 WL 768441.
424. Ex parte Stevenson, No. AP-75639, 2007 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 868
(Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 21, 2007) (per curiam); Ex parte Carr, No. AP-75,627, 2007 WL
602816 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2007) (per curiam); Ex parte Simms, No. AP-75,625
(Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2007) (per curiam); Ex parte Valdez, 158 S.W.3d 438 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2004) (per curiam).
425. See infra notes 426-55 and accompanying text.
426. See Transcript of Record at 8-10, Carr, 2007 WL 602816 (Nos. 644434-B; WR-
55,033-02; AP-75,627) (containing Successor Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus).
427. See id. at 215-19 (containing Respondent's Original Answer).
428. See id. at 298-308 (containing Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order).
429. See id. at 304-05 (identifying additional tests performed to detect malingering
(i.e., intentionally performing poorly on the test), anxiety, and depression that could affect
test results).
WAIS-III 10 score was fifty-three, though he also noted that Carr's
full scale WAIS-III IQ score, as administered by the Atkins defense
expert, was fifty, and his full scale WISC-Revised IQ score, at age
thirteen, was sixty-eight. Carr's reading, spelling, and math WRAT
performance was at the second grade level. Carr's composite ABAS
score of sixty-four supported the expert's findings of significant
deficits in the adaptive behavior areas of community use, functional
academics, health and safety, and self-care. Carr's functioning in the
leisure, communication, and social skills areas was slightly above the
significantly impaired level.43 0 The Texas Court held that the trial
court's findings and conclusions regarding Carr's mental retardation
were supported by the record and accordingly granted Carr Atkins
relief.431
In Demetrius Simms' initial Atkins writ pleading, he cited full
and partial IQ testings administered when he was a juvenile, which
included performance scores of sixty-one, seventy-one, and seventy-
five, as well as a verbal score of fifty-four. Simms also cited his
placement in special education; Woodcock-Johnson achievement test
performance between a first and third grade level; juvenile Street
Survival Skills Questionnaire ("SSSQ") scores reflecting significant
deficits in practical areas of daily living; noted deficits in social and
interpersonal skills and impulse control; prior testimony of family
members and teachers about limitations in academic performance
and other areas of adaptive behavior; and placement in the prison
system's Mentally Retarded Offender Program ("MROP") at age
eighteen.432 In the State's Answer, it acknowledged prior trial
testimony by defense experts that Simms was "mildly" mentally
retarded (based in part on a full scale WAIS-Revised IQ score of
sixty-eight) and "functionally" retarded; however, the State also
highlighted State expert and lay testimony indicating that Simms
functioned above the mental retardation level. The State also noted
Simms' full scale IQ score of seventy-one on the WAIS-Revised test
at age eighteen, and his full scale IQ score of seventy-three on this
same test administered in a previous proceeding. At age eighteen, as
430. See id. at 298-308. The State's expert found Carr's VABS score of twenty-five, an
adaptive behavior level of a profoundly mentally retarded person, based on the
administration of this test by a defense Atkins expert, was unreliable. See id. at 307.
431. Carr, 2007 WL 602816.
432. See Transcript of Record at 9-15, Ex parte Simms, No. AP-75,625 (Tex. Crim.
App. Feb. 28, 2007) (per curiam) (Nos. 605233-02; WR-56,811-01; AP-75,625) (containing
Successor Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus); see also supra note 385 (describing the
SSSO test).
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the State also noted, Simms scored a composite fifty-three on the
VABS scale and eighty on the SSSQ test, both regarding adaptive
behavior. Expert and lay witnesses in Simms' prior trial testified
regarding Simms' adaptive behavior abilities, including his holding a
part-time job, receiving training, performing many daily living
activities, having a girlfriend, communicating with police and
correctional personnel, and carrying out aspects of his crime.43
Despite its detailed initial opposition to Simms' Atkins claim,
after the State's Atkins expert also found Simms mentally retarded,
the State submitted proposed findings and conclusions, based on this
expert's finding of Simms' mental retardation, that were adopted by
the trial court.434 The State's expert administered the WAIS-III,
WRAT, and ABAS tests.43 1 Simms' full scale WAIS-III IQ score was
sixty-three. Simms' reading, spelling, and math WRAT performance
was at the third grade level. Simms' composite ABAS score of sixty-
one supported the expert's findings of significant deficits in the
adaptive behavior areas of communication, community use,
functional academics, health and safety, and social skills. Simms'
functioning in the self-care and self-direction areas was marginal.436
This expert also noted various tests during Simms' formative years,
including Simms' full scale WISC-Revised IQ score of sixty-three and
VABS score of fifty-three. 437  The Texas Court held that the trial
court's findings and conclusions regarding Simms' mental retardation
were supported by the record and granted Simms Atkins relief.43 8
Exzavier Stevenson's initial Atkins claim was supported by his
IQ score of sixty-eight on a test administered in connection with his
previous trial, his participation in special education classes, and his
difficulties with independent living.' However, the State opposed
the claim by noting Stevenson's prison Beta screening IQ score of
433. See Transcript of Record at 64-91, Ex parte Simms, No. AP-75,625 (Nos. 605233-
02; WR-56,811-01; AP-75,625) (containing Respondent's Original Answer) (noting
additionally the intellectual and behavioral impact of Simms' hearing impairment as
opposed to mental impairments).
434. See id. at 112-24 (containing Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order).
435. See id. at 120-21 (identifying additional tests performed to detect malingering,
anxiety, and depression that could affect test results).
436. See id. at 120-23.
437. See id. at 123.
438. See Simms, No. AP-75,625.
439. See Stevenson v. State, 73 S.W.3d 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (rejecting pre-
Atkins claim of mental retardation and affirming conviction).
eighty-nine, his security guard job of two years, his support for his
girlfriend and child, and other adaptive behavior abilities." After the
State's expert found Stevenson mentally retarded, the State and
defense jointly proposed factual findings and legal conclusions
supporting a mental retardation finding that the trial court adopted."'
Supporting the intellectual functioning element were Stevenson's
Social Security Administration classification as moderately mentally
retarded (with an IQ range of forty to fifty-five) at age twenty, a
WAIS-III full scale IQ score of fifty-five at age thirty-three, a WAIS-
III full scale IQ score of fifty-one at age thirty-five, and a full scale
SB5 IQ score of forty-one at age thirty-eight."2 Supporting the
adaptive behavior element were an ABAS composite score of fifty-
one at age thirty-seven reflecting deficits in seven of ten skill areas,
and another ABAS composite score of forty-seven (adjusted for
lifestyle factors to sixty-one) at age thirty-seven reflecting deficits
regarding functional academics, communication, community use,
health and safety, leisure, and social areas."3 In the absence of school
and juvenile records reflecting Stevenson's abilities in the
developmental period, the State's expert confirmed that Stevenson's
adult testing was reflective of his intellectual and adaptive behavior in
his developmental period."4 The Texas Court noted the agreed
findings and conclusions of mental retardation adopted by the trial
judge and granted Stevenson Atkins relief."'
In Alberto Valdez's initial Atkins writ pleadings, he cited, in
support of his Atkins claim, his WISC full scale IQ score of sixty-three
at age thirteen, a WAIS full scale IQ score of sixty-three at age
eighteen, placement in special education before failing most classes
and dropping out of school after sixth grade, and expert testimony
from prior proceedings regarding his adaptive behavior deficits."'
440. See Transcript of Record at 22-30, Ex parte Stevenson, No. AP-75,639, 2007 Tex.
Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 868 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 21, 2007) (per curiam) (Nos.
836855-B; WR-57,059-01; AP-75,639) (containing Respondent's Original Answer).
441. See id. at 490-504 (containing Applicant's and Respondent's Proposed Findings of
Facts, Conclusions of Law and Order).
442. See id. at 498-99 (including the test results of State and defense experts, with the
State expert noting that his test result of forty-one understated Stevenson's mental ability
due to his severe depression at the time of the test).
443. See id. at 499-500 (noting also that the Social Security Administration disability
determination would include a determination of adaptive behavior deficits).
444. See id. at 501-02.
445. See Stevenson, 2007 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 868.
446. See Second Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 4-5, Ex parte Valdez, 158
S.W.3d 438 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (per curiam) (Nos. 87-CR-1459-B; WR-31,184-02; AP-
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The State initially opposed the Atkins claim by citing Valdez's WAIS
full scale 10 score of eighty-one at age sixteen; prison Beta IQ
screening test scores from eighty-seven to ninety-six in four tests
administered between age eighteen and twenty-seven; likelihood that
Valdez's lower IQ scores were artificially depressed by his limited
formal education, cultural and language background, testing
motivation, and the divergence of the component verbal and
performance scores; and the record and forthcoming evidence
regarding his adaptive behavior abilities."'
During the Atkins evidentiary hearing, three defense experts
testified that Valdez was mentally retarded."' In addition to their
clinical examinations of Valdez and review of past records and family
testimony, further tests were performed, including a WAIS-III
producing a full scale IQ score of sixty-four; WRAT tests indicating
reading, spelling, and math skills at a first or second grade level; and a
test measuring brain function and motor behavior that reflected
severe dysfunction in an area highly correlated with adaptive
behavior functioning." Evidence was also introduced at the hearing
regarding Valdez's adaptive behavior deficits in functional academics,
social skills, leisure, and work, including his inability to live
independently, hold a regular job, or budget money, as well as his
impulsive, unplanned actions as reflected in his past criminal
behavior. 45 0 Evidence was also introduced regarding his satisfaction
75,039). In pre-Atkins collateral proceedings in state and federal court, Valdez had
asserted Atkins claims and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, based in part on
counsel's failure to present available mental retardation evidence at punishment.
Although his claims were denied in state collateral proceedings, Atkins was decided during
the pendency of the federal proceedings and Valdez's federal writ proceedings were
dismissed so that he could exhaust his Atkins claim in state court. See Transcript of
Record at 353-56, Valdez, 158 S.W.3d at 438 (Nos. 87-CR-1459-B; WR-31,184-02; AP-
75,039) (containing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law).
447. See Transcript of Record at 165-69, Valdez, 158 S.W.3d at 438 (Nos. 87-CR-1459-
B; WR-31,184-02; AP-75,039) (containing State's Answer to Atkins pleading).
448. See id. at 366, 370, 372 (containing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law).
449. See id. at 365-72. Additional evidence included a school-administered group
overall IQ score of sixty-four, previous WRAT scores at the third or fourth grade level in
connection with prior litigation, and Valdez's failure of the GED test three times while in
prison. See id. at 357, 362, 370-71.
450. See id. at 356-72. The expert who focused principally on adaptive behavior issues
testified that standardized adaptive behavior scales (e.g., VABS) are not necessary or
appropriate regarding a retrospective assessment of an adult who has been incarcerated
for a lengthy period. These tests are not normed for adults in segregated environments
like prisons and it is not appropriate to diagnose mental retardation based on an inmate's
behavior in a controlled environment like a prison. See id. at 366-67. This expert stated
that Valdez's ability to groom himself, form relationships with women, drive a car, adjust
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of the Briseno factors.45' In the course of the Atkins proceedings, the
State's expert announced that he was changing his opinion and
joining the defense's three experts in concluding that Valdez was
mentally retarded. 452 The experts' consensus opinion that Valdez was
mentally retarded and the facts on which it was based were reflected
in the trial judge's factual findings and legal conclusions that Valdez
was mentally retarded.453 The State also submitted a factual finding,
adopted by the trial judge, that Valdez was in the range of "mild
mental retardation." 45 4  The Texas Court found that the record
supported the trial court's finding of mental retardation and granted
Atkins relief to Valdez.455
b. Texas Governor's Atkins Relief Based on Agreed Findings of Mental
Retardation
The Texas Governor commuted the death sentences of Robert
Smith and Doil Lane to life sentences based on agreed findings of
mental retardation. 456  During the punishment phase of Robert
Smith's pre-Atkins trial, mitigation evidence had been introduced,
to prison life, and earn small amounts of money in prison did not exclude a mental
retardation diagnosis. As stated by the AAMR, strengths can coexist with weaknesses in a
mentally retarded person. See id. at 369.
451. See id. at 369, 376.
452. See id. at 353, 372-73. The State's expert changed his opinion after hearing the
defense evidence, especially the evidence about the brain function test results. He
concluded that Valdez met the criteria for "mild" mental retardation. See id. at 372-73.
453. See id. at 352-53, 373-77.
454. Although the State had presented testimony from police and correctional officers
and Valdez's former defense attorney, after the change of its expert's testimony and the
trial judge's subsequent announcement that she was finding Valdez mentally retarded, the
State announced that it would not oppose the court's findings and conclusions in light of
the testimony at the hearing and submitted its proposed finding. See id. at 352-53, 382.
The State proposed a legal conclusion that Valdez's execution be barred as long as his
mental retardation persisted rather than that his sentence be reformed to life
imprisonment. The convicting trial court refused this proposed legal conclusion. See id.;
see also Amicus Curiae Brief by the District Attorney for the 105th Judicial District of
Texas, Ex parte Bell, 152 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (per curiam) (Nos. 10,898-06;
AP-75,038) (proposing a permanent or indefinite stay rather than sentence reformation).
455. See Valdez, 158 S.W.3d at 438. The State's subsequent attempts to seek rehearing
and certiorari review were unsuccessful. See Texas v. Valdez, 544 U.S. 1000 (2005); Ex
parte Valdez, No. AP-75,039, 2005 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 49 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 12,
2005).
456. See Ex parte Lane, Nos. WR-67,161-01, WR-67,161-02, 2009 Tex. Crim. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 102 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 4, 2009) (per curiam); Ex parte Smith, No.
40,874-02 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 21, 2004) (per curiam) (describing Texas Governor's
commutations on Atkins grounds and dismissing the writ applications as moot); infra notes
457-66 and accompanying text.
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including an IQ score of sixty-four. His expert had characterized
Smith as "above the cutoff line for mental retardation ... but he
didn't-to be honest with you, he doesn't have a lot left over or a lot
extra upstairs."45 7 During these punishment proceedings, the State
located additional records that reflected Smith's school and juvenile
system full scale IQ scores of fifty-two, sixty-three, and sixty-four,
classifications as mentally deficient and mildly mentally retarded, and
achievement test results at the third to fifth grade level.458  In his
Atkins writ pleading, Smith cited these IQ scores, his inability to pass
the General Educational Development Test ("GED"), and adaptive
behavior challenges such as difficulties with independent living, work
skills, and self-direction. 459  Defense and State experts evaluated
Smith in connection with the Atkins proceedings, and both
determined he was mentally retarded. Smith's full scale IQ score on
the WAIS-III was sixty-three, and his full scale IQ score on the SB5
was sixty-one. Smith's VABS scores reflected severe deficiencies
regarding communication, daily living, and socialization skills. His
ABAS scores reflected deficiencies regarding community use,
functional academics, health and safety, leisure, self-direction, and
social skills. His WRAT achievement scores had declined from those
assessed in his youth.4 ' The convicting trial court adopted the State's
457. Smith v. Cockrell, 311 F.3d 661, 671 (5th Cir. 2002). The Fifth Circuit reviewed
this evidence in connection with Smith's collateral review claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel regarding his counsel's failure to investigate or present punishment evidence
regarding his mental retardation and related Penry error. See id. at 664, 668-74, 675-77,
677-83. In this proceeding, the Fifth Circuit reversed the federal trial court's grant of
habeas corpus relief on both grounds, finding that the Texas state courts had not
unreasonably applied federal law in denying these claims. See id. at 664, 677, 683, 685.
Following the announcement of Atkins during the pendency of the federal proceedings,
Smith also raised an Atkins claim for the first time on appeal. Given the unsettled state of
Texas's application of Atkins, the Fifth Circuit declined to consider Smith's unexhausted
Atkins claim in this appeal. See id. at 664, 684-85. The Court granted certiorari review of
the case, but subsequently dismissed it following the commutation of Smith's death
sentence. See Smith v. Dretke, 541 U.S. 913 (2004); Smith v. Dretke, 539 U.S. 986 (2003)
(regarding one issue).
458. See Smith, 311 F.3d at 672-73. Smith's attorney did not refer to these additional
records in his punishment case-in-chief. See id. at 673.
459. See Transcript of Record at 21-26, Smith, No. 40,874-02 (Nos. 564448-B; 40,874-
02) (containing Second Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus).
460. See id. at 116-24, 153-59, 161-64, 166-81, 183-84, 186-87 (containing
Respondent's Original Answer and Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Order and related exhibits). Although the State's expert challenged the
reliability of some of Smith's juvenile IQ scores, he found at least one was sufficiently
reliable (reflecting an IQ of sixty-three) in addition to his Atkins assessment of Smith's IQ
of sixty-one on the SB5 test. See id. at 171, 176, 179. He also stated that the defense
Atkins expert's WAIS-III scores and VABS assessment understated Smith's abilities. See
factual findings and conclusions regarding Smith's mental retardation,
including the recommendation that Smith's death sentence be
commuted to a life sentence through executive clemency.46' Following
the recommendation of the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles, the
Texas Governor commuted Smith's sentence to a life sentence.462
Smith's sentence commutation in March 2004 was both the first death
sentence commutation for this Texas Governor and the first grant of
Atkins relief in Texas.43
In Doil Lane's case, the agreed mental retardation findings that
led to the Texas Governor's commutation were largely based on
records from his developmental period, as introduced or further
developed during his prior trial and collateral review proceedings.4 64
As noted in the agreed factual findings and legal conclusions adopted
by the convicting trial court during Lane's Atkins proceedings, both
parties at his trial repeatedly referred to Lane as mentally retarded.
During his developmental period, Lane was classified as mentally
retarded. His full scale IQ scores were sixty-four at age twelve and
sixty-five on the WISC-Revised at age fifteen. He was in special
education throughout his academic career (including residential
placement), and he was functioning at the third grade level at age
eighteen. Based on past testing and additional testing using the SB
test, a defense expert diagnosed Lane as mentally retarded during
prior collateral review proceedings. Based on his developmental
records and performance, Lane was deemed to be deficient in
id. at 167,172. But see id. at 179 (referencing the WAIS-III score as supportive of his own
IQ finding). Nevertheless, both Atkins experts' reports were included as exhibits to the
findings and conclusions document. See id. at 155.
461. See id. at 153-59 (containing proposed findings and conclusions). The State
actually conceded Smith's mental retardation and recommended commutation through
executive clemency in its Original Answer to the writ pleading. See id. at 116-24. In
connection with these proceedings, Smith was convicted of and received a thirty-three
year sentence for a related offense. See R.G. Ratcliffe & Polly Ross Hughes, Two Inmates
on Death Row Given Reprieves; Governor Commutes Sentence in Case of Mentally
Retarded Houston Killer, HOUS. CHRONICLE, Mar. 13, 2004, at Al.
462. See Ratliffe & Hughes, supra note 461; Rick Perry, Gov. Rick Perry Grants
Inmate's Request for Commuted Sentence, http://www.governor.state.tx.us/divisions/
press/pressreleases/PressRelease.2004-03-12.4200/view (last visited Sept. 16, 2007).
463. See Smith, No. 40,874-02; Ratliffe & Hughes, supra note 461; cf Ex parte Modden,
147 S.W.3d 293 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (reflecting a decision in April 2004).
464. See Agreed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Ex parte Lane, Nos. WR-
67,161-01, WR-67,161-02, 2009 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 102 (Tex. Crim. App.
Feb. 4, 2009) (per curiam) (Nos. 93-454-B; 71,835, WR-67,161-02); Subsequent
Application for Post-Conviction Writ of Habeas Corpus at 4-6, Lane, 2009 Tex. Crim.
App. Unpub. LEXIS 102 (Nos. 93-454-B; 71,835, WR-67,161-02).
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communication, self-care, social/interpersonal, self-direction,
functional academics, and work skills. He was not deemed capable of
fully independent living.465 Prior to the return of the convicting trial
court's findings and commutation recommendation to the Texas
Court, the matter was submitted to the Texas Governor. Following
the recommendation of the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles, the
Texas Governor commuted Lane's death sentence to one of life
imprisonment.'
c. Texas Court's Atkins Relief Based on Contested Claims of Mental
Retardation
The Texas Court granted Atkins relief to Walter Bell, Gregory
Van Alstyne, Timothy Cockrell, and Daniel Plata following contested
Atkins proceedings.467 In Walter Bell's Atkins writ pleading, he cited
evidence from past trial and writ proceedings in his case,"' including
school, prison system, and litigation expert assessments reflecting his
full scale IQ scores of fifty-four at age nine, sixty-two at age fourteen,
sixty-seven at age twenty, fifty-eight at age thirty-five, and sixty-nine
at age forty; evidence from family, friends, military personnel, and
past experts as to Bell's adaptive behavior difficulties;4 69 and previous
465. See Agreed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Lane, 2009 Tex. Crim. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 102 (Nos. 93-454-B; 71,835, WR-67,161-02).
466. Lane, 2009 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 102; Rick Perry, Proclamation No.
2007-00002 (Mar. 9, 2007) (noting the convicting trial court's findings of Lane's mental
retardation and commutation recommendation, the local prosecutor's and police chief's
agreement, and the commutation recommendation of the Texas Board of Pardons and
Paroles).
467. See Ex parte Cockrell, No. AP-76,168, 2009 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 409
(Tex. Crim. App. June 10, 2009) (per curiam); Ex parte Plata, No. AP-75,820, 2008 Tex.
Crim. App. LEXIS 1398 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2008) (per curiam); Ex parte Van
Alstyne, 239 S.W.3d 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (per curiam); Ex parte Bell, 152 S.W.3d
103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (per curiam).
468. See Transcript of Record at 1-18, Bell, 152 S.W.3d at 103 (Nos. 31,678-E; 10,898-
06; AP-75,038) (containing Subsequent Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus). During
his three previous trials and related appeals and collateral proceedings, Bell had asserted
his mental retardation to unsuccessfully challenge the voluntariness of his conviction,
successfully claim Penry error, and unsuccessfully challenge the constitutionality of his
death sentence. Bell filed his Atkins subsequent writ following the pre-Atkins denial of his
constitutionality claim in state and federal court, its subsequent remand following the
Court's certiorari review after the Atkins decision, and the Fifth Circuit's dismissal of his
federal claim to permit post-Atkins exhaustion by the Texas courts. See id. at 3-5. See
generally Tobolowsky, supra note 60 (describing the thirty-year litigation history of Bell's
case).
469. See Transcript of Record at 7-11, Bell, 152 S.W.3d at 103 (Nos. 31,678-E; 10,898-
06; AP-75,038).
formal acknowledgements by the State and Texas Court of his mental
retardation.470 Although the State controverted Bell's Atkins claim
and requested an evidentiary hearing, it did not present its own
witnesses.47 IQ testing by a defense Atkins expert resulted in a full
scale IO score of sixty-five and confirmation of Bell's adaptive
behavior deficits. In its factual findings supporting its determination
of Bell's mental retardation, the convicting trial court cited Bell's past
diagnoses as mentally retarded, his history in special education, and
his IQ scores ranging from fifty-four to sixty-nine in full scale IQ tests
administered over a forty-year period that consistently placed him in
the range of a person with mild mental retardation. Bell's significant
deficits in adaptive behavior were established by his lengthy
placement in special education and academic ability at the second
grade level; his inability to manage his own money, perform other
than menial jobs, perform adequately in the military, maintain
significant peer relationships, or successfully live independently; and
his performance on adaptive behavior assessment instruments. The
court also recited how the evidence satisfied the Briseno factors.472
The Texas Court found that the record supported the convicting trial
court's finding of mental retardation and granted Bell Atkins relief.473
470. See id. at 3-4, 7, 11 (including a statement by the Texas Court in Bell's first appeal
that all parties agreed that Bell was "mildly mentally retarded"; a Texas Court statement
in habeas corpus proceedings following Bell's second conviction regarding uncontroverted
evidence of Bell's mild mental retardation; and a statement in the State's appellate brief
following Bell's second conviction that the evidence reflected that he was "mildly mentally
retarded").
471. See id. at 311; Tobolowsky, supra note 60, at 836.
472. See Transcript of Record at 314-22, Bell, 152 S.W.3d at 103 (Nos. 31,678-E;
10,898-06; AP-75,038) (containing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law). The State
had challenged the defense expert and witnesses on cross-examination. However, the trial
court noted that the State did not present controverting expert testimony regarding Bell's
mental retardation at his previous trial or in the instant writ proceeding. It also rejected
the State's claim that the mental retardation issue had been decided by the jury's failure to
find that Bell's mental retardation constituted sufficient mitigating evidence in his prior
trial. See id. at 318; see also Tobolowsky, supra note 60, at 839-42 (describing cross-
examination regarding some of the assessment instruments, some conflicting preliminary
prison assessment and academic test information, and Bell's satisfaction of the Briseno
factors).
473. See Bell, 152 S.W.3d at 103. Although they agreed that Bell could not be
executed, four Judges would have deferred reforming Bell's sentence to life imprisonment
until the Texas Court could fully consider the alternative remedy of a permanent
execution stay, as proposed in an amicus curiae pleading. See id. at 104 (Keller, P.J.,
joined by Meyers, Keasler, and Hervey, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
also Ex parte Bell, No. AP-75,038, 2005 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 51 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan.
12, 2005) (denying amicus curiae's rehearing motion). See generally Tobolowsky, supra
note 60, at 826-29, 835-49 (describing Bell's state Atkins collateral review proceedings).
90 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 39:1
Fall 2011] TEXAS'S POST-ATKINS CLAIMS OF MENTAL RETARDATION 91
Gregory Van Alstyne's Atkins proceeding was complicated by
the absence of school or other records regarding his life in the
Philippines prior to age eighteen.474 Evidence concerning his impaired
intellectual and adaptive behavior during his developmental period
was supplied by family members and friends.475 His full scale WAIS-
Revised IQ score of sixty-nine, administered in prison after receiving
a sixty on the Beta screening test and failing another assessment test,
was followed by scores of sixty-nine and seventy-two on two more
limited tests administered by a defense Atkins expert and a full scale
score of fifty-six on the WAIS-III administered by the State's Atkins
expert.4 76  The parties contested the implications of Van Alstyne's
admission into and subsequent dismissal from the prison system's
MROP program, a television interview he had given, and the
application of the Briseno factors.477 In its factual findings that Van
Alstyne had significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, the
convicting trial court cited the above IQ testing results and the fact
that the State and defense experts agreed that the IQ test
administered by the prison system was within the mentally retarded
range.478 The convicting trial court's finding that Van Alstyne had the
requisite adaptive behavior deficits primarily focused on the Briseno
factors. The court cited family members' and friends' description of
474. See Transcript of Record at 1818-20, Ex parte Van Alstyne, 239 S.W.3d 815 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007) (per curiam) (Nos. 30,941-02-B; 33,801-02; AP-75,795) (containing
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law).
475. See id. at 1820-23, 1831, 1833.
476. See id. at 1810-17.
477. Van Alstyne was initially admitted into the prison MROP program and then
discharged approximately one month later, according to incomplete records, because his
adaptive behavior (and perhaps his intellectual functioning) was too high for the program.
The State raised the MROP discharge in opposition to an adaptive behavior deficit
finding. The defense asserted the program discharge was incorrectly based on Van
Alstyne's exaggerated self-reports of his adaptive abilities, reflected only an ability to
adjust to structured prison life, and was not reflective of the Atkins standard. See id. at
1811, 1823-27. State experts indicated that Van Alstyne's performance in a television
interview was inconsistent with a mentally retarded person, but defense experts testified
that it was consistent with mental retardation. The trial judge stated that before being
educated about mental retardation in this case, he would have thought that the television
interview was not indicative of a mentally retarded person and that he struggled the most
with the experts' disagreement about the implications of Van Alstyne's performance in the
interview. See id. at 1813-14, 1834-38; see also id. at 1817-43 (describing other disputes
about the application of the Briseno factors).
478. See id. at 1810-17. The State experts suggested that Van Alstyne's IQ test results
might be a product of malingering and were inconsistent with his performance in his
television interview. However, they did not conduct tests regarding malingering and the
defense expert's test for malingering did not reflect it. See id. at 1813-14.
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his school and developmental and post-developmental adaptive
behavior difficulties; his prison WRAT achievement scores at or
below the third grade level (as well as other prison achievement test
results above the third and ninth grade level); and his initial referral
to and subsequent discharge from the prison MROP program. The
court also cited examples of the lack of planning demonstrated in his
personal and criminal life; examples of his tendency to be led by
others in his personal and criminal life; examples of his inappropriate
responses to external stimuli; limitations in his ability to respond to
specific questions rather than providing narrative, and sometimes
nonresponsive, replies; his inability to effectively lie or hide facts; and
his lack of leadership or planning in the instant offense.479
In its opinion, the Texas Court recited in some detail the
evidence supporting the convicting trial court's determination of Van
Alstyne's mental retardation, as well as conflicting evidence.4, It
found the record "amply" supported the trial court's intellectual
functioning finding.481 It also recited the "hotly contested" evidence
regarding Van Alstyne's adaptive behavior, including the conflicting
expert views of his television interview.482 In light of its typical
deference to the trial court's findings and finding "no compelling
reason" to reject the trial court's conclusion regarding Van Alstyne's
mental retardation, the Texas Court granted Van Alstyne Atkins
relief.483
479. See id. at 1817-43. But see id. at 1826 (describing the State expert's view that Van
Alstyne's family and friends had a motive to exaggerate his impairment and that his
impairment could be due to lack of education, a learning disability, or anti-social
personality disorder rather than mental retardation).
480. See Van Alstyne, 239 S.W.3d at 818-23.
481. Id. at 818 (noting that the State's expert conceded that the IQ evidence presented
was within the mild mental retardation range).
482. Id. at 818-23 (including the defense expert's conclusion that Van Alstyne had a
"life-long pattern of substandard functioning in all areas of daily living: conceptual, social,
and practical" and supporting record evidence as well as the State expert's concession that
there was evidence in the record that would support adaptive deficits in the three skill
areas and a mild mental retardation diagnosis). The majority rejected the dissenting
Judges' view that the Texas Court's personal assessment of Van Alstyne's performance in
the television interview was sufficient to reject the trial court's findings. Instead the
majority found that the trial court, aided by all of the expert opinions, had adequately
assessed this piece of evidence in the "totality of the evidence" in reaching its conclusion.
See id. at 821-23. But see id. at 824-26 (Keller, P.J., joined by Keasler and Hervey, JJ.,
dissenting) (rejecting the trial court's mental retardation finding in light of the conflicting
evidence, especially the television interview).
483. Id. at 817, 823-24.
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Timothy Cockrell cited, in his Atkins pleading (and subsequent
hearing), his IQ score of thirty-one at age fifteen (plus partial IQ
score results at age nine and fourteen in the low forties and below);
placement in special education; poor school performance; and
affidavits and testimony from teachers, family members, and friends
regarding his adaptive behavior difficulties during his developmental
period and afterward." He also introduced expert testimony
regarding recent WAIS III testing in the mentally retarded range;
WRAT testing at the second grade level or below; and ABAS testing,
examination, and records review revealing "very impaired" functional
academics, social skills, vocational skills, and self-direction consistent
with mild to moderate mental retardation.485 Finally, Cockrell cited a
factual finding from prior litigation in his case that he was "mentally
retarded." 486 During the Atkins proceedings, the State introduced
evidence reinterpreting Cockrell's overall IQ scores to be in the mid-
eighties at age nine and mid-seventies at age fifteen; prison Beta 10
screening scores of seventy-five, eighty-six, and ninety-three; and its
Atkins experts' WAIS III testing score of eighty (as well as Slosson
IQ testing in the mildly retarded range).4"
In its initial factual findings, the convicting trial court found that
Cockrell had established significant adaptive behavior deficits, with
onset during the developmental period, in communication, self-care,
and self-direction skill areas.4 8 However, based on the conflicting
evidence concerning Cockrell's intellectual functioning-including
the lack of detail concerning the IQ tests administered in school and
prison, the pattern of higher performance and lower verbal
component scores (influenced by Cockrell's poor reading skills)
484. See Transcript of Record at 9-20, 25, 28-29, Ex parte Cockrell, AP-76,168, 2009
Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 409 (Tex. Crim. App. June 10, 2009) (per curiam) (Nos.
1992-CR-6426-W2; WR-41,775-02; AP-76,168) (containing writ application); Findings of
Fact & Conclusions of Law, Cockrell, 2009 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 409 (Nos.
1992-CR-6426-W2; WR-41,775-02; AP-76,168).
485. See Transcript of Record at 14-15, 19-20, Cockrell, 2009 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 409 (Nos. 1992-CR-6426-W2; WR-41,775-02; AP-76,168); Findings of Fact &
Conclusions of Law at 13-16, Cockrell, 2009 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 409 (Nos.
1992-CR-6426-W2; WR-41,775-02; AP-76,168).
486. See Transcript of Record at 15, 25, 28-29, Cockrell, 2009 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 409 (Nos. 1992-CR-6426-W2; WR-41,775-02; AP-76,168).
487. See Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law at 16-20, Cockrell, 2009 Tex. Crim.
App. Unpub. LEXIS 409 (Nos. 1992-CR-6426-W2; WR-41,775-02; AP-76,168) (including
assessment by the State's Atkins expert and prior assessment by its expert from Cockrell's
punishment hearing). Because his IQ testing of Cockrell did not indicate mental
retardation, the State expert did not examine the adaptive behavior factors. See id. at 17.
488. See id. at 22-23; cf. id. at 21 (reciting but not applying the Briseno factors).
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artificially lowering his overall IQ scores, and testimony from a
defense expert that she would have estimated Cockrell's IQ in the
eighties based on initial conversation with him and prior to testing-
the trial court found that Cockrell had not met his burden regarding
this element of his Atkins claim.489 The Texas Court, however, re-
remanded the Atkins writ so that the trial court could enter additional
findings and conclusions to address "discrepancies" between its
current finding that Cockrell was not mentally retarded and its
previous finding that he was mentally retarded in prior litigation
regarding the voluntariness of his confession.4
In its additional factual findings and legal conclusions, the
convicting trial court cited Cockrell's IQ testing in the mentally
retarded range at age nine and fourteen, his placement in special
education, his achievement testing below the third grade level at age
fourteen, the confirmatory testing and diagnosis of Cockrell's Atkins
expert regarding his mental retardation, and the evidence concerning
his adaptive behavior deficits in concluding that the mental
retardation finding that the court had made in Cockrell's previous
litigation had not changed and should be applied to this Atkins
proceeding.49 ' On review, the Texas Court noted that, in cases where
the evidence could support both a finding of mental retardation and
the rejection of such a finding, it typically defers to the
489. See id. at 22. After review of all of Cockrell's prior IQ testing evidence and her
own testing, criticism of the State expert's incomplete record review and practice effect
regarding his IQ testing of Cockrell, and expressed concern about the unreliability of Beta
testing, the defense expert maintained her diagnosis of mental retardation. She also found
no evidence of his malingering in her testing. See id. at 14-16. The State's expert
attributed Cockrell's low school IQ scores to reporting error, identified the impact of his
limited educational background on his IQ scores, noted his "near perfect" score on the
picture completion test, and cited the possibility of malingering. Although he
acknowledged the potential impact of the practice effect on his administration of the
WAIS, his Slosson IQ test result in the mildly mentally retarded range, his non-review of
Cockrell's school records, and the inconsistency of Cockrell's picture completion result
with his prior special education status, the State's expert testified that Cockrell's higher
scores were more likely to be accurate than the conflicting lower scores. Prior testimony
from the State's expert at Cockrell's punishment proceeding reinterpreted Cockrell's
school IQ test results and provided his prison IO screening test results. This expert also
attributed Cockrell's lower school IQ scores (as opposed to his prison scores) to poor
reading ability and low motivation. See id. at 16-20.
490. See Ex parte Cockrell, No. WR-41,775-02, 2008 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS
725, at *2-3 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 1, 2008) (per curiam).
491. See Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Cockrell, 2009 Tex.
Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 409 (Nos. 1992-CR-6426-W2; WR-41,775-02; AP-76,168)
(noting that the prior finding of Cockrell's mental retardation was submitted by the State
and signed by the court).
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recommendation of the convicting court. The Texas Court did so
regarding the convicting court's additional findings and accordingly
granted Cockrell Atkins relief.492
Daniel Plata's IQ had not been formally tested during the
developmental period. However, he supported his claim of limited
intellectual functioning with Atkins expert IQ test results of sixty-five
on the WASI (an abbreviated Wechsler test), sixty-five on the WAIS-
III, sixty-nine on the WAIS-III (administered by the State expert and
rescored by a defense expert), and testimony of teachers, family, and
friends regarding his difficulties in school. 493 His adaptive difficulties
regarding communication, academics, money, interpersonal
relationships, self-esteem, practical and work skills, and independent
living were presented by Plata's teachers, family, and friends, as
reviewed and analyzed by a defense Atkins expert.494 The State
countered the defense IQ evidence with a prison abbreviated WAIS-
Revised test result of eighty-three, a prior defense expert witness
estimate of Plata's IQ at eighty-five to ninety, and its expert's WAIS-
III test result of seventy that the expert testified understated Plata's
IQ.495 The State contested Plata's adaptive behavior limitations by
challenging the inconsistencies in and bias of Plata's witnesses'
testimony, and presenting its expert's adjusted ABAS score of
seventy, that the expert testified understated Plata's adaptive
behavior. The State also submitted evidence of Plata's adaptive
behavior in prison, and Plata's own work and communication skills.496
The parties disagreed regarding the application of the Briseno
factors.4 " In finding Plata mentally retarded, the convicting trial court
492. See Cockrell, 2009 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 409, at *2-3.
493. See Transcript of Record at 17-18, 31-33, Ex parte Plata, No. AP-75,820, 2008
Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1398 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2008) (per curiam) (Nos. 693143-
B; 72639-A; AP-75,820) (containing writ application citing additional confirmatory test
score of seventy-one); see also id. at 1266-84 (containing Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law citing confirmatory test scores of sixty-one and seventy-two).
494. See id. at 18-23, 33-35 (containing writ application); see also id. at 1284-1312
(containing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law citing criticism of State expert's
retrospective use of ABAS test).
495. See id. at 389-91 (containing Respondent's Original Answer); see also id. at 1208-
18, 1240-41 (containing Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and criticizing aspects of the defense testing).
496. See id. at 391-402 (containing Respondent's Original Answer); see also id. at
1218-39, 1241-42 (containing Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law).
497. See id. at 394-96, 401-02 (containing Respondent's Original Answer); see also id.
at 1237-39 (containing Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law).
But see id. at 1332-37 (containing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law).
accepted the defense experts' IQ testing results and the defense
evidence regarding Plata's adaptive behavior deficits and satisfaction
of the Briseno factors.498 The court expressly disregarded the IQ
estimate evidence and abbreviated prison IQ score presented by the
State. It also disregarded both the State expert's IQ and adaptive
behavior assessment results due to errors in their administration and
analysis." Finding support in the record for the convicting trial
court's findings, the Texas Court granted Plata Atkins relief."o
d. Fifth Circuit's Finding of Mental Retardation Following Contested
Atkins Claims
The Texas federal courts conducted de novo review of the Atkins
claims of Eric Moore and Jose Rivera following the Texas Court's
dismissal of their Atkins subsequent writ pleadings as an abuse of the
writ."o' In support of the intellectual functioning element, Eric Moore
proffered results of a mental abilities test administered in first grade
that resulted in a score of seventy-four, a WAIS-Revised IQ test score
of seventy-six administered at age twenty-four (at the time of his
498. See id. at 1266-312, 1332-38 (containing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law).
499. See id. at 1274-83, 1285, 1305-09. The court also found the testimony of
correctional officers of limited value. See id. at 1310-12.
500. See Plata, 2008 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1398.
501. See Moore v. Quarterman, 533 F.3d 338, 341-42 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (en
banc) (finding cause and prejudice regarding the offender's failure to exhaust his Atkins
claim when it was dismissed as an abuse of the writ prior to the Texas Court's
development of Atkins procedures and thus no application of the deferential review
standards); Rivera v. QuartermAn, 505 F.3d 349, 356-61 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding that the
Texas Court's dismissal of the offender's claim as an abuse of the writ was an
"unreasonable" application of "clearly established" federal law and thus not entitled to
deferential treatment). The Texas Court reviewed both of these Atkins claims in the early
stages of its Atkins jurisprudence and prior to the issuance of its Briseno collateral review
procedures. See Ex parte Rivera, No. 27,065-03 (Tex. Crim. App. Aug. 6, 2003) (per
curiam); Ex parte Rivera, No. 27,065-02 (Tex. Crim. App. Aug. 5, 2003) (per curiam); Ex
parte Rivera, No. 27065-02, 2003 WL 21752841 (Tex. Crim. App. July 25, 2003) (per
curiam); Ex parte Moore, No. 38,670-02 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2003) (per curiam).
Accompanying litigation in the Moore case also reflects the Texas federal courts' early
attempts to apply concepts of federal collateral review to state Atkins claims. See Moore
v. Quarterman, 491 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (finding Atkins claim not
exhausted); Moore v. Quarterman, 454 F.3d 484 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding Atkins claim not
exhausted); Moore v. Dretke, 369 F.3d 844 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (vacating
conditional grant of relief and remanding); Moore v. Dretke, No. 6:03-CV-224, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 37431 (E.D. Tex. July 1, 2005) (applying de novo standard based on its
finding that claim was not adjudicated on the merits in state court); Moore v. Johnson, No.
6:03cv224, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27338 (E.D. Tex. May 15, 2003) (applying successive
writ authorization procedure).
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trial), and his Atkins WAIS-III score of sixty-six at age thirty-eight.502
Moore also presented adaptive behavior evidence including record
evidence and testimony of family members and friends that Moore
was enrolled in special education classes; his achievement levels were
three years lower than his age level; and he had difficulties with self-
care, work skills, interpersonal skills, and conceptual skills (such as
counting money, telling time, and following directions)."3 Based on
his examination of Moore, interviews of others, review of relevant
records, and IQ and other testing, Moore's Atkins expert diagnosed
him as mentally retarded.' The State presented testimony from
Moore's teachers and correctional officers indicating that they did not
consider Moore mentally retarded and regarding his adaptive abilities
in school and prison."'s Although the State's expert appeared to
concede the intellectual functioning element,' he did not find that
Moore had the required adaptive behavior deficits for a diagnosis of
mental retardation based on his examination of Moore, the
administration of the VABS test, and review of materials.07
In determining Moore's mental retardation, the federal trial
court applied the AAMR definition. and declined to utilize the
Briseno factors in its analysis.'" In finding that Moore satisfied the
502. See Moore, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37431, at *13-14. The defense expert found all
of these IQ scores consistent, found no evidence of intentional poor performance, and
administered an additional confirmatory test. See id.
503. See id. at *19-34.
504. See id. at *14, *35-36. The defense expert's assessment of Moore's significant
deficits in adaptive behavior was based on his clinical judgment after his interviews of
Moore and family members and administration of various tests. This expert did not view
the VABS or similar scales as appropriate to make a retrospective assessment of adaptive
behavior. See id. at *35-36.
505. See id. at *23-30 (containing teacher testimony acknowledging limited personal
recollection of Moore and limited knowledge of the legal mental retardation definition);
id. at *34-35 (containing correctional officer testimony reflecting Moore's communication,
reading, and hygiene abilities and ability to follow rules).
506. On cross-examination of the defense expert and examination of its own expert,
the State questioned the validity and accuracy of the submitted IQ tests. On cross-
examination, however, the State's expert adopted the test results and agreed that Moore
satisfied this element. See id. at *14 & n.5.
507. See id. at *36-38 (basing assessment on Moore's interview and self-reported
VABS results and records and other evidence reflecting Moore's educational, work, and
interpersonal history).
508. See id. at *8-11 (citing its use in Briseno and finding that both parties used this
definition at the evidentiary hearing).
509. See id. at *15 n.6 (finding these factors are discretionary and not part of the
AAMR mental retardation definition and were presented to assist in distinguishing mental
retardation from a personality disorder, an issue not present in Moore's case).
intellectual functioning component, the trial judge averaged the three
IQ scores cited above at seventy-two, applied a five-point standard
error of measurement, and relied on the agreement between the
experts that Moore satisfied this element.so The trial court reviewed
all of the lay and record evidence regarding Moore's adaptive
behavior, but found the defense expert's assessment of Moore's
adaptive functioning more credible than that of the State expert,
based in part on his more comprehensive procedure." Both experts
agreed that Moore had some adaptive deficits, but disagreed on
whether these deficits were significant.5 12 Concluding that Moore had
significant adaptive limitations concerning his conceptual and social
skills, the trial judge found this element was satisfied. Also finding
the satisfaction of developmental period onset, the trial judge found
that Moore was mentally retarded for Atkins purposes.' Applying a
"deferential lens" to the trial judge's determinations of credibility and
conflicting evidence, the Fifth Circuit found that the trial judge's
determination of Moore's mental retardation was not clearly
erroneous and affirmed the trial court's grant of habeas corpus
relief.14
510. See id. at *15.
511. See id. at *19-45.
512. See id. at *40.
513. The trial judge supported his finding of significant deficits in conceptual skills by
noting Moore's academic achievement levels below his age and difficulties in following
directions and learning new skills (e.g., counting money, telling time, and driving). He
found significant limitations in Moore's social skills based on his difficulties in navigating
difficult family relationships and forming relationships with others. The judge also found
some (but not significant) limitations in Moore's practical skills. See id. at *38-45. The
experts agreed that any deficits arose during Moore's developmental period. See id. at
*45-47. Based on his finding of Moore's mental retardation, the trial judge granted the
writ directing Moore's release unless the State permanently stayed his execution or
reformed his death sentence to life imprisonment. See id. at *1, *47.
514. See Moore v. Quarterman, 342 F. App'x 65, 66, 71, 74 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
The majority found the trial judge's determination that the State expert had conceded the
intellectual functioning component was reasonable and there was adequate IQ evidence to
support its intellectual functioning finding. See id. at 68-71 (including expert testimony
supporting the averaging of the IQ scores, use of the measurement error standard,
consideration of mental retardation based on an IQ score up to seventy-five, presence of
an IQ score below seventy, and the absence of evidence of Moore's intentional poor
performance on the IQ test). Regarding Moore's adaptive behavior, the majority found
that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in declining to apply the discretionary
Briseno factors in the instant case (and actually did consider record evidence pertaining to
the factors in making his adaptive skill deficit determination) and did not clearly err in
resolving the conflicting evidence concerning Moore's adaptive behavior and making
related credibility determinations. See id. at 71-74. But see id. at 74-93 (Smith, J.
dissenting) (finding the trial court erred in its mental retardation analysis, including
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In assessing Jose Rivera's intellectual functioning, the federal
trial court relied on his Atkins WAIS-III IQ score of sixty-eight. The
trial judge found Rivera's prior school and prison screening IQ test
scores of seventy, eighty-five, ninety-two, and eighty insufficiently
reliable, based on their more limited nature and the lack of
information regarding their administration and scoring.-' The trial
court's finding that Rivera had adaptive behavior deficits regarding
self-care, social skills, home living, and functional academics was
supported by evidence of his academic difficulties during school, work
challenges, and issues with personal care supplied by the testimony of
Rivera's teachers, family, and experts, as well as documentary
evidence."' Acknowledging the important role of the trial judge in
weighing the evidence, the Fifth Circuit found that the trial court's
findings regarding these elements, as well as developmental onset,
were not clearly erroneous and affirmed its finding of Rivera's mental
retardation.'
3. Illustrative Unsuccessful Texas State and Federal Atkins Claims on
Collateral Review
Although six of the successful Atkins claims described above
resulted from contested Atkins collateral proceedings,"' most
contested Texas Atkins claims have been unsuccessful on collateral
averaging Moore's IQ scores, finding mental retardation based on an IQ above seventy,
determining a State concession regarding Moore's IQ, failing to apply the Briseno factors,
and inconsistently using AAMR adaptive behavior criteria; and finding that the majority
applied too deferential a review standard to the trial court's findings). The Court denied
the State's certiorari petition. Thaler v. Moore, 130 S. Ct. 1736 (2010).
515. See Rivera v. Quarterman, 505 F.3d 349, 356-57, 361-62 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting
the trial court's rejection of the State's criticism of the defense expert's administration of
the WAIS test).
516. See id. at 356-57, 362-63 (noting the State's acknowledgement of Rivera's
adaptive limitations, but its attribution of them to his inhalant abuse and antisocial
personality); see also Successor Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Ex parte Rivera,
No. 27,065-03 (Tex. Crim. App. Aug. 6, 2003) (describing Rivera's placement in special
education, achievement scores at the fifth grade level or below at age nineteen, inability to
live independently, and inability to maintain work).
517. See Rivera, 505 F.3d at 363 (noting the trial judge's characterization of the case as
presenting a "close call"). Although the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's mental
retardation finding, it vacated the court's judgment in part and remanded the case for
consideration of the issue of the equitable tolling of the AEDPA statute of limitations.
See id. at 353-55. The Court denied Rivera's certiorari petition on the statute of
limitations issue. Rivera v. Quarterman, 129 S. Ct. 176 (2008). The limitations issue has
not been addressed by the federal trial court. Commutation of Rivera's death sentence is
also being pursued through the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles.
518. See supra notes 403-05 and accompanying text.
review."' This section examines some illustrative unsuccessful, but
vigorously contested, Atkins collateral review claims. These
illustrative cases include instances in which the Texas Court disagreed
with certain findings by the convicting trial court,52o instances in which
the Texas federal court disagreed with certain findings by the Texas
Court,521 and instances in which the convicting trial court simply found
the State's evidence regarding mental retardation more persuasive
than that of the defense.522 Reflecting the significant deference
granted to the trial courts' ultimate factual findings regarding mental
retardation, their rejection of these Atkins claims was maintained
upon review by the Texas Court and any further Texas federal court
*523review.
a. Texas Court Disagreement with Aspects of Convicting Trial Courts'
Findings
In three of these illustrative cases (involving Elroy Chester, John
Matamoros, and Elkie Taylor),524 the Texas Court disagreed with
aspects of the convicting trial courts' findings before ultimately
endorsing their rejection of the offenders' Atkins claims.525 Elroy
Chester supported his Atkins claim in state court5 26 by presenting
519. See supra Table 1 (describing the resolution of Texas Atkins collateral review
claims).
520. See infra notes 524-58 and accompanying text.
521. See infra notes 559-69 and accompanying text.
522. See infra notes 570-97 and accompanying text.
523. See supra Table 1 (describing the resolution of Texas Atkins collateral review
claims).
524. Taylor v. Quarterman, 498 F.3d 306 (5th Cir. 2007); Matamoros v. Thaler, No. H-
07-2613, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35425 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2010); Chester v. Quarterman,
No. 5:05cv29, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34936 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2008); Ex parte
Matamoros, No. WR-50,791-02, 2007 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1861 (Tex. Crim. App. June
13, 2007) (per curiam); Ex parte Chester, No. AP-75,037, 2007 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS
1852 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2007); Ex parte Taylor, No. WR-48,498-02, 2006 Tex. Crim.
App. LEXIS 2534 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 1, 2006) (per curiam); cf. Ex parte Henderson,
No. WR-37,658-03 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 25, 2006) (per curiam) (rejecting one of the trial
court's factual findings about a previous IQ test, but maintaining the denial of the Atkins
claim); id. (Cochran, J., joined by Keller, P.J., and Price and Johnson, JJ., concurring)
(indicating the case represented a "close question" regarding the determination of
Henderson's mental retardation).
525. See infra notes 526-58 and accompanying text.
526. Soon after Atkins was announced, a Texas federal trial court ordered that Chester
be given a new sentencing hearing or a sentence reduction to life imprisonment. The Fifth
Circuit vacated this decision and ordered the federal application dismissed without
prejudice so that Chester could first exhaust his Atkins claim in the state court system. See
Chester v. Cockrell, 62 F. App'x 556 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
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evidence of the following full scale IQ scores: sixty-nine at age seven
and one-half (WISC-Revised), fifty-nine at age twelve (WISC-
Revised), seventy-seven at age thirteen and one-half (WISC-
Revised), sixty-nine at age eighteen (WAIS-Revised), and sixty-six at
age twenty-nine (WAIS-Revised).5 2 He was placed in special
education early in his schooling and admitted into the prison MROP
program at approximately age eighteen. Achievement testing in
prison placed him at third grade levels or below. He received a score
of fifty-seven on the VABS adaptive behavior assessment in
connection with his MROP placement." Two of his sisters testified
regarding his adaptive behavior deficits, including his inability to live
or work independently.5 29  A special education teacher testified
regarding his limited abilities at school.530 Chester asserted that he
demonstrated deficits regarding the broader conceptual and practical
adaptive skill areas, as well as the specific skill areas of
communication, work, functional academics, self-direction, and
community use. He asserted that he also satisfied the Briseno
factors.' One expert diagnosed Chester as mentally retarded based
on a review of his records, interviews with Chester, and observation
of the State expert's interview with him. Another expert classified
him as mildly mentally retarded based on a review of his MROP
records.
The convicting trial court adopted the State's proposed findings
and conclusions.533 The trial court found that Chester had
insufficiently established the intellectual functioning component of
527. See Transcript of Record at 406-11, Chester, 2007 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1852
(Nos. 76044-B; 45,249-02; AP-75,037) (containing Applicant's Proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law). Chester disputed the reliability of the IQ score of seventy-seven
due to the practice effect, anomaly regarding the performance component score, and use
of an incorrect age. See id. at 411-13.
528. See id. at 397, 399-406, 415-20. Chester disputed as erroneous references in his
school records to a learning disability and in his MROP records to a borderline intellectual
functioning (rather than or in addition to references to mental retardation). See id. at 381,
405-06,419-20.
529. See id. at 380, 397-99, 414.
530. See id. at 381-82, 400-01.
531. See id. at 414-33. Chester asserted that the Briseno factors did not apply in his
case, that they did not supplant the AAMR mental retardation definition, and that he
satisfied the Briseno factors in any event. See id. at 430-33.
532. See id. at 379, 381. The State's expert agreed that the proper diagnosis for a
person with a full scale IQ of sixty-nine and a VABS score of fifty-seven is mild mental
retardation. See id. at 419-20.
533. See id. at 437-62 (containing Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order).
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mental retardation based on the proffered IQ test scores. The trial
court specifically found two of the scores inconclusive because they
were subject to differing interpretations and questioned the WISC
scores as outdated and potentially culturally biased. It further noted
the debatable validity of IQ scores in close cases and their inherent
error margins. Finally, the trial court stated that component scores
on four of Chester's IQ tests would not reflect mental retardation
under a Texas Education Agency definition." The trial court
rejected an adaptive behavior deficit finding based on its application
of the Briseno factors, including Chester's classification in some
school records as learning disabled rather than mentally retarded; his
graduation from high school; his ability to communicate rationally
with the State expert who determined that he was not mentally
retarded; and the planning, forethought, and execution of his capital
crime and other crimes.' The trial court also noted Chester's
classification as having borderline intellectual functioning (rather
than mental retardation) in connection with his MROP
participation.536
Contrary to the trial court, the Texas Court found that Chester
had met his burden in establishing his intellectual functioning deficits
based on his IQ scores, with three full scale test scores below seventy
during the developmental period and the one higher score likely
affected by a practice effect.537 The Texas Court further stated that
even the State's expert acknowledged that a person with Chester's
VABS adaptive functioning score of fifty-seven combined with an
accompanying IQ of sixty-nine would be "correctly diagnosed" as
mildly mentally retarded, and that such evidence was "persuasive."
However, the Texas Court also noted that it could not substitute its
own judgment for that of the trial court as long as the record
534. See id. at 440-45. The trial court misreported Chester's IQ score of fifty-nine on
one of his tests as sixty-nine. Id. at 441.
535. See id. at 445-57. The trial court relied in part on testimony concerning Chester's
school records from a school diagnostician presented by the State. See id. at 444-48. The
trial court found the testimony of Chester's sisters and teacher regarding his mental
retardation (as opposed to a learning disability) as a child less persuasive. See id. at 447,
459-60. The trial court also compared the credentials of the State expert to the defense
primary expert. See id. at 438.
536. See id. at 457-59.
537. See Chester, 2007 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1852, at *6-10 (noting the trial court's
incorrect reporting of one of Chester's IQ scores and the State expert's agreement that a
person with similar IQ scores would be classified as mildly mentally retarded). The Texas
Court stated that there was no dispute regarding the developmental onset factor. See id.
at *6.
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supported the trial court's findings." The Texas Court found that the
trial court had addressed each of the Briseno factors and concluded
that Chester had failed to satisfy any of them. With regard to the
final Briseno factor concerning the crime's planning and execution,
the Texas Court provided a lengthy description of the facts of
Chester's crimes before concluding that the trial court did not err in
rejecting Chester's Atkins claim."' In denying Chester's subsequent
federal habeas corpus application based on the adaptive functioning
component,'" the Texas federal trial court found that 1) the Texas
courts' use of the Briseno factors to determine his Atkins claim was
not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law, 2) an
"affirmative finding" regarding the final Briseno factor was sufficient
in itself to deny federal relief on an Atkins claim, and 3) Chester did
not challenge the state courts' factual determination that his crime
541involved forethought, planning, and complex execution of purpose.
In support of his Atkins claim, John Matamoros presented the
following full scale IQ scores: seventy-one at age fourteen (WISC-
Revised), seventy-four at almost age seventeen (WAIS), and sixty-
five by his Atkins expert (WAIS-III). 542 Evidence of his adaptive
behavior limitations was presented by two of his sisters, his youth
custody records, his Atkins VABS score of forty-one (with deficits in
multiple areas), and achievement test results at less than fourth grade
level."3 While in youth custody, he had been classified as mildly
mentally retarded.'" The convicting trial court adopted the State's
538. Id. at *10-12.
539. See id. at *12-27.
540. See Chester v. Quarterman, No. 5:05cv29, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34936, at *5-6
(E.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2008) (noting the Texas Court's findings regarding the intellectual
functioning aspect (that were not disputed by the State) and the basis for the Texas
Court's findings regarding Chester's adaptive behavior functioning).
541. See id. at *15-21; see also id. at *6-14 (repeating detailed description of the
crime's facts). The federal trial court also concluded that the final Briseno factor itself was
not contrary to federal law due to its alleged requirement of a nexus between the crime
and an offender's mental retardation. See id. at *17-19. Based on its finding regarding the
final Briseno factor, the federal trial court found it unnecessary to address the other
Briseno factors. See id. at *2(-21.
542. See Transcript of Record at 411, 415, 419, 422, Ex parte Matamoros, No. WR-
50,791-02, 2007 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1861 (Tex. Crim. App. June 13, 2007) (per
curiam) (Nos. 643410-B; WR-50,791-02) (containing Applicant's Proposed Findings of
Facts and Conclusions of Law).
543. See id. at 412-13, 415, 419.
544. See id. at 411, 420, 422, 423-24; cf id. at 444 (describing a reference to Matamoros
as "borderline mentally retarded" in his youth records). Matamoros also relied on the
proposed findings and conclusions.545 The trial court noted the above
IQ scores, as well as the State expert's full scale IQ result of sixty-two
(SB5) that the expert felt was affected by Matamoros' bilingualism
and limited education, and concluded that Matamoros had not
established the required intellectual functioning deficits.546 The trial
court also found the adaptive behavior aspect deficient based on
evidence of Matamoros' adaptive functioning in youth and adult
custody, his ability to communicate with his trial counsel, his
testimony in the capital proceedings, some work history, and the
application of the Briseno factors.547 The trial court accepted the State
expert's upward adjustment of Matamoros' ABAS test results to
leave a significant deficit only in the functional academics area (and
an overall score of sixty-three to sixty-five) and his discrediting of the
contrary VABS results. The trial court also noted the general
inadequacy of adaptive behavior testing for Atkins purposes, and
stated that Matamoros' youthful classification as mentally retarded
did not include an adaptive behavior component.5 48 The Texas Court
rejected the convicting trial court's finding that Matamoros had not
satisfied the intellectual functioning aspect of mental retardation, but
maintained the trial court's findings and conclusions regarding
Matamoros' adaptive functioning and developmental period onset.549
The federal trial court recited the adaptive behavior evidence relied
on by the Texas courts, found their conclusions were reasonable and
entitled to deference under the AEDPA, and denied Matamoros
federal collateral relief.5
State expert's IQ test results of less than seventy and his preadjusted adaptive behavior
test results that indicated deficits in four skill areas. See id. at 422-24.
545. See id. at 431-73 (containing Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order).
546. See id. at 440-46, 469-71 (noting other testing that was also consistent with the
higher IQ scores).
547. See id. at 446-60, 467-69, 471; see also id. at 453-55 (finding Matamoros' sisters'
testimony "unpersuasive").
548. See id. at 447, 460-67. Based on the absence of the required deficits, the trial court
found no developmental period onset. See id. at 469, 471-72.
549. See Matamoros, 2007 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1861, at *2-3 (rejecting the specific
findings regarding the effect of bilingualism on Matamoros' intellectual and adaptive
functioning as well). The Texas Court took no action on Matamoros' motion for a
rehearing based on the trial court's failure to use the AAMR's current adaptive behavior
categories. See Ex parte Matamoros, WR-50,791-02 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 12, 2007) (per
curiam).
550. See Matamoros v. Thaler, No. H-07-2613, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35425, at *12-41
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2010); see also id. at *30-31 (rejecting claim that the courts were
required to use the newest AAMR adaptive behavior categories); cf. Matamoros v.
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In the case of Elkie Taylor, the Texas Court re-remanded his writ
application after the convicting trial court denied his Atkins claim
without a live evidentiary hearing."' Taylor relied on his full scale IQ
scores of approximately seventy-five at age ten (WISC), sixty-nine in
prison (WAIS-Revised), sixty-five by the State's Atkins expert
(WAIS-III), and seventy-one by the defense Atkins expert
(Kaufman).552 His experts had conducted VABS, SIB-R, and ABAS
adaptive behavior testing and one expert found adaptive functioning
deficits in at least five skill areas. Taylor also offered evidence of his
achievement test scores at or below third grade level, his inability to
stay in school or the Job Corps, his placement in the prison MROP
program, and testimony of family and friends regarding his limited
work, independent living, communication, and leisure skills.' The
convicting trial court substantially adopted the State's findings and
conclusions.554 The trial court found that the one IQ test administered
during the developmental period understated Taylor's intellectual
functioning.' In finding that Taylor did not meet the adaptive
functioning element, the court found the results of the State expert's
administration of the SSSQ test (that did not reflect mental
retardation) were more meaningful than the defense tests, and were
consistent with a previous prison administration of the SSSQ test.
The trial court also found that Taylor's behavior in the capital crime
and surrounding events, as well as other crimes, reflected a higher
level of adaptive functioning than the defense contended. It further
found that Taylor demonstrated an ability to adapt in prison, and
effectively communicate in his underlying case and with the State
Thaler, No. H-07-2613, 2010 WL 1404375 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2010) (denying stay based on
licensing board complaint against the State's expert).
551. See Ex parte Taylor, No. WR-48,498-02, 2005 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 265
(Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 23, 2005) (per curiam).
552. See Transcript of Record at 237-38, 241-42, Ex parte Taylor, No. WR-48,498-02,
2006 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 2534 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 1, 2006) (per curiam) (Nos. C-
297-006327-0542281-B; WR-48,498-02) (containing Taylor's Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law); see also id. at 242 (stating that the State expert conceded that Taylor
met the intellectual functioning element); id. at 239 (stating that the Flynn effect reduced
Taylor's IQ score at age ten to between sixty-three and seventy-three).
553. See id. at 239-49. The State expert found an adaptive deficit regarding Taylor's
functional academics. See id. at 243.
554. See id. at 34-58, 264-69 (containing State's Subsequent Proposed Memorandum
and trial court's Order).
555. See id. at 41, 43.
expert."' In rejecting his Atkins claim, the trial court noted that
Taylor had not been diagnosed as mentally retarded prior to this
Atkins proceeding.' Based on the trial court's findings, both the
Texas Court and Texas federal trial court denied Taylor collateral
relief on his Atkins claim.5
b. Texas Federal Court Disagreement with Aspects of Texas Court
Findings
In his Atkins subsequent writ application, Jeffrey Williams
presented his full scale WISC-Revised IQ score of seventy at age
sixteen, a hospital notation regarding his mild mental retardation,
participation in special education classes, and adaptive functioning
difficulties in the Navy and elsewhere."9 The State countered with
Williams' graduation from high school with satisfactory grades and
achievement test scores, his participation in special education classes
due to his diagnosed emotional disturbance rather than mental
retardation, and his adaptive skills in the Navy and in securing
subsequent jobs and living independently." In dismissing Williams'
subsequent writ application as an abuse of the writ, the Texas Court
repeated its requirement that an applicant present evidence of all
three elements of mental retardation in order to establish the prima
facie showing required for an Atkins subsequent writ claim.561
Although noting Williams' proffered IQ score of seventy, the Texas
556. See id. at 37-51 (finding family testimony inconsistent with other evidence and
MROP participation not contingent on mental retardation, as well). But see id. at 239
(describing defense criticism of the use of the SSSQ test).
557. See id. at 44. The trial court also referred to the application of the Briseno factors.
See id. at 55. The trial court found that Taylor did not satisfy the three-part definition of
mental retardation, he did not satisfy the adaptive behavior element, and he did not have
the type of mental retardation regarding which there was a national consensus that would
bar his execution. See id. at 52-54, 55-57, 268.
558. See Taylor v. Quarterman, 498 F.3d 306 (5th Cir. 2007) (denying certificate of
appealability from federal trial court habeas corpus denial); Taylor, 2006 Tex. Crim. App.
LEXIS 2534; Ex parte Taylor, No. 48,498-02 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 1, 2006) (Johnson, J.,
joined by Keasler, Hervey, and Cochran, JJ., concurring); see also Ex parte Taylor, Nos.
WR-48,498-02, WR-48,498-04 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 6, 2008) (dismissing subsequent writ
application regarding and declining to reconsider Taylor's Atkins claim).
559. See Application for Post Conviction Writ, Ex parte Williams, No. 50,662-02 (Tex.
Crim. App. Oct. 8, 2003) (per curiam).
560. See Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Applicant's Subsequent Application,
Williams, No. 50,662-02.
561. See Williams, No. 50,662-02 (requiring at least one IQ test (or other comparable
evidence in the absence of an available IQ test result) reflecting mental retardation and
supporting school, medical, and record evidence or expert or lay affidavits establishing
adaptive skill deficits and developmental period onset).
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Court stated that this evaluation resulted in a diagnosis of emotional
disturbance rather than mental retardation and an assessment of
Williams' adaptive behavior as "adequate" for his age. The Texas
Court also noted his graduation from high school.5 62
When Williams filed his Atkins claim in federal court, the Texas
federal trial court found the Texas Court's dismissal of his subsequent
writ application to be an "unreasonable" determination of the
presented facts, and thus not entitled to deference under the
AEDPA. The court ordered an evidentiary hearing to consider the
Atkins claim de novo.63 Although characterizing it as a "close case,"
the court rejected Williams' Atkins claim.'6 On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit reviewed evidence in support of and opposition to a mental
retardation finding produced in the "battle of the experts" waged in
the trial court.6  Additional intellectual functioning evidence
included post-conviction full scale IQ scores of seventy-one on two
tests (WAIS-III and SB5), and achievement test and other scores in
the nonmentally retarded range.'6 Additional adaptive functioning
evidence included defense identification of deficits in the areas of
self-care, home living, social and personal skills, work, and leisure
versus State identification of a potential deficit only in socialization
based on VABS testing.5 67  Lay and expert witnesses presented
varying characterizations of Williams' intellectual and adaptive
functioning during his school, military, post-military, and prison
periods.6' After a review of the evidence, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that the federal trial court's determinations that Williams had failed
562. See id. (noting also that evidence regarding Williams' adaptive difficulties in the
Navy occurred after the developmental period and thus did not support his Atkins claim).
563. See Williams v. Dretke, No. H-04-2945, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34438, at *12-19
(S.D. Tex. July 15, 2005). The court found that the additional expert and lay affidavits
presented with Williams' federal application supplemented rather than fundamentally
altered the claim presented in state court and thus did not render the claim unexhausted.
See id. at *13-17.
564. See Williams v. Quarterman, 293 F. App'x 298, 307, 311 (5th Cir. 2008) (per
curiam).
565. See id. at 301-14; cf id. at 311-14 (reciting but not applying the Briseno factors).
566. See id. at 303-04. The Fifth Circuit noted the State's view that Williams was
deliberately performing poorly on the IQ tests and the inconsistency between the IQ test
results and his achievement test results and high school performance. The appellate court
stated that the trial court was not restricted to a consideration of IQ test results alone in
determining Williams' intellectual functioning. See id. at 308-11.
567. See id. at 304-O5, 312.
568. See id. at 305-07, 312, 314. The Fifth Circuit found that the trial court could
consider Williams' adaptive strengths as well as weaknesses in determining whether any of
his alleged adaptive deficits were significant. See id. at 312-14.
to establish either the intellectual or adaptive functioning elements
were not clearly erroneous and affirmed the denial of Atkins relief.'
c. Contested Atkins Claims Unsuccessful in Texas State and Federal
Courts
The cases of two offenders (James Clark and Curtis Moore)7 o
illustrate vigorously contested Atkins claims that were nevertheless
unsuccessful in Texas state and federal courts. James Clark's full
scale 10 test results were seventy-four at age fifteen (WISC-Revised),
sixty-eight (Kaufman) by the defense Atkins expert, and sixty-five
(WAIS-III) by the Atkins expert initially retained by the State."' The
defense expert assessed Clark's adaptive functioning using the VABS
and SIB-R tests, and the original State expert used the ABAS test to
find deficits in four skill areas. Both of these experts determined that
Clark was mentally retarded.572 The defense also presented evidence
of Clark's special education placement and record evidence from his
juvenile incarceration indicating adaptive functioning deficits.573 The
State presented evidence that Clark's first IQ score underrepresented
his intellectual capacity and asserted that the Atkins IQ and adaptive
569. See id. at 300, 308, 310-11, 312, 314 (noting deference to the trial court's
credibility determinations).
570. Moore v. Quarterman, 517 F.3d 781 (5th Cir. 2008); Clark v. Quarterman, 457
F.3d 441 (5th Cir. 2006); Moore v. Quarterman, No. 4:07-CV-077-A, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 49024 (N.D. Tex. July 6, 2007); Ex parte Moore, WR-42,810-03 (Tex. Crim. App.
Jan. 31, 2007) (per curiam); Ex parte Clark, No. 37288-02, 2004 WL 885583 (Tex. Crim.
App. Mar. 3, 2004) (per curiam); cf Thomas v. Quarterman, 335 F. App'x 386 (5th Cir.
2009) (per curiam) (denying certificate of appealability after finding the Texas courts'
resolution of the conflicting evidence, including rejection of the Flynn effect, not
unreasonable and no error in the federal trial court's denial of Atkins relief without an
evidentiary hearing); Lewis v. Quarterman, 541 F.3d 280 (5th Cir. 2008) (vacating federal
trial court's denial of Atkins relief and remanding for consideration of additional,
previously proffered Atkins evidence); Lewis v. Quarterman, 272 F. App'x 347 (5th Cir.
2008) (per curiam) (denying certificate of appealability regarding evidentiary and
procedural issues related to Atkins claim); Lewis v. Thaler, No. 5:05cv70, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 111135 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2010) (denying Atkins claim after considering
additional proffered evidence); Lewis v. Quarterman, No. 5:05cv70, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
45358 (E.D. Tex. June 22, 2007) (denying Atkins relief based on intellectual functioning
alone after finding the evidence in "equipoise"); Ex parte Thomas, WR-16,556-04, 2006
Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 61 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 13, 2006) (per curiam); Ex parte
Lewis, No. 44,725-02 (Tex. Crim. App. June 29,2005).
571. See Transcript of Record at 765, 768, 771, Clark, 2004 WL 885583 (Nos. F-93-
0713-C; 37288-02) (containing Clark's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law).
572. See id. at 763-71 (concluding that Clark was not manipulating the test results).
573. See id. at 771-72.
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functioning test results were subject to Clark's manipulation.574
Evidence from several lay, investigative, and correctional witnesses
described Clark's completion of a GED, his ability to work and live
independently in the community, his adaptation to life in custody, and
his ability to plan the commission of his crime and its concealment."'
The State also presented an additional expert who, based on a review
of the records and an interview of Clark, concluded that he was not
mentally retarded.'
The convicting trial court substantially utilized the State's
proposed findings and conclusions in this pre-Briseno case.' After
citing the five-point standard measurement error regarding each IQ
test, the trial court concluded that Clark's IQ result of seventy-four at
age fifteen had been deemed reliable by all of the experts and it was
the most reliable test result. The trial court further concluded that it
underrepresented Clark's intellectual functioning, and it did not
reflect significant intellectual functioning deficits.' The trial court
also found that the retrospective adaptive behavior tests were not
reliable indicators of Clark's adaptive functioning during the
developmental period due, in part, to their reliance on information
supplied by Clark and others with a bias. Instead, the trial court
determined that record and testimonial evidence of Clark's actual
adaptive functioning in the community, in youth and adult custody,
and regarding his crime reflected an absence of adaptive functioning
deficits during the developmental period and in adulthood.57 9
Agreeing with the assessment of the State's Atkins hearing expert, the
trial court found that Clark was not mentally retarded.sso
The Texas Court reviewed the evidence relied on by the
convicting trial court, determined that its findings and conclusions
574. See id. at 779-81, 789-90 (containing the State's Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law).
575. See id. at 782-89 (including educational and work activities during juvenile
incarceration, active engagement during trial, and reading and adaptive activities in
prison).
576. See id. at 790-91 (concluding that Clark had an antisocial personality disorder).
577. See id. at 1-19 (containing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law).
578. See id. at 4-7 (noting Clark's intellectual potential between the dull average and
average ranges based on his first IQ test, his verbal component score of seventy-four on
the WAIS-III test, and the manipulation potential regarding the Atkins IQ testing).
579. See id. at 7-18.
580. See id. at 18 (finding, alternatively, that even if Clark was in the upper ranges of
mild mental retardation, he was not so impaired as to fall within the national consensus
warranting an exemption from execution).
were supported by the record, and denied Clark Atkins relief.581
Finding no error in the Texas courts' determination that Clark had
failed to establish the intellectual functioning component of mental
retardation, the federal trial court denied his federal claim for Atkins
relief." On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that it was not contrary to
clearly established federal law for the Texas courts to fail to use the
lowest IQ score in the measurement error range in assessing this
element. 83 The appellate court further found that the federal trial
court did not err in its resolution of this aspect of Clark's Atkins
claim, and that the federal trial court did not err in only considering
this aspect of the mental retardation definition in denying Clark's
Atkins claim." Out of an "abundance of caution," the Fifth Circuit
reviewed the Texas Court's findings regarding the adaptive
functioning and developmental period onset elements. The Fifth
Circuit noted the appropriate role of evidence of adaptive strengths in
a skill area to demonstrate the absence of an adaptive weakness in the
skill area. It also found no error in the Texas courts' finding that
evidence of Clark's actual adaptive functioning was more credible
than the retrospective adaptive behavior assessments administered by
the Atkins experts. The Fifth Circuit found that Clark had failed to
show by clear and convincing evidence that the Texas Court made
unreasonable factual determinations based on the presented evidence
and affirmed the denial of Atkins relief.585
Curtis Moore presented, in support of his Atkins claim, evidence
of two full scale IQ scores of sixty-eight and seventy-two on WISC-
Revised tests taken at ages twelve and thirteen, respectively; a youth
incarceration recommendation of special education; and an Atkins IQ
581. See Clark, 2004 WL 885583 (noting also Clark's achievement test results "only
slightly below" grade norms, special education placement due to truancy and negative
behavior, juvenile diagnosis of conduct disorder, and planning associated with the crime).
582. See Clark v. Quarterman, 457 F.3d 441, 443 (5th Cir. 2006).
583. See id. at 444-46. The Fifth Circuit noted that although the Court referred to the
AAMR and APA mental retardation definitions in Atkins, the Court did not mandate that
states exactly follow all of the professional organizations' approaches in diagnosing mental
retardation. See id. at 445. In implementing Atkins, the Texas Court had advised
flexibility in interpreting IQ scores. See id. at 444. This approach suggests that courts
should not "rigidly consider an IQ score to be determinative of the defendant's intellectual
functioning." Id. at 445. In light of the evidence of Clark's intellectual functioning
described above, the Texas Courts' determination regarding this element of mental
retardation was not unreasonable. See id. at 445-46.
584. See id. at 443-44 (noting the offender's burden to establish all three elements of
mental retardation).
585. See id. at 446-48.
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score of sixty-three (WAIS-III). Moore asserted that his IQ score of
seventy-six (WAIS-Revised) as assessed at trial was inflated due to
the Flynn effect. The expert who administered this test (as well as
Moore's initial 10 test) reviewed Moore's Atkins expert's findings
and agreed that Moore was mentally retarded.' Moore's adaptive
behavior deficits were supported by information supplied by juvenile
records, correctional personnel, and family members regarding his
limitations in self-care, communication, and academic and social
skills. He also presented Atkins VABS test results reflecting deficits
in communication, daily living, and socialization, in addition to
achievement test results at the fourth to sixth grade level.8
Regarding his intellectual functioning, the State asserted that Moore's
initial IQ test underrepresented his intellectual functioning, and
additionally cited a full scale IQ score of seventy-two (WISC-
Revised) at age fifteen, the trial IQ score of seventy-six (rejecting any
Flynn effect), and its own Atkins IQ score of seventy-six (WAIS-
III).'" As to Moore's adaptive functioning, the State noted his
written and oral communication abilities reflected during his
incarceration and at trial; his work abilities in prison and in the
community; his completion of his GED while in prison; his adaptive
functioning during his school, community, and incarceration periods;
his relationships with women; his leadership role in planning,
executing, and attempting to avoid detection and responsibility for his
crime; and his satisfactory performance in seven of nine areas
measured by the Atkins SSSQ test administered.'89 The State noted
the absence of any pre-Atkins diagnosis of Moore's mental
retardation."
586. See Transcript of Record at 661-63, Ex parte Moore, WR-42,810-03 (Tex. Crim.
App. Jan. 31, 2007) (per curiam) (Nos. C-297-006492-0631559-C; WR-42,810-03)
(containing Applicant's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) (noting also
the absence of records regarding any additional IQ test administered at age fifteen and
criticizing the State's Atkins IQ score as the outlier).
587. See id. at 663-64; see also id. at 12-14 (containing expert affidavit accompanying
Moore's initial Atkins application); id. at 74-77 (containing information from Moore's
amended application); cf id. at 664 (criticizing the State expert's use of the SSSQ test to
measure adaptive behavior).
588. See id. at 130-33 (containing State's Reply to Moore's amended pleading).
589. See id. at 133-43 (criticizing the defense expert's use of the VABS test and
attacking the inconsistencies in and limitations of the defense expert witnesses and
inconsistencies in and credibility of the defense lay witnesses).
590. See id. at 143 (noting characterizations of his borderline to low-average
intellectual functioning and diagnoses of conduct and behavior disorders).
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The convicting trial court substantially adopted the State's
proposed findings and conclusions. 9' The trial court noted all of the
IQ scores described above. It found that Moore's initial IQ scores of
sixty-eight and seventy-two underrepresented his intellectual
capacity; none of his IQ scores should be adjusted for the Flynn
effect; his Atkins expert's score was likely affected by his poor
motivation or the test setting; the State expert's test results were not
affected by any practice effect and were a reliable and accurate
measure of Moore's IQ; and multiple IQ assessments supported a
determination that Moore functioned in the borderline (not mentally
retarded) range of intellectual functioning.'9 Regarding Moore's
adaptive functioning, the court adopted the State's evidence of
Moore's adaptive functioning (including the State expert's SSSO
results as one source of adaptive functioning information). The trial
court found the defense expert and lay witnesses' evidence
inconsistent or less credible and found fault with the defense expert's
use and administration of the VABS test. Finally, the convicting trial
court found that Moore failed to satisfy each element of the Briseno
factors.' The trial court noted that Moore had no pre-Atkins
diagnosis of mental retardation and concluded instead that he had a
conduct and oppositional disorder that developed into an antisocial
personality disorder.94
With the exception of one factual finding, the Texas Court
adopted the convicting trial court's findings and conclusions and
denied Moore Atkins relief.'9 The federal trial court reviewed the
conflicting evidence regarding Moore's intellectual and adaptive
functioning, including the evidence applying the Briseno factors that
"amply supported" the absence of significant deficits in his adaptive
behavior. The federal trial court concluded that the Texas courts'
finding that Moore was not mentally retarded was not unreasonable
591. See id. at 643-59 (containing State's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law); id. at 667 (containing trial court's order correcting one aspect of a proposed factual
finding).
592. See id. at 646-50 (reciting a State Atkins IQ score of seventy-eight rather than
seventy-six).
593. See id. at 650-57.
594. See id. at 646, 647, 649, 656 (noting developmental period diagnoses of borderline
intellectual functioning and oppositional syndrome).
595. See Moore, WR-42,810-03 (deleting the factual finding rejecting the conclusions
of one of the defense experts who did not personally examine Moore).
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and was thus entitled to due deference under the AEDPA.'9 The
Fifth Circuit, though it described the conflicting nature of the
evidence, determined that Moore presented a "thin case" of mental
retardation and accordingly denied his application for a certificate of
appealability from the trial court's denial of his Atkins claim."
4. Conclusion
The vast majority of Texas Atkins claims have been pursued
through the collateral review process in Texas state and federal
courts.59 8  The Texas Court has found that approximately thirty
percent of the eighty-one Atkins collateral review claimants presented
insufficient evidence of their mental retardation to warrant further
review and has dismissed their subsequent writ applications as an
abuse of the writ.5" On the other hand, approximately ten percent of
these Atkins claimants successfully established their claims following
agreed findings of their mental retardation.6m In their review of the
remainder of these Atkins claims (representing approximately sixty
percent of the total number of claimants), Texas state and federal
trial courts have been presented with an array of often conflicting
expert and lay testimony and record evidence." Not surprisingly, as
illustrated by the cases presented above, these fact-intensive inquiries
have not produced uniform results: sometimes seemingly similar
factual presentations have produced differing determinations of
mental retardation" and courts have not always uniformly
interpreted the elements of the mental retardation definition. 3 In
596. See Moore v. Quarterman, No. 4:07-CV-077-A, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49024, at
*15-20 (N.D. Tex. July 6, 2007).
597. See Moore v. Quarterman, 517 F.3d 781, 784 (5th Cir. 2008).
598. Compare supra Table 1 (describing collateral review cases), with infra Table 2
(describing direct appeal cases).
599. See supra Table 1 (identifying twenty-four Atkins claimants whose cases were
dismissed due to the absence of prima facie or clear and convincing evidence, but not
including Moore and Rivera who successfully established their mental retardation in
federal court).
600. See supra Table 1; supra notes 407-66 and accompanying text (describing these
eight cases resolved by the Texas Court and Texas Governor).
601. See supra Table 1 (identifying the remaining forty-nine Atkins claimants); supra
notes 376-400 and accompanying text (describing challenges in the review of Atkins
claims).
602. Compare Exparte Plata, No. AP-75,820, 2008 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1398 (Tex.
Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2008) (per curiam), with Ex parte Chester, No. AP-75,037, 2007 Tex.
Crim. App. LEXIS 1852 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2007).
603. See, e.g., Transcript of Record at 440-45, Chester, 2007 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS
1852 (Nos. 76044-B; 45,249-02; AP-75,037) (using Texas Education Agency IQ standard);
some cases, the Briseno factors, unique to Texas Atkins proceedings,
have played a determinative role in the rejection of a mental
retardation finding.6 In light of the offender's burden of proof,
"close" cases are more likely to be resolved against the offender."
Following contested proceedings in Texas state and federal trial
courts, approximately seven percent of the total number of Atkins
collateral review claimants have successfully established their Atkins
claim and approximately fifty-three percent have not.6
The factual determinations by these Texas trial courts have
played a critical role in these Atkins proceedings. The Texas Court
has repeatedly noted the significant deference it accords to the
convicting trial courts' Atkins mental retardation findings.60
Although there have been occasional disagreements between the
Texas Court and convicting trial courts concerning aspects of an
Atkins claim, the Texas Court has never rejected a convicting trial
court's ultimate determination of mental retardation!" Similarly, the
AEDPA prescribes a highly deferential review standard regarding
state court factual findings, including those regarding mental
retardation in an Atkins claimi? Consequently, the Texas federal
courts have denied Atkins relief in all cases subject to the AEDPA
review standard and made mental retardation findings only in two
cases subject to de novo review in federal court .6 " Thus, although
Transcript of Record at 37-51, Ex parte Taylor, No. WR-48,498-02, 2006 Tex. Crim. App.
LEXIS 2534 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 1, 2006) (per curiam) (Nos. C-297-006327-0542281-B;
WR-48,498-02) (finding SSSQ adaptive behavior assessment more persuasive than VABS
and SIB-R tests).
604. See, e.g., Chester, 2007 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1852, at *12-27; see also infra
notes 857-72 and accompanying text.
605. See Ex parte Henderson, No. WR-37,658-03 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 25, 2006)
(Cochran, J., joined by Keller, P.J., and Price and Johnson, JJ., concurring) (indicating the
case represented a "close question" regarding the determination of Henderson's mental
retardation).
606. See supra notes 467-517 and accompanying text (describing six successful
contested Atkins cases); see also supra Table 1 (identifying forty-three remaining
unsuccessful Atkins claimants).
607. See, e.g., Ex parte Cockrell, No. AP-76,168, 2009 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS
409, at *2-3 (Tex. Crim. App. June 10, 2009) (per curiam); Chester, 2007 Tex. Crim. App.
LEXIS 1852, at *10-12; Ex parte Modden, 147 S.W.3d 293, 298-99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
608. See supra notes 524-58 and accompanying text (describing illustrative cases); see
also supra Table 1.
609. See, e.g., Thomas v. Quarterman, 335 F. App'x 386, 388-91 (5th Cir. 2009) (per
curiam); Clark v. Quarterman, 457 F.3d 441, 443-48 (5th Cir. 2006).
610. See supra notes 372, 501-17 and accompanying text (describing the de novo
review cases); see also supra Table 1 (identifying unsuccessful Atkins claims in Texas
federal courts).
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Atkins has generated significant collateral review litigation in Texas,
it has resulted in relatively limited changes in the capital outcomes of
611these cases.
V. The Texas Court and Texas Trial Courts
Address Atkins Claims
A. Overview
Unlike the significant number of Atkins claims that have been
raised through the collateral review process in Texas state and federal
courts, relatively few Atkins claims have been raised during Texas
capital trial proceedings or on direct review by the Texas Court in the
period since the Atkins decision in 2002.612 Nevertheless, in the
absence of legislative action, the Texas Court has provided a general
framework for the resolution of Atkins claims at trial and on direct
appeal.
In Hall v. State,6 14 the Texas Court's first direct appeal decision
611involving an Atkins claim and decided a few months after Briseno,
the Texas Court applied several aspects of its interim Atkins collateral
review procedures to cases in the trial and direct appeal stages. At
the outset, the Texas Court identified key components of the interim
Atkins procedure it had adopted in the collateral review context. It
had defined mental retardation for Atkins purposes as "(1)
'significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning' (an IQ of
611. See supra Table 1 (describing the results in these cases). Factors describing the
difference in the Texas results in Atkins cases and those elsewhere are described more
fully infra notes 707-87 and accompanying text.
612. Compare supra Table 1 (describing Atkins claims on collateral review), with infra
Table 2 (describing Atkins claims at trial and on direct appeal).
613. See infra notes 614-65 and accompanying text (describing these standards).
614. Hall v. State, 160 S.W.3d 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
615. The Hall appeal reached the Texas Court in an unusual posture. Evidence
regarding mental retardation was introduced in Hall's pre-Atkins trial with reference to
the mitigating evidence punishment issue and no specific findings were sought regarding
mental retardation as a separate issue. The Texas Court had rejected Hall's claim that the
execution of mentally retarded persons was unconstitutional when it initially considered
his appeal prior to Atkins. While Hall was pursuing a certiorari petition on this issue from
the Court, he asserted the same claim in state habeas corpus proceedings. While both
matters were pending, the Court announced its Atkins decision. The Court subsequently
vacated Hall's direct appeal judgment and remanded the appeal for reconsideration based
on its Atkins ruling-an action resulting in the instant appellate decision. Before the
Texas Court delivered its decision in the direct appeal case, however, the state habeas
corpus proceeding was completed, with the Texas Court denying Atkins relief based on
the convicting court's determination that Hall was not mentally retarded. See id. at 26-27.
about 70 or below), (2) 'related limitations in adaptive functioning,'
and (3) onset of the above two characteristics before age eighteen.""'
The Texas Court had entrusted the fact-finder with the determination
of mental retardation, with expert testimony relevant, but not
"necessarily conclusive" in this determination. It had concluded that
no separate jury determination of mental retardation was required.
The Texas Court stated that, at least in the habeas corpus context, it
had assigned the defendant the burden to prove mental retardation
by a preponderance of the evidence. The Texas Court completed its
recitation of its interim Atkins collateral review procedure by stating
that its appellate review would be characterized by "almost total
deference" to trial courts' factual findings, especially those based on
credibility and demeanor determinations.617
The Texas Court then noted that none of the typical bases for
differences in the evaluation of claims on direct appeal and habeas
corpus review were present in the Hall case.61' However, with regard
to cases tried before, but appealed after, Atkins, the Texas Court
acknowledged that a "serious question" about the adequacy of the
direct appeal record with regard to the Atkins mental retardation
issue would be presented. In such cases, mental retardation evidence
would have been presented at trial only in terms of its relevance to
the elements of the crime or the sentencing issues, and not for the
619purpose of establishing a constitutional bar to execution.
616. Id. at 36 (quoting Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). In Briseno,
the Texas Court identified the similar pre-Atkins AAMR and Texas mental retardation
law definitions as the bases for the mental retardation definition it adopted for Atkins
purposes. In its recitation of the mental retardation definition in Hall, the Texas Court
used language from the AAMR definitions it cited. Compare id. at 36, with Briseno, 135
S.W.3d at 7; see supra notes 227-40 (containing definitions from Briseno).
617. Hall, 160 S.W.3d at 36. Only with regard to the assignment to the defendant of
the burden to prove mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence did the Texas
Court add the additional qualifier that these standards were established "at least on
habeas corpus," implicitly indicating the application of the other standards to proceedings
beyond the habeas corpus context. See id.
618. The Texas Court identified these aspects as related to potential differences in the
adequacy of the appellate and habeas corpus record to support a claim and differences in
the evaluation standards sometimes applied to claims in these differing contexts. Because
the Texas Court concluded that it could consider the evidence developed in connection
with the habeas corpus proceedings in this appeal and because it applied essentially the
same review standards to the Atkins claim presented on direct appeal, the Texas Court
determined that these noted differences were not relevant in the instant case. See id. at
36-38.
619. See id. at 37; see also id. at 40-41 (Price, J., joined by Cochran, J., concurring)
(noting the general advisability of an evidentiary hearing to resolve contested Atkins
claims); id. at 41-44 (Johnson, J., joined by Holcomb, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
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Nevertheless, other aspects of the procedures articulated in
Briseno applied with equal force in the trial and appellate stages,
specifically the burden and standard of proof and appellate review
standard.6 20 The Texas Court repeated its comparison of the Atkins
mental retardation determination to an affirmative defense, and
expanded the analogy to several statutory punishment-reducing
factors, all of which required that the defendant prove the "discrete"
facts at issue by a preponderance of the evidence.6 2' The Texas Court
therefore concluded: "Given the legislative backdrop for similar
affirmative defenses and analogous punishment mitigating factors, we
find, absent further legislative guidance, that mental retardation is the
type of issue that must be proven by the defendant by a
preponderance of the evidence-regardless of when the claim is
presented."6 2   Based on this conclusion, the Texas Court further
determined that the review standard of "almost total deference" to
the trial court's factual findings (if supported by the record), as
adopted in the habeas corpus context, also applied on direct appeal:
"Given the same burden, the standard of deference will also be the
same, whether the Court conducts a sufficiency review of a mental
retardation claim decided at trial or a legal review of a trial court's
recommendation on habeas corpus."6 3
reliance on punishment evidence and affidavit evidence in rejecting Hall's Atkins claim);
id. at 44-45 (Holcomb, J., dissenting) (criticizing the reliance on punishment evidence and
affidavit evidence in rejecting Hall's Atkins claim).
620. See id. at 38-39.
621. In Briseno, the Texas Court had compared the Atkins mental retardation
determination to an insanity affirmative defense and to the competency to stand trial and
to be executed determinations. See Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 12. In Hall, the appellate court
expanded the analogy to certain punishment-reducing factors, such as murder committed
in the context of sudden passion and a release of the victim in a safe place in an aggravated
kidnapping context. In each of these areas, the Texas Legislature assigned the defendant
the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Moreover, the Texas Court
found that like the punishment-reducing factors, the proof of mental retardation involves
a "single, discrete fact" and contrasted this with the proof relating to the mitigating
circumstances sentencing issue. See Hall, 160 S.W.3d at 38-39.
622. Hall, 160 S.W.3d at 39; see Escamilla v. State, 143 S.W.3d 814, 827-28 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2004) (rejecting the contention that the State must affirmatively show that a capital
defendant is not mentally retarded).
623. Hall, 160 S.W.3d at 39. Interestingly, the Texas Court compared this deferential
review standard to that articulated by the Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
(1972), regarding review of the legal sufficiency of the evidence in support of a guilt
determination. In this analysis, evidence is reviewed in the light most favorable to the
prosecution to determine whether a rational fact-finder could have found the elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In a guilt determination, of course, the prosecution
has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Hall, 160 S.W.3d at 39 & n.48.
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In Atkins direct appeal cases after Hall, the Texas Court has
maintained most of the standards adopted in Hall, clarified and
articulated other standards, and left some standards open for
resolution in the trial and direct appeal context.624 At the outset, the
Texas Court has held that there is no separation of powers
constitutional violation as a result of the Texas Court's articulation of
Atkins standards in the absence of legislative action.6' The Texas
Court has maintained the burden and standard of proof allocations
identified in Hall, i.e., placing the burden of proof on the offender to
prove his mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence at
trial.626 The determination of mental retardation at trial is a question
of fact, based on all the expert and lay evidence and credibility
findings.627 On appellate review of a factual finding at trial that an
offender is not mentally retarded, the Texas Court considers all of the
relevant evidence presented, and with "great deference" to the fact-
finder's conclusion, determines whether the mental retardation
finding is "so against the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence as to be manifestly unjust." 628
In the Atkins context, however, the Texas Court had placed the mental retardation
burden of proof on the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence after comparing this
determination to affirmative defenses and punish-reducing factors. In this context, the
Texas Court had previously adopted a review standard concerning findings adverse to the
defendant which reviewed all the evidence presented without the restriction to that most
favorable to the prosecution and which set aside the adverse finding if it was "so against
the great weight and preponderance of the evidence so as to be manifestly unjust." Meraz
v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 154-55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). In subsequent Atkins direct
appeal cases, the Texas Court referred to this review standard rather than the legal
sufficiency standard. See infra note 628 and accompanying text.
624. See infra notes 625-65 and accompanying text (describing these cases).
625. See Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 270-72 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (finding that
Atkins does not require legislative implementation procedures and declining to delay
Atkins proceedings until legislative action). The Texas Court also rejected an equal
protection claim based on the absence of uniform statutory procedures and the possibility
of different procedures being utilized by different trial courts. See id. at 272.
626. See, e.g., Lizcano v. State, No. AP-75,879, 2010 WL 1817772, at *10 (Tex. Crim.
App. May 5, 2010); Neal, 256 S.W.3d at 273, 277; Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 770 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007).
627. See Lizcano, 2010 WL 1817772, at *10.
628. See id. at *35-37; see also Gallo, 239 S.W.3d at 770 (quoting Meraz, 785 S.W.2d at
155); cf. Lizcano, 2010 WL 1817772, at *39 n.39 (Price, J., joined by Holcomb and
Johnson, JJ., concurring and dissenting) (concluding that the result of an appellate finding
of insufficient evidence regarding mental retardation would be a remand for a new
sentencing hearing unless the State requested a sentence reformation to life
imprisonment). But cf Hall, 160 S.W.3d at 39 (citing a different review standard); supra
note 623.
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The Texas Court has stated that an offender is entitled to a "full
and fair hearing" on his mental retardation claim at trial.629 However,
it has declined to specify who must be the fact-finder for an Atkins
claim at trial and it has rejected claims of error based on the fact-
finder in particular cases.'" In this connection, the Texas Court has
found no due process violation in a trial court's denial of an
offender's request for a pretrial determination of mental retardation
by a judge or specially called jury.631 It has held that a jury
determination of mental retardation at trial is not required by
Atkins.63 2 In instances in which a jury has served as the fact-finder
regarding mental retardation at trial, the Texas Court has found no
error in the jury that determined guilt also determining mental
retardation during the punishment proceedings in the case (rather
than a separate jury).633 The Texas Court has further held that a
punishment phase determination of mental retardation sufficiently
protects an offender's constitutional rights under Atkins.6 In fact,
the Texas Court has indicated that the jury that has determined guilt
might be "especially well-prepared" to also consider an offender's
mental retardation due to its knowledge of the facts of the crime that
may be relevant to mental retardation.635 In instances in which both
the trial judge and jury have made mental retardation findings, the
629. Williams v. State, 270 S.W.3d 112, 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
630. See infra notes 631-39 and accompanying text.
631. See Lizcano, 2010 WL 1817772, at *8-9 (suggesting that the defense policy
argument for a pretrial determination be addressed to the Legislature). In another case,
the Texas Court found that the trial court did not err in denying the offender's request for
the pretrial determination of his mental retardation by a judge or separate jury in the
"absence of legislation or a constitutional requirement directing when the determination
of mental retardation is to be made or by whom." Hunter v. State, 243 S.W.3d 664, 672
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). But see Neal, 256 S.W.3d at 285 (Meyers, J., concurring) (stating
that mental retardation should be determined by a separate jury prior to the capital trial in
cases in which the offender makes a prima facie case of his Atkins claim).
632. See Hunter, 243 S.W.3d at 672; Gallo, 239 S.W.3d at 770. Both of these cases cited
the Court's decision in Schriro v. Smith, 546 U.S. 6, 7-8 (2005) (per curiam), holding that
the Ninth Circuit erred in preemptively requiring Arizona courts to conduct a jury trial to
determine the mental retardation of an offender before the state court had the
opportunity to apply its own procedures to the Atkins claim.
633. See Neal, 256 S.W.3d at 272 (rejecting claim of error based on trial court's refusal
to empanel a separate jury to determine mental retardation).
634. See Lizcano, 2010 WL 1817772, at *8-9.
635. See id., at *9 (quoting Neal, 256 S.W.3d at 272). But see Neal, 256 S.W.3d at 285
(Meyers, J., concurring) (noting the negative aspects of the punishment jury deciding
mental retardation).
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Texas Court has addressed only the finding of the jury.636 In a few
cases tried prior to Atkins, but resolved on direct appeal after Atkins,
the Texas Court has effectively served as fact-finder regarding mental
retardation during the appellate proceedings. 3 ' Although contested
636. See Neal, 256 S.W.3d at 264; Lomi Kriel, Court Rejects Appeal of Man Who Killed
Heights Teacher, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, June 19, 2008, at B2 (indicating that the
trial judge also made a finding that the offender was not mentally retarded). The Atkins
decision was announced during the retrial of Johnny Paul Penry following the Court's
second reversal of his case. The defense attorney, with the agreement of the prosecutor,
requested that the trial judge make a determination regarding Penry's mental retardation.
The trial judge found that Penry was not mentally retarded, out of the presence of the
jury. The parties subsequently agreed to submit an issue regarding mental retardation to
the jury during the sentencing proceeding, using the three-part definition, but no burden
of proof. The jury found that Penry was not mentally retarded. See Mark Babineck, Jury
Sentences Johnny Paul Penry to Death, ASSOCIATED PRESS STATE & LOCAL WIRE, July
4, 2002; John Council, The Penry Predicament: How Should Texas Handle Mental
Retardation Claims in Capital Cases?, TEX. LAWYER, July 15, 2002, at 1. The Texas
Court's subsequent reversal of Penry's death sentence was based on errors in the trial
court's instructions. See Penry v. State, 178 S.W.3d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); infra
notes 660-64 and accompanying text (describing this decision).
637. See Hall v. State, 160 S.W.3d 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). The Court had vacated
the judgment in Hall's initial appeal and remanded the case for reconsideration following
Atkins. Prior to the Texas Court's reconsideration of this direct appeal, it had already
denied relief on an intervening habeas corpus application asserting an Atkins claim. See
supra note 615 (describing the procedural history of the case). The Texas Court
determined that the habeas corpus proceeding "satisfied the mandate" of Atkins. Its own
judicial notice of the habeas corpus proceedings and their outcome satisfied the Court's
remand order in the direct appeal case. Moreover, because the Texas Court had
determined that the burden of proof and standard of review regarding the Atkins claim
were the same in the collateral review and direct appeal contexts, its conclusion on the
merits of the claim was the same on direct appeal as in the habeas corpus proceeding.
After "re-reviewing" the trial record and the additional affidavit evidence introduced in
the habeas corpus proceeding, the Texas Court found that each supported a finding that
Hall was not mentally retarded. See Hall, 160 S.W.3d at 39-40; cf id. at 40-41 (Price, J.,
joined by Cochran, J., concurring) (noting the general advisability of an evidentiary
hearing to resolve contested Atkins claims). But see id. at 41-44 (Johnson, J., joined by
Holcomb, J., dissenting) (criticizing the reliance on punishment evidence and affidavit
evidence in rejecting Atkins claim); id. at 44-45 (Holcomb, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
reliance on punishment evidence and affidavit evidence in rejecting Atkins claim).
During federal collateral review proceedings, the federal trial court initially denied
collateral relief based on the state court Atkins record. See Hall v. Quarterman, 443 F.
Supp. 2d 815 (N.D. Tex. 2006). The Fifth Circuit found that Hall had not received a "full
and fair" hearing on his Atkins claim in state court in light of his pre-Atkins trial, pre-
Briseno habeas corpus proceeding based on affidavit evidence, and some erroneous
findings in the state court record. The appellate court determined that the federal trial
court abused its discretion in not holding an evidentiary hearing on the Atkins claim,
vacated its judgment, and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. See Hall v.
Quarterman, 534 F.3d 365, 369-72 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). Following an evidentiary
hearing, the federal trial court again denied collateral relief on the Atkins claim and the
Fifth Circuit affirmed its judgment. See Hall v. Thaler, 597 F.3d 746 (5th Cir. 2010) (per
curiam); Hall v. Quarterman, No. 4:06-CV-436-A, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18021 (N.D.
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post-Atkins mental retardation claims have generally been resolved
during punishment proceedings by the jury that determined guilt,'
the Texas Court has not required this procedure in trial
proceedings.6 " Thus, until the Court or Texas Court or Legislature
specifies otherwise, Texas capital trial judges appear to have the
discretion to determine when in the capital proceeding and by whom
the mental retardation determination is made.6
In Hall, the Texas Court restated the three-part mental
retardation definition articulated in Briseno, based on the Texas
mental retardation law and AAMR definitions." Post-Hall direct
appeal cases have also used this three-part definition, as well as the
Briseno factors.62 The Texas Court has characterized the Briseno
factors as "relevant" to evaluating all three parts of the mental
retardation definition." It has further rejected the claim that the
Briseno factors changed the AAMR mental retardation definition by
assigning "superior status" to lay evidence regarding adaptive
Tex. Mar. 9, 2009); cf Hall, 597 F.3d at 747 (Higginbotham, J., concurring) (noting the
appellate panel's division regarding whether AEDPA deference was due to the state court
finding and the federal trial court's mental retardation findings under the deferential
standard and as an original matter).
In the case of another offender sentenced prior to Atkins who raised an Atkins claim in
his direct appeal, the Texas Court applied its Briseno mental retardation definition to the
evidence introduced at trial. It concluded that although the trial evidence supported
impairment in the offender's intellectual and adaptive functioning to "some degree," it
was not "sufficiently developed" to establish his mental retardation under the Briseno
definition. The Texas Court therefore rejected the offender's Atkins claim. See Howard
v. State, 153 S.W.3d 382, 386-87 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (per curiam).
638. See, e.g., Neal, 256 S.W.3d at 272.
639. In addressing a challenge on direct appeal regarding the denial of a pretrial
mental retardation determination procedure, the Texas Court stated that its Briseno
interim guidelines "do not address when the determination of mental retardation is to be
made." Hunter v. State, 243 S.W.3d 664, 672 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In the absence of
legislative or constitutional articulation of when or by whom the mental retardation
determination must be made, the Texas Court found no error in a trial court's choice of a
punishment jury procedure and rejection of a pretrial procedure to determine mental
retardation. See id.
640. See id.
641. See Hall, 160 S.W.3d at 36 (citing Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 7-8 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2004)); see also Howard, 153 S.W.3d at 386 (citing Briseno's reference to both
definitions).
642. See Lizcano v. State, No. AP-75,879, 2010 WL 1817772, at *10-11 (Tex. Crim.
App. May 5, 2010); Williams v. State, 270 S.W.3d 112, 113-14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008);
Hunter, 243 S.W.3d at 666-67. See generally Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 5-9; supra notes 227-
40 and accompanying text (discussing the Texas mental retardation definition adopted in
Briseno for Atkins purposes, including the Briseno factors).
643. See Neal, 256 S.W.3d at 273.
behavior. The Texas Court has concluded that, although these factors
incorporate lay evidence (such as regarding the crime and the
offender's behavior surrounding its commission), they do not exclude
or diminish the importance of expert evidence in the determination of
mental retardation. The ultimate factual determination of mental
retardation for Atkins purposes is based on all of the evidence and
related credibility determinations.6"
Post-Hall direct appeal cases have also addressed some
evidentiary and other trial-related issues." The Texas Court has
rejected claims that only expert testimony can establish (or disprove)
mental retardation and that the prosecution has a burden of
production to introduce expert evidence to overcome a mental
retardation claimi" Despite the fact that the offender has the burden
of proof regarding mental retardation, the State retains the right to
make the final punishment argument when mental retardation is
presented as one of the punishment issues."
Finally, the Texas Court has addressed post-Hall claims of error
based on the instructions given to jurors to guide their mental
retardation determinations. All of the reviewed instructions used the
three-part definition of mental retardation, but provided differing
information regarding the diagnostic criteria accompanying them.6'
In one case, the trial court defined significantly limited intellectual
functioning using the AAMR and Texas mental retardation law
criterion of two standard deviations below the instrument's mean and
included a standard measurement error of five points. The trial court
defined the requisite adaptive behavior limitations in terms of the
AAMR's more recent consolidated conceptual, social, and practical
644. See Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 775-77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (rejecting claim
of error based on trial court's denial of a mistrial or additional continuance to gather
additional evidence and otherwise respond to Briseno, decided during trial).
645. See, e.g., Lizcano, 2010 WL 1817772, at *7--8 (finding trial court may order
independent State psychological examination when offender indicates intent to use expert
evidence of mental retardation and no constitutional violation based on the manner in
which the examination was conducted in this case); Neal, 256 S.W.3d at 273 (noting
testimony regarding the Flynn effect and the Texas Court's past refraining from applying
it because it is an "unexamined" principle of insufficient reliability to establish the level of
intellectual functioning).
646. See Lizcano, 2010 WL 1817772, at *10 (finding that the State's failure to
introduce rebuttal expert testimony did not require the trial court to disregard the jury's
finding that the offender was not mentally retarded).
647. See id. at *15-16 (rejecting claimed error based on trial court denial of defense
request to open and close punishment argument regarding mental retardation).
648. See infra notes 649-64 and accompanying text (describing these cases).
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skill areas and the required performance on standardized measures of
two standard deviations below the mean regarding one of these three
areas or overall.69 The Texas Court rejected the claim that the
instructions were "arcane and almost incomprehensible." It found
that the mental retardation issue was litigated pursuant to Briseno
and the AAMR definition and these instructions were not "glaringly
inconsistent" with these standards. Finally, in the absence of a trial
objection, the Texas Court concluded that the offender was not
deprived of a "fair" determination of his mental retardation or
"egregiously harmed" by the instructions."o
In another case, the trial court generally used definitions from
the Texas mental retardation law, including the two or more standard
deviations from the mean criterion for the intellectual functioning
component (also used in the AAMR definition). The trial court
defined the adaptive functioning component using the Texas law's
definition regarding the "effectiveness with or degree to which a
person meets the standards of personal independence and social
responsibility expected of the person's age and cultural group" rather
than the defense-requested AAMR standard regarding deficits in two
or more identified adaptive skill areas.' On review, the Texas Court
stated that it had endorsed the Texas mental retardation law and
AAMR definitions in the Briseno interim procedure and therefore
the trial court did not err in refusing the offender's proposed
instruction.
However, in a subsequent case in which this Texas statutory
adaptive behavior definition and the Briseno factors were used,6
three dissenting Texas Court Judges vigorously rejected their use in
measuring the sufficiency of the adaptive functioning evidence.654
649. See Williams v. State, 270 S.W.3d 112, 133-34 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); supra notes
177, 265-66, 389 and accompanying text (describing these standards).
650. See id. 132-34. The jury was also instructed that it could find Williams mentally
retarded based on the affirmative votes of ten jurors; a unanimous verdict was required to
reject a mental retardation finding; and no verdict on the issue should be entered in the
absence of either of these two results. See id. at 134 n.30.
651. See Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 777-78 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting TEx.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 591.003 (West 2010)).
652. See id. at 778; see also id. (rejecting claim of error based on a defense-requested
instruction that the State had the burden to prove the offender was not mentally
retarded).
653. See Lizcano v. State, No. AP-75,879, 2010 WL 1817772, at *15 (Tex. Crim. App.
May 5, 2010).
654. See id. at *32-40 (Price, J., joined by Holcomb and Johnson, JJ., concurring and
dissenting). The jury returned a general verdict on the mental retardation claim. All
Although the Texas Court had referenced the state mental
retardation law definition in Briseno, it had also referenced the pre-
Atkins AAMR definition that included the determination of adaptive
functioning by "clinical assessment and, usually, standardized
scales.""' The AAMR and APA adaptive functioning definitions
referenced in Atkins both contained specific diagnostic criteria for
assessing adaptive functioning that required deficits in at least two of
the identified skill areas."' The dissenting Judges expressed concern
that the Texas Court adopted the three-part clinical mental
retardation definition in Briseno without expressly adopting its
accompanying diagnostic criteria identified in Atkins, further
promulgated non-diagnostic criteria through the Briseno factors, and
ultimately entrusted the determination of mental retardation to the
fact-finder without the explicit incorporation of the diagnostic criteria
identified in Atkins.' These Judges further explained:
In failing thus to anchor the fact-finder's decision on the specific
diagnostic criteria, we seem to have granted a certain
amorphous latitude to judges and juries in Texas to supply the
normative judgment-to say, in essence, what mental
retardation means in Texas (and, indeed, in the individual case)
for Eighth Amendment purposes.
Or, stated another way (in terms of the actual jury instruction
that was submitted in this case), Briseno would seem to
authorize the fact finder to decide just what "the standard" is in
Texas for "personal independence and social responsibility
expected of the person's age and cultural group"-without
necessarily taking into account the specific criteria that
diagnosticians in the field routinely use to make that
658determination.
members of the Texas Court found that Lizcano satisfied the intellectual functioning
aspect of the mental retardation definition. However, the Texas Court majority upheld
the evidentiary sufficiency of the jury's presumed rejection of his adaptive functioning
deficiency using the Texas mental retardation law definition that had been used at trial
without defense objection. See id. at *32-33 & n.4.
655. See id. at *33 (quoting Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 7 n.25 (Tex. Crim. App.
2004)).
656. See id. (referencing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2002)).
657. See id. at *33-35 (noting that the parties and convicting court in Briseno had used
the AAMR definition, including the diagnostic criteria regarding adaptive functioning).
658. Id. at *35.
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In order to carry out Atkins' mandate, the dissenting Judges
maintained that the diagnostic criteria should be incorporated in both
the jury instructions regarding mental retardation and the Texas
Court's sufficiency review of mental retardation evidence on appeal.65 9
The Texas Court has thus far found one set of jury instructions
concerning mental retardation fatally flawed.60 In a sentencing
proceeding underway when Atkins was announced, the trial court
incorporated the mental retardation issue into the mitigating evidence
punishment instruction. The jury was instructed that mental
retardation is mitigating as a matter of law.66 Under the procedure
for the determination of mitigating punishment evidence,662 if the jury
found that the offender was mentally retarded, it was instructed to
answer the mitigating evidence issue in the offender's favor. If it
found that the offender was not mentally retarded, the jury was
instructed to consider whether "any other" mitigating circumstance
existed. In that case, the jury did not find the existence of any
mitigating factor. On appeal, the Texas Court found that the
instruction impermissibly restricted the consideration of mental
impairment as a mitigating factor in the event that the jury found the
offender was not mentally retarded, and reversed and remanded the
death sentence.6
Thus, in the absence of legislative action, the Texas Court has
articulated most of the core aspects of the procedure to resolve
Atkins claims at trial and on direct appeal, including the burden and
standard of proof, the three-part mental retardation definition, and
the appellate review standard. It has not dictated a specific fact-
finder regarding mental retardation or specified when in the trial
court proceeding the mental retardation finding must be made. The
659. See id. at *35, *39-40.
660. See Penry v. State, 178 S.W.3d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
661. See id. at 784-85. The trial court did not assign a burden of proof regarding this
issue. It used the three-part mental retardation definition. The court defined the
intellectual functioning component as an IQ of approximately seventy or below. It
defined the adaptive functioning component as deficits in two or more of the specific skill
areas. See id. at 790; Council, supra note 636 (describing the process of deciding on a jury
instruction in this case).
662. See Penry, 178 S.W.3d at 790 (requiring ten votes to respond in the offender's
favor and a unanimous vote to reject the mitigation issue).
663. See id. at 785.
664. See id. at 783-84, 788-89. But see id. at 794-97 (Cochran, J., joined by Keller, P.J.,
and Keasler and Hervey, JJ., dissenting).
Texas Court continues to address specific evidentiary issues and
challenges to jury instructions as they arise."
B. Resolution of Atkins Claims in the Texas Court and Texas Trial
Courts
Although many fewer Atkins claims have been resolved in the
Texas trial courts and by the Texas Court on direct appellate review
than through the collateral review process, the outcomes in these
cases resemble those on collateral review.i' In some cases, the
evidence of mental retardation has affected the prosecutor's decision
not to seek the death penalty in a capital case."' In cases in which the
issue of mental retardation has been contested, the capital defendant
generally has not prevailed. In fact, as described in the table below,
no capital offender has thus far successfully established mental
retardation in a contested trial proceeding or had a trial level
rejection of mental retardation reversed on appeal.'
665. See supra notes 614-64 and accompanying text.
666. Compare supra Table 1 (describing collateral review cases), with infra Table 2
(describing cases at trial and on direct appellate review).
667. See infra Table 2.
668. See infra Table 2. In two cases in which the offender raised mental retardation, he
received a life sentence on other grounds. See Depue v. State, No. 04-08-00487-CR, 2009
WL 5150069 (Tex. App. Dec. 30, 2009) (stating life sentence based on jury's finding
regarding punishment issue related to the offender's role in the crime); Baskin v. State,
No. 01-05-00842-CR, 2007 WL 1441036 (Tex. App. Apr. 2, 2008) (stating life sentence
based on jury's finding of unspecified mitigating circumstances); Elizabeth Allen, Man
Gets Life in Retired Edison Teacher's Fatal Shooting, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS,
June 25, 2008, at B2 (indicating punishment jury's rejection of Depue's mental
retardation); Andrew Tilghman, Lawyer Urges Jurors to Spare Life of Killer; Defense Says
Man Convicted of Capital Murder Is Mentally Retarded, HOUS. CHRONICLE, Aug. 11,
2005, at B3 (describing Baskins' assertion of mental retardation during punishment
proceeding); cf. Cooper v. State, No. 01-03-00835-CR, 2004 WL 2415433 (Tex. App. Oct.
28, 2004) (reflecting a life sentence based on punishment jury finding regarding mitigating
circumstances); Council, supra note 636, at 1 (describing defense plan to raise Cooper's
mental retardation at trial); Ron Nissimov, Convicted Killer Gets Life in Slayings at Video
Store, Hous. CHRONICLE, Aug. 8, 2003, at A27 (identifying nonmental retardation
mitigating circumstances).
669. The Texas Court reversed Penry's sentence due to an erroneous mitigating
circumstances jury instruction. See Penry v. State, 178 S.W.3d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005);
supra notes 660-64 and accompanying text. In lieu of resentencing, Penry agreed to a life
sentence without parole and a stipulation that he was not mentally retarded. Mike Tolson,
An End to a Legal Saga, HOUS. CHRONICLE, Feb. 16, 2008, at B1 (noting that Penry's
death sentence had been reversed three times). Milam's case has not yet been decided by
the Texas Court. See Howard Roden, Jury Gives Milam Death Sentence, CONROE COURIER
NEWS, May 27, 2010, http://www.hcnonline.com/articles/2010/05/27/conroecourier/news/
milam052810b.txt (noting the punishment jury's rejection of Milam's mental retardation
claim); cf. Adriana M. Chavez, Fabian Hernandez Sentenced to Death, EL PASO TIMES,
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Table 2. Action on Atkins Claims in Texas Trial Courts and the Texas
Court





Gallo No MR No MR
Hall No MR
Howard No MR
Hunter No MR No MR
Lizcano No MR No MR
Milam No MR
Neal No MR No MR
Penry No MR __ _
Williams No MR No MR
Legend: Prosecutor Action: No DP = prosecutor decision not to pursue the death penalty
in case in which mental retardation asserted; Trial Stage Action: No MR = mental
retardation claim rejected by the fact-finder; Texas Court Action: No MR = Texas Court
upholding of fact-finder's rejection of mental retardation on direct appeal or finding, on
direct appeal, that evidence did not support a mental retardation finding in cases tried pre-
Atkins.
Prosecutorial decisions not to pursue the death penalty in cases
in which the offender has asserted mental retardation have occurred
at various stages of the proceeding. In two cases, the decision was
made prior to the capital trial.7 o In another case, however, jury
selection had already begun when the State's experts returned
conflicting reports on the defendant's mental retardation. The
Nov. 25, 2009, http://www.tdcaa.com/node/5576; Adriana M. Chavez, Prosecutors, Defense
Rest Case in Murder Trial, EL PASO TIMES, Nov. 11, 2009, 2009 WLNR 22610664 (noting
assertion in pretrial filings that Hernandez was mentally retarded). In two cases tried pre-
Atkins, the Texas Court effectively had a fact-finding role when an Atkins claim was made
on direct appeal. See supra note 637 and accompanying text (describing the Hall and
Howard cases).
670. See Alexander v. State, 229 S.W.3d 731 (Tex. App. 2007) (noting life sentence for
capital murder); Delao v. State, No. 10-05-00323-CR, 2006 WL 3317718 (Tex. App. Nov.
15, 2006) (describing capital murderer who received statutory life sentence as suffering
from "moderate" mental retardation with an IQ of approximately fifty-five (and
schizophrenia, disruptive behavior disorder, and alcohol abuse) in issue regarding the
voluntariness of his confession); Maro Robbins & Karisa King, Retardation Issue Looms
Big in Bexar, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Mar. 5, 2006, at Al (noting Alexander's IQ
scores from sixty-nine to seventy).
prosecutor decided not to pursue a death sentence to avoid the risk of
an "appellate quagmire.",1
Illustrative cases in which mental retardation has been contested
at trial resemble contested Atkins collateral review proceedings. In
Tomas Gallo's case, the defense presented evidence that, at age
fourteen, he had a full scale WISC-Revised IQ score of seventy-four
and an adolescent adaptive behavior test score of seventy-one. He
began special resource or education classes at approximately age
thirteen and remained eligible for them at age seventeen when he
tested at or below a sixth grade level in the tested areas on the
WRAT achievement tests. A teacher testified regarding his academic
limitations. His mother testified regarding his adaptive functioning
limitations, including his inability to perform simple household tasks,
read a clock, and make change.' Based on an interview with Gallo
and review of various records, the defense expert concluded that
Gallo's intellectual functioning was two standard deviations below
average, that he had adaptive limitations in at least two of the clinical
skill areas, that both deficiencies were manifest before Gallo was
eighteen, and that he was mentally retarded.
The State's expert tested Gallo's full scale IQ at sixty-eight at age
twenty-seven, but believed that his IQ was above seventy based on
Gallo's youthful IQ score and the score deflating effect of his
depression and anxiety during the recent testing. He adjusted Gallo's
adolescent adaptive testing score from seventy-one to eighty-five
based on the test's "bad" norms. His own ABAS testing resulted in a
score of seventy-one, with identified deficiencies in academic
functioning and health and safety. However, the expert also noted
that the "scaled" score range was sixty-nine to seventy-seven, that
Gallo had a high level of adaptive functioning in his own environment
(including work, drug selling, and gang activities), and the areas of
adaptive deficiency could be attributed to nonmental retardation
factors. Based on the above testing and his review of records and
interviews of Gallo, four of his teachers, and his juvenile probation
officer, the State's expert concluded that Gallo was not mentally
671. See Cantu v. State, No. 13-02-694-CR, 2004 WL 1532263 (Tex. App. July 8, 2004)
(reflecting life sentence); John Council, A Difficult Diagnosis: Determining Mental
Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, TEx. LAWYER, Nov. 4, 2002, at 1 (noting Cantu's IQ
scores of fifty-five and sixty-five and three defense experts that found him mildly mentally
retarded).
672. See Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 770-72 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
673. See id. at 770-71 (describing review of school and criminal justice records, an
interview transcript with Gallo's mother, and the results of the State expert's testing).
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retarded. 674  Cross-examination of Gallo's mother and testimony of
another teacher and a juvenile probation officer revealed Gallo's
ability to interact and communicate with others, work as a short-order
cook as a teen, and find and perform more sophisticated work
cleaning reactor tanks and live on his own as an adult.6"
The jury unanimously found that Gallo was not mentally
retarded. In response to Gallo's challenge to the sufficiency of that
finding on appeal, the Texas Court noted that the case involved
"dueling" experts and summarized evidence that supported and
contradicted a finding of mental retardation. The Texas Court noted
that the jury was in the best position to evaluate the conflicting
evidence and make related credibility determinations.6 7 The Texas
Court then applied the Briseno factors and found that they provided
"further support" for the jury's conclusion. The Texas Court found
679that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's determination.
Although Clifton Williams had not had his IQ tested prior to age
eighteen,' he was evaluated for Social Security disability benefits
purposes at age nineteen. In this evaluation, he had a full scale
WAIS-III 10 score of sixty-three and WRAT academic performance
scores at the fourth grade level. Based on this testing and self-
reported information by Williams and his father, he was diagnosed as
674. See id. at 772-73. The State's expert stated that Gallo had a lack of motivation
and not a lack of ability, noted his ability to perform better academically when motivated,
and described his mother's characterization of him as above average in several areas on an
adolescent personality inventory test. See id.
675. See id. at 772-74.
676. See id. at 770. The instructions followed the Texas mental retardation law: two or
more standard deviations below the test's age group mean for the intellectual functioning
component and the "effectiveness with or degree to which a person meets the standards of
personal independence and social responsibility expected of the person's age and cultural
group" regarding adaptive functioning. See id. at 777-78.
677. See id. at 774.
678. The Texas Court stated that although there was conflicting testimony, there was
also testimony that Gallo's mother and juvenile probation officer did not regard him as
mentally retarded in his youth and some testimony that he had good leadership and
communication skills. Although Gallo's commission of the instant crime may have been
impulsive, Gallo was able to lie and attempt to cover up and diminish his role in it
subsequently. While incarcerated, Gallo also stated that he had failed the IQ test and that
"he'd probably beat the case" due to his retardation. See id.
679. See id. at 775 (applying the standard whether the finding was so "against the great
weight and preponderance of the evidence" as to be "manifestly unjust").
680. See Williams v. State, 270 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Although
Williams was classified as a "special needs" student, he was not in special education. See
id. at 116-17.
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"mildly" mentally retarded.61 The defense also presented its expert's
testing of Williams' IQ with a full scale score of sixty-five.6 Two
defense experts identified Williams' adaptive deficits in three skill
areas.' The State and State's expert criticized the limited nature of
the Social Security evaluation and aspects of the defense experts'
assessments.6 In the State expert's administration of the WAIS-III,
Williams' full scale 10 score was seventy-one." Based on his
interview of twenty-three teachers and seven family members, this
expert found that Williams could live and work independently and
that he did not have significant deficits in any adaptive skill areas.6
A second State expert characterized Williams as in the below average
and borderline range of intellectual function, but above the mentally
retarded level."7 Teachers and family members testified that Williams
was not regarded as mentally retarded as a youth, that he had many
passing and above-average grades before he dropped out of school in
twelfth grade, and that he could perform customer service tasks at
fast food restaurants during this period . Upon review of the
conflicting mental retardation evidence, the Texas Court concluded
that the jury could have reasonably found the State's evidence more
681. See id. at 118-21.
682. See id. at 124 (no indication of the test used).
683. See id. at 122-23 (finding deficits regarding functional academics, home living, and
community use); see also id. at 124-25 (finding deficits regarding academic functioning,
daily living skills, and socialization). One of the defense experts stated that the facts of
Williams' crime were not relevant to his mental retardation diagnosis and that this crime
was not complex in any event. See id. at 125.
684. With regard to the Social Security evaluation, Williams' father had told the
evaluator that Williams had been in special education classes. The inaccuracy of this
report was discussed with this expert on cross-examination as well as Williams' above
average grades in some subjects and his alcohol and drug problems. The expert responded
that this incomplete and inaccurate information could have affected his assessment of
Williams' adaptive functioning. See id. at 118-21. On cross-examination, it was noted that
one of the defense experts was a special education consultant who cannot legally diagnose
mental retardation. See id. at 122. The other defense expert stated that he did not
interview any of Williams' teachers in his evaluation. See id. at 124. The State's expert
noted the incomplete and inaccurate information used for the Social Security and defense
experts' evaluations, questioned whether the disability determination was based on mental
retardation, and challenged the finding of a significant deficit in functional academics. See
id. at 128-31.
685. See id. at 127 (noting additional unidentified IQ tests with scores of seventy,
seventy-three to seventy-four, seventy-eight, and eighty-three).
686. See id. at 125-28.
687. See id. at 131.
688. See id. at 116, 121-22.
130 [Vol. 39:1
Fall 2011] TEXAS'S POST-ATKINS CLAIMS OF MENTAL RETARDATION 131
persuasive when it determined Williams was not mentally retarded69
and that its finding was "not so against the great weight and
preponderance of the evidence" as to be "manifestly unjust."6
Juan Lizcano presented evidence of IQ test scores performed by
three defense experts of forty-eight, fifty-three, sixty, sixty-two, and
sixty-nine.69 1 One defense expert found Lizcano had significant
adaptive behavior deficits regarding communication, self-care,
functional academics, home living, self-direction, and work.'
Another defense expert found adaptive behavior deficits, without any
countervailing strengths, in the areas of communication, self-care,
functional academics, and use of community resources. 693 The State
presented no expert testimony. 694 Lay witnesses included Lizcano's
mother, relatives, teacher, employers, girlfriends, and correctional
officers who provided conflicting descriptions of Lizcano's adaptive
functioning. Witnesses indicated he had limited vocabulary skills and
also had difficulty learning and socializing, following instructions and
performing simple tasks at work, and completing simple personal
tasks (including maintaining personal hygiene and appropriate dress).
On the other hand, Lizcano was recognized by his employers as a
hard and reliable worker. Witnesses also confirmed that he
maintained continuous employment, made regular payments on a
vehicle he bought, regularly sent funds and other items to his family
in Mexico, had romantic relationships with at least two women who
did not consider him mentally retarded, and did not have difficulties
689. See id. at 114-15, 132; see also id. at 133-34 (describing jury instructions defining
intellectual functioning as two standard deviations below the instrument's mean and
identifying the standard measurement error; and defining adaptive functioning deficits
with reference to conceptual, social, and practical skills and testing two standard
deviations below the mean in one area or overall).
690. See id. at 132.
691. See Lizcano v. State, No. AP-75,879, 2010 WL 1817772, at *11 (Tex. Crim. App.
May 5, 2010). No information was supplied as to which IQ tests were administered. See id.
692. See id. at *36 (Price, J., joined by Holcomb and Johnson, JJ., concurring and
dissenting). Because the standardized adaptive functioning tests are not normed for
native Spanish speakers, this expert based his conclusions on his clinical interview with
Lizcano and information supplied by the defense mitigation investigator. He did not
consider the facts of the crime in his assessment, but stated that, had he done so, he would
have considered them as further evidence of Lizcano's adaptive behavior deficits. See id.
693. See id. (finding adaptive behavior deficits in at least six areas, including some with
co-existing strengths).
694. See id. at *37 & n.34 (referencing a State expert who did not testify).
adapting to confinement.' The jury returned a general verdict that
Lizcano was not mentally retarded.9'
Addressing Lizcano's challenge to the jury's finding on direct
appeal, the Texas Court determined that he had satisfied the
intellectual functioning component of the mental retardation
definition.6 " In its review of the adaptive functioning evidence, the
Texas Court applied the Texas mental retardation law definition on
which the jury had been instructed: the "effectiveness with or degree
to which a person meets the standards of personal independence and
social responsibility expected of the person's age and cultural
group."'" Giving "great deference" to the jury's determination
regarding mental retardation and finding that there was "significant"
evidence of Lizcano's effectiveness in meeting these adaptive
standards,'" the Texas Court concluded that the jury's finding was
695. See id. at *12-15.
696. See id. at *32 (Price, J., joined by Holcomb and Johnson, JJ., concurring and
dissenting).
697. See id. at *11-12 (rejecting the State's contentions, made without expert support,
that Lizcano's IQ scores should be adjusted upward because he is a Spanish speaker, for
the standard measurement error, and based on a regression to the mean theory that was
not presented at trial); id. at *32 (Price, J., joined by Holcomb and Johnson, JJ.,
concurring and dissenting).
698. See id. at *12, *15 (applying the definition to Lizcano's age of twenty-eight and all
Texans as his cultural group); see also id. at *15 (noting that the jury could also consider
evidence relevant to the Briseno factors). But see id. at *33-40 (Price, J., joined by
Holcomb and Johnson, JJ., concurring and dissenting); supra notes 653-59, infra notes
880-87 and accompanying text (criticizing the use of the Texas mental retardation law
adaptive functioning definition without the diagnostic criteria regarding this aspect of
mental retardation).
699. See Lizcano, 2010 WL 1817772, at *15. Using the diagnostic criteria
accompanying the clinical definition of mental retardation, the three dissenting Judges
addressed the evidence in support of adaptive deficits regarding Lizcano's communication,
self-care, and functional academics skills, regarding which both defense experts agreed.
They found that the State had failed to undermine Lizcano's evidence. These Judges cited
lay testimony reflecting his difficulties in understanding and responding to information, as
well as test results that measured his communication skills at the level of someone eight to
ten years old. The evidence of Lizcano's self-care deficits regarding his personal dress and
hygiene and performance of personal tasks was not overcome by testimony that he could
function in the controlled environment of incarceration. His limited functional academics
were reflected by his graduation from sixth grade at age sixteen only because of his age.
The dissenting Judges noted that the majority had not even referenced the defense
expert testimony regarding Lizcano's adaptive functioning. See id. at *36-40 (Price, J.,
joined by Holcomb and Johnson, JJ., concurring and dissenting); see also Andrea
Grimes, The State of Texas Cannot Execute the Mentally Retarded, But That May Not
Prevent a Dallas Cop Killer From Being Put To Death, DALLAS OBSERVER, July 1,
2010, http://www.dallasobserver.com/content/printVersion/1821463.
[Vol. 39:1132 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Fall 2011] TEXAS'S POST-ATKINS CLAIMS OF MENTAL RETARDATION 133
"not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence"
as to be "manifestly unjust.""
Thus, as these illustrative cases reflect, taken together with the
other information regarding the resolution of Atkins claims in Texas
trial courts and in the Texas Court on direct appeal, prosecutors are
not unwilling to forgo pursuit of a death sentence upon a persuasive
showing of a capital offender's mental retardation. However, when
the State has contested a capital offender's mental retardation at trial,
the State has thus far prevailed and the trial court determination has
been upheld on appeal.70'
VI. The Differences in Texas's Post-Atkins Path, Its Results,
and Its Compliance with Atkins
A. Overview
The Court prohibited the execution of mentally retarded capital
offenders in Atkins based on its determination that a national
consensus in support of such a constitutional ban had evolved since it
rejected the ban over a decade earlier in Penry.702 This concluding
section revisits the concepts of mental retardation reflected in this
national consensus against the execution of mentally retarded
offenders." To determine how different a path Texas has chosen to
implement Atkins, this section then compares the Texas mental
retardation definition and procedures articulated to implement the
Atkins mandate with these Atkins concepts of mental retardation and
with those definitions and procedures adopted by other capital
punishment states.7" The actual Texas results, after almost a decade
of post-Atkins litigation described in this Article, are compared with
projections of Texas mentally retarded capital offenders and other
states' Atkins litigation.70 s Finally, this Article examines Texas's
compliance with the Atkins mandate to identify mentally retarded
700. See Lizcano, 2010 WL 1817772, at *15 (finding consideration of the
developmental onset aspect unnecessary).
701. See supra Table 2 (describing these cases); see also notes 668-69 and
accompanying text (describing additional case resolutions).
702. Compare Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002), with Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302, 335 (1989).
703. See infra notes 709-13 and accompanying text.
704. See infra notes 714-69 and accompanying text.
705. See infra notes 770-87 and accompanying text.
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offenders and exclude them from execution, and potential Court
responsive action.*
B. How Different Is Texas's Post-Atkins Path?
As the Supreme Court had previously done regarding the
prohibition of the execution of insane offenders,' the Atkins Court
entrusted the states with the "'task of developing appropriate ways to
enforce the constitutional restriction upon [the] execution of
sentences"' for mentally retarded offenders.' The Court however,
did not leave the states without guidance in their task of identifying
mentally retarded capital offenders in order to enforce the
constitutional ban on their execution.'" The Atkins Court discussed
mental retardation with express reference to and quotation of the
three-part clinical definitions of the AAMR and APA requiring 1)
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, 2) significant
limitations in two or more specified adaptive functioning skill areas
(e.g., communication, self-care, and functional academics), and 3)
manifestation prior to age eighteen." The Court further noted that
the statutory definitions of mental retardation in the state execution
bans-on which its finding of national consensus was based-
"generally conform[ed] to the clinical definitions" referenced in its
opinion.' In light of the fact that the Supreme Court imposed its
constitutional ban on the execution of mentally retarded offenders
with express reference to these clinical definitions, it clearly appears
that offenders who meet these clinical definitions are therefore the
mentally retarded offenders about whom there exists a national
consensus against their execution. Thus, while entrusting
706. See infra notes 788-943 and accompanying text.
707. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416-17 (1986) (plurality opinion).
708. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 416-17).
709. Although the Court subsequently stated that its Atkins opinion did not "provide
definitive procedural or substantive guides" to identify mentally retarded offenders for
Atkins purposes, it identified Ohio's adoption of the three-part clinical definitions of
mental retardation referenced in Atkins when determining if the federal courts'
intervention in the state proceedings was warranted. See Bobby v. Bies, 129 S. Ct. 2145,
2150 (2009).
710. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3, 318; supra note 162 and accompanying text.
Although the quoted AAMR definition did not reference a particular IQ score regarding
the intellectual functioning element, the APA definition included an IQ of "approximately
70" as an upper boundary for "mild" mental retardation. The Court also cited another
definition describing the intellectual functioning element as an IQ between seventy and
seventy-five or lower. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308-09 nn.3, 5.
711. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 n.22.
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enforcement of the constitutional ban to the states, the Court
provided clear guidance that state definitional provisions in their
capital punishment exclusion provisions should be at least as
comprehensive as the clinical definitions referenced by the Atkins
Court.712 On the other hand, the Atkins Court was silent regarding
the procedures that the states might adopt to implement the
constitutional ban.713
In articulating its Atkins procedures in Briseno, the Texas Court
adopted the general three-part definitions of mental retardation of
the AAMR and Texas mental retardation law.714 With regard to the
intellectual functioning component of the standard, the Texas Court
referred to definitions that defined this as an IQ of approximately
seventy or below or approximately two standard deviations below the
mean. The Texas Court, however, also recognized some flexibility in
assessments of mental retardation based on IQ test scores, as well as
differences in the content and accuracy of various IQ tests.71' The
Texas Court has maintained this concept of the intellectual
functioning element in subsequent cases and has also recognized an
IQ assessment measurement error of approximately five points that
could vary based on the IQ testing instrument.' Regarding the third
prong of the mental retardation definition, the Texas Court stated in
Briseno that the AAMR definition characterized the developmental
period onset as occurring before age eighteen, and it has used this
standard in subsequent cases.7I1
712. See, e.g., Blume et al., supra note 21, at 693-94; Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note
169, at 818-19, 822-23; Everington & Olley, supra note 376, at 2-3; Fabian, Life, supra
note 376, at 8; Penny J. White, Treated Differently in Life But Not In Death: The Execution
of the Intellectually Disabled After Atkins v. Virginia, 76 TENN. L. REv. 685, 690 (2009).
But see, e.g., Mossman, supra note 376, at 274-76.
713. Cf. Blume et al., supra note 21, at 693-94 (suggesting Atkins left states "free" to
craft procedural rules regarding the mental retardation determination, including the
burden of proof, fact-finder, and timing of the determination).
714. See Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 5-9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); supra notes 227-
46 (describing the Briseno Atkins standards).
715. See Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 7 n.24.
716. See supra notes 261-63, 616, 641-42 and accompanying text (describing the
intellectual functioning standard in subsequent trial, direct appeal, and collateral review
cases). The Texas Court has rejected the use of clinical assessment as a replacement for
IQ scores to establish this element and has not endorsed the application of the Flynn
effect regarding the interpretation of IQ scores. See supra notes 262-63 and
accompanying text.
717. See Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 7 & n.26; supra notes 616, 641-42 and accompanying
text.
In its description of the adaptive functioning element in Briseno,
the Texas Court quoted the Texas mental retardation law standard
addressing comparisons to the personal independence and social
responsibility expected of the person's age and cultural group."' It
also quoted a similar standard in a pre-Atkins AAMR definition
requiring significant limitations in effectiveness in meeting the above-
identified expectations, as well as maturation and learning
expectations, as clinically assessed (and usually including
standardized scales)."' The Texas Court did not reference the more
specific AAMR and APA adaptive functioning definitions quoted in
Atkins that required deficits in two or more of the specified skill areas
(e.g., communication, self-care, social skills, and functional
academics).720 Instead, in a formulation unique to Texas, the Texas
Court identified several evidentiary factors (i.e., the Briseno factors)
that might assist fact-finders in their mental retardation
determination. These factors included others' perception of the
offender as mentally retarded during the developmental period, the
offender's ability to formulate and execute plans generally and
regarding his capital crime, the offender's ability to act and
communicate coherently as well as deceptively, and the offender's
leadership abilities.721 Although in subsequent cases the Texas Court
has acknowledged and endorsed fact-finders' use of the more specific
AAMR and APA adaptive skill area criteria, it has also maintained
its endorsement of the Briseno factors-including their use to reject a
finding of mental retardation.722
In Briseno and subsequent cases, the Texas Court articulated the
primary aspects of the procedural framework for resolving Atkins
718. See Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 7 n.25; supra note 236 and accompanying text.
719. See Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 7 n.25; supra note 235 and accompanying text.
720. Compare Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2004), and supra notes 162-63
and accompanying text, with Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 5-9, and supra notes 227-40 and
accompanying text.
721. See Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8-9; supra note 237-40 and accompanying text. The
Texas Court articulated the Briseno factors in the context of its characterization of the
adaptive functioning criteria it had identified as being "exceedingly subjective" and as a
way to help distinguish between evidence of mental retardation and of a personality
disorder. See Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8. Subsequently, the Texas Court endorsed the
relevance of these factors to all three elements of mental retardation. See, e.g., Neal v.
State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
722. See supra notes 264-71,616, 641-44, 648-64, infra notes 857-79 and accompanying
text.
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claims on collateral review." The normal statutory procedures
regarding initial habeas corpus review of claims apply to Atkins
claims.7 24 For post-Atkins subsequent writ applications raising Atkins
claims, the Texas Court adopted a screening test requiring prima facie
evidence of mental retardation prior to remand to the convicting trial
court.72' The Texas Court also recognized the possibility of raising an
Atkins claim through a second post-Atkins subsequent writ, but
imposed a clear and convincing evidence of mental retardation
screening test on such Atkins claims.7 26 The offender bears the burden
to prove his mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence,
and by clear and convincing evidence regarding this final category of
Atkins collateral review claims.2 In all of these collateral review
proceedings, and as specified by statute and endorsed by the Texas
Court, the convicting trial court is the initial fact-finder." The Texas
Court reviews and takes action on these factual findings regarding
mental retardation with "almost total" deference.729
The Texas Court has prescribed some, but not all of the primary
procedural requirements for the determination of Atkins claims at the
trial and direct appeal levels. 730 At the trial level, the defendant bears
the burden to prove his mental retardation by a preponderance of the
evidence.73 ' Although the Texas Court has stated that a jury
determination of mental retardation for Atkins purposes is not
required at trial, it has thus far declined to specify who the fact-finder
must be or when in the trial proceeding the mental retardation
finding must be made, currently leaving both of these determinations
to the discretion of the trial court. On direct appeal from the
rejection of an Atkins claim at trial, the Texas Court has adopted a
723. See Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 9-13; supra notes 241-59, 275-80 and accompanying
text.
724. See supra notes 247-49 and accompanying text.
725. See supra notes 221-25 and accompanying text.
726. See supra notes 250-59 and accompanying text.
727. Compare supra note 242 and accompanying text, with supra note 258 and
accompanying text.
728. See supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text.
729. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
730. See Hall v. State, 160 S.W.3d 24, 36-39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); supra notes 614-
40,645-65.
731. See supra notes 617, 620-22, 626 and accompanying text.
732. See supra notes 629-40 and accompanying text.
deferential review standard regarding the mental retardation finding
made.'
In their review of Texas state courts' resolution of Atkins claims
on federal collateral review, the Fifth Circuit and Texas federal trial
courts have applied the procedural requirements and deferential
review standards prescribed by the AEDPA." The Fifth Circuit
adopted its own prima facie evidence screening test for Atkins claims
filed through successive writ applications.' In general, the Fifth
Circuit has found that the Texas Court's mental retardation
definition-including the Briseno factors-and Atkins procedures are
not contrary to clearly established federal law, as articulated by the
Court in Atkins."'
In many respects, Texas's mental retardation definition and
Atkins procedures are similar to those of other states that legislatively
or judicially developed definitions and procedures to exclude
mentally retarded offenders from execution either before or after
Atkins.' Thirty-four of the thirty-eight states that authorized capital
punishment as of the Atkins decision have adopted such definitions
and procedures regarding trial or collateral review proceedings, or
both.3  Virtually all of the states, including Texas, have adopted
some variation of the three-part clinical definition of mental
733. See supra notes 623, 628 and accompanying text.
734. See supra notes 281-313, 318-23, 344-50 and accompanying text.
735. See supra notes 313-17 and accompanying text.
736. See supra notes 324-43 and accompanying text.
737. See Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 77 (describing Atkins definitional and primary
procedural provisions regarding thirty states). Other studies have surveyed certain aspects
of state statutory mental retardation definitions. See Duvall & Morris, supra note 376;
Patton & Keyes, supra note 376; cf. David DeMatteo et al., A National Survey of State
Legislation Defining Mental Retardation: Implications for Policy and Practice After Atkins,
25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 781, 790 (2007).
738. See Exparte Alabama, No. 1060427, 2007 Ala. LEXIS 91 (Ala. May 25, 2007); Ex
parte Perkins, 851 So. 2d 453 (Ala. 2002); State v. Jimenez, 908 A.2d 181 (N.J. 2006);
Commonwealth v. Miller, 888 A.2d 624 (Pa. 2005); Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2004); Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 77 n.6, 78 nn.7, 9, 141 n.*; see also OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10b (West Supp. 2011) (describing statutory Atkins definition and
procedures following interim judicial definition and procedures); King v. State, 960 So. 2d
413 (Miss. 2007); Commonwealth v. Vandivner, 962 A.2d 1170 (Pa. 2009). Since Atkins,
Illinois, New Mexico, and New Jersey have abolished capital punishment and New York
has not enacted legislation to remedy a finding of unconstitutionality regarding its capital
punishment statute. See Facts about the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION
CENTER, http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (last updated Sept. 23,
2011). These states' Atkins provisions are nevertheless included in this analysis for
illustrative purposes. Montana, New Hampshire, Oregon, and Wyoming have not yet
adopted Atkins-specific definitions or developed Atkins procedures.
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retardation for Atkins purposes,'" but the prescribed degree of detail
regarding the elements of these definitions varies.'40 For example, of
the thirty-one states that include a developmental period onset
criterion in their mental retardation definitions, twenty-three states
(including Texas) define that period as prior to age eighteen; three
states define it as before age twenty-two; and five states do not
further define the term.41
All thirty-four states have a significantly subaverage intellectual
functioning element in their definitions. 42 Ten states do not further
define the term. 43 In their intellectual functioning definitions,
nineteen states (including Texas) include some reference to a specific
IQ score'" and four states refer to IQ scores two or more standard
deviations below the instrument mean. 45 Kansas uniquely defines the
term by referencing the standard deviation below the mean
benchmark, but adding that the intellectual functioning must be at a
level that "substantially impairs one's capacity to appreciate the
criminality of one's conduct or to conform one's conduct to the
requirement of law"-essentially a criminal insanity definition.'"
There is similar variation in the adaptive functioning definitions
of the thirty-three states that include this criterion in their mental
retardation definitions. 47 Fifteen states provide no further definition
beyond the requirement of limitations or significant limitations in this
739. Three states (Kansas, Nebraska, and New Mexico) do not include a
developmental period onset criterion, and Kansas does not include an adaptive
functioning element. See Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 90 & nn. 76-77.
740. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10b (West Supp. 2011); Perkins, 851 So. 2d at
456; Jimenez, 908 A.2d at 184 n.3; Miller, 888 A.2d at 630-31; Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 5-9;
Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 89-93, 141 n.*.
741. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10b (West Supp. 2011); Perkins, 851 So. 2d at
456; Jimenez, 908 A.2d at 184 n.3; Miller, 888 A.2d at 630-31; Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 5-9;
Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 91, 93, 141 n.*.
742. See Perkins, 851 So. 2d at 456; Jimenez, 908 A.2d at 184 n.3; Miller, 888 A.2d at
630-31; Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 5-9; Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 90-92, 141 n.*.
743. See Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 90-92,141 n.*.
744. Seventeen of the nineteen states that reference an IQ score refer to an IQ of
seventy or approximately seventy; one state uses an 10 score of seventy-five; and one uses
an IQ of sixty-five. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10b (West Supp. 2011); Perkins,
851 So. 2d at 456; Jimenez, 908 A.2d at 184 n.3; Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 5-9; Tobolowsky,
supra note 5, at 90-92, 141 n.*.
745. See Miller, 888 A.2d at 629-30; Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 90, 92.
746. See Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 90 & n.83 (quoting the Kansas statute).
747. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10b (West Supp. 2011); Perkins, 851 So. 2d at
456; Jimenez, 908 A.2d at 184 n.3; Miller, 888 A.2d at 630-31; Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 5-9;
Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 90-93, 141 n.*.
area. 748  Twelve states incorporate a reference to deficits in two or
more of the skill areas identified in the AAMR and APA clinical
definitions quoted in Atkins, or the consolidated skill area groupings
in the current AAMR definition.749 Five states (including Texas) refer
to the more general comparisons to maturation, learning, personal
independence, and social responsibility included in a pre-Atkins
AAMR definition.5 o Utah has customized its definition to reference
"significant deficiencies in adaptive functioning that exist primarily in
the areas of reasoning or impulse control, or in both of these areas.""'
Finally, Texas has uniquely added the Briseno factors to aid in the
assessment of this element.752
In terms of their procedural requirements to implement Atkins,
twenty-six states (including Texas) expressly assign the burden to the
offender to prove his mental retardation and eight states do not
expressly assign this burden to any party.' Twenty-four states
(including Texas) use the preponderance of the evidence standard of
proof." Four states use the clear and convincing evidence standard.7 11
748. See Perkins, 851 So. 2d at 456; Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 91-93, 141 n.*.
749. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10b (West Supp. 2011); Jimenez, 908 A.2d at
184 n.3; Miller, 888 A.2d at 630-31; Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 91-93.
750. See Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 5-9; Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 91; cf supra notes
265-66 and accompanying text (describing the Texas Court's reference to adaptive skill
area definitions in subsequent cases).
751. See Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 93 & n.95 (quoting the Utah statute and noting it
includes a contingent ban if there are significant adaptive deficits without the quoted
restrictions).
752. See Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8; supra notes 237-40, 721 and accompanying text.
Although two panels of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals have previously cited
the Briseno factors, the Tennessee Supreme Court has never adopted these factors in its
adaptive behavior analysis for Atkins purposes. Instead, the Tennessee Supreme Court
has noted that, in implementing the state's Atkins statute, Tennessee's "trial and appellate
courts have repeatedly relied upon expert analysis of adaptive behavior or functioning
predicated" on clinical definitions and related authoritative texts. Coleman v. State, No.
W2007-02767-SC-R11-PD, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 319, at *73 (Tenn. Apr. 11, 2011), affg in
part and vacating in part, No. W2007-02767-CCA-R3-PD, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS
36, at *69-70 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 13, 2010) (citing the Briseno factors); see Van Tran v.
State, 66 S.W.3d 790, 795 (Tenn. 2001) (referring to deficits in at least two adaptive skill
areas in interpreting the statutory adaptive functioning element). But see Van Tran v.
State, No. W2005-01334-CCA-R3-PD, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 899, at *71-72
(Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 9, 2006) (citing the Briseno factors).
753. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10b (West Supp. 2011); Ex parte Alabama,
No. 1060427, 2007 Ala. LEXIS 91, at *32 (Ala. May 25, 2007); Jimenez, 908 A.2d at 190;
Miller, 888 A.2d at 631; Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 12; Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 118 &
n.235, 141 n.*.
754. See Alabama, 2007 Ala. LEXIS 91, at *32; Jimenez, 908 A.2d at 190; Miller, 888
A.2d at 631; Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 12; Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 118-19, 141 n.*; see
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North Carolina and Oklahoma use both standards (depending on
who the fact-finder is and at what stage of the proceeding)."' Georgia
alone uses the beyond a reasonable doubt standard at trial.7 ' Three
states have not specified a standard of proof.'
Of the thirty-three states that have specified the Atkins trial level
fact-finder, twenty-two identify the trial judge as the sole fact-finder
regarding mental retardation. 75 9  Eleven states authorize the trial
judge or a jury to make the determination in specified
circumstances.7" Texas, however, has not specified who the fact-
finder must be."' Regarding the timing of the trial level mental
retardation determination, thirteen states require a pretrial
determination,762 and one additional state encourages a pretrial
determination.763 One state requires a guilt determination." Nine
states authorize a pretrial and/or post-guilt determination.76 Eight
states require a post-guilt determination7" Texas and another state
have not specified when the determination must be made.6 The
states that have addressed Atkins' implementation on collateral
review either adapt their trial phase procedures for determining
also Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90, 103 (Ind. 2005) (finding the statutory clear and
convincing evidence standard unconstitutional).
755. See Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 118-19; see also Pruitt, 834 N.E.2d at 103.
756. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10b (West Supp. 2011); Tobolowsky, supra
note 5, at 118 & n.236 (using the clear and convincing evidence standard for pretrial court
determination and preponderance of the evidence standard for any subsequent jury
determination).
757. See Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 119 & n.237 (using the preponderance standard
in collateral review proceedings).
758. See id. at 118.
759. See Alabama, 2007 Ala. LEXIS 91, at *36; King v. State, 960 So. 2d 413, 424-28
(Miss. 2007); Commonwealth v. Vandivner, 962 A.2d 1170, 1183-89 (Pa. 2009);
Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 111-12, 141 n.*; supra note 753.
760. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10b (West Supp. 2011); Jimenez, 908 A.2d at
191-92; Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 111-12, 141 n.*.
761. See supra notes 630-40 and accompanying text.
762. See Alabama, 2007 Ala. LEXIS 91, at *36; Vandivner, 962 A.2d at 1183-89;
Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 111-12, 141 n.*.
763. See Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 111 & n.188.
764. See id. atlll&n.191.
765. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10b (West Supp. 2011); King, 960 So. 2d at
424-28; Jimenez, 908 A.2d at 191-92; Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 111-12, 141 n.*.
766. See Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 111-12.
767. See id. at 111 & n.195; supra notes 630-40 and accompanying text.
mental retardation or the procedures generally applicable to
collateral review in the state.76
Thus, in comparing the Texas mental retardation definition and
procedures to those of the other states that have implemented Atkins,
Texas stands with the majority of states in adopting a three-part
definition of mental retardation that references an 10 score regarding
the intellectual functioning component and sets the developmental
period as prior to age eighteen. Texas also joins the majority of these
states in assigning the defendant the burden to prove his mental
retardation by a preponderance of the evidence. On the other hand,
of the states that have defined the adaptive functioning element, most
have chosen a definition that references the AAMR or APA skill
areas. Moreover, no other state has adopted a definitional aid similar
to the Briseno factors. In addition, all of the other states have
assigned a fact-finder to make the mental retardation determination
at trial, and almost all have specified when in the trial proceedings the
determination should be made. Thus, the Texas Court has clearly
taken a path that differs from the other states both in its actions and
in its failure to act regarding its Atkins definition and procedures."'
C. What Are the Results of Texas's Post-Atkins Path?
An important way to measure the significance of the different
path that Texas has taken to implement the Atkins mandate is to
compare the results of Texas Atkins cases with anticipated results
based on estimates of mentally retarded capital offenders, and also to
compare the Texas Atkins case results with those of other states
implementing Atkins."'o The first comparison reveals that Texas has
identified fewer mentally retarded capital offenders than general
768. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 888 A.2d 624 (Pa. 2005); Ex parte Briseno, 135
S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 122-27, 141 n.*.
769. Compare supra notes 714-33 and accompanying text, with supra notes 737-68 and
accompanying text. Of course, Texas is not alone in taking a different path in
implementing Atkins. Kansas has adopted a unique mental retardation definition based
on a single criterion that adds a restriction based on criminal insanity rather than mental
retardation definitions. See supra note 746 and accompanying text. Utah has adopted a
unique conditional limitation regarding its adaptive functioning criterion. See supra note
751 and accompanying text. Finally, Georgia is the only state that requires a reasonable
doubt standard regarding mental retardation. See supra note 757 and accompanying text.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently found this standard of proof
unconstitutional, but the decision has been vacated pending consideration by the court en
banc. See Hill v. Schofield, 608 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir.), vacated by 625 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir.
2010) (per curiam) (en banc).
770. See infra notes 773-86 and accompanying text.
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estimates would predict."' The second comparison indicates that a
smaller percentage of claimants has been successful in asserting
Atkins claims in Texas than in several other states that have
considered a meaningful number of Atkins claims.772
In his dissent in Atkins, Chief Justice Rehnquist cited expert
estimates indicating that as many as ten percent of death row inmates
are mentally retarded. 3  Other estimates of the proportion of
convicted capital offenders who are mentally retarded range between
four and twenty percent.774 As of the end of 2002, six months after
Atkins was decided, there were 450 Texas prisoners with death
sentences."' Using the lowest estimate of four percent, eighteen of
these capital offenders would be predicted to be mentally retarded.
Using former Chief Justice Rehnquist's ten percent estimate would
result in forty-five predicted Texas mentally retarded capital
offenders. Using the highest estimate of twenty percent would result
in ninety predicted Texas mentally retarded capital offenders. As
described previously in this Article, a total of fourteen convicted
capital offenders have been determined to be mentally retarded in
post-Atkins collateral review proceedings in the Texas state and
federal courts or by the Texas Governor.776 This number of successful
Atkins claimants is over twenty percent lower than the lowest
estimate of mentally retarded Texas death row offenders as of the
Atkins decision and approximately eighty-five percent lower than the
highest estimate of mentally retarded Texas convicted capital
offenders at the time of Atkins. Thus, the application of Texas's
771. See infra notes 773-77 and accompanying text.
772. See infra notes 778-86 and accompanying text.
773. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 324 n.* (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by
Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
774. See EMILY FABRYCKI REED, THE PENRY PENALTY: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND
OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION 39 (1993); Lyn Entzeroth, Putting the
Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant to Death: Charting the Development of a National
Consensus to Exempt the Mentally Retarded from the Death Penalty, 52 ALA. L. REV. 911,
911 (2001); Timothy S. Hall, Legal Fictions and Moral Reasoning: Capital Punishment and
the Mentally Retarded Defendant After Penry v. Johnson, 35 AKRON L. REV. 327, 327
(2002); Carol S. Steiker, Commentary, Things Fall Apart, But the Center Holds: The
Supreme Court and the Death Penalty, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1475, 1478 n.10 (2002); cf. Mark
D. Cunningham & Mark P. Vigen, Death Row Inmate Characteristics, Adjustment, and
Confinement: A Review of the Literature, 20 BEHAv. SCi. & L. 191, 199 (2002) (describing
clinical studies that reported some data regarding the intellectual capability of their death
row samples).
775. See THOMAS P. BONCZAR & TRACY L. SNELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2002, at 5 (2003).
776. See supra Table 1; supra notes 351-72, 402-517 and accompanying text.
Atkins mental retardation definition and the review of Texas Atkins
collateral relief claims have identified Texas mentally retarded
convicted capital offenders at a rate, at best, meaningfully below, and
at worst, substantially below, that predicted by the above estimates."'
The Texas Atkins results also differ from those of several other
states that have resolved a meaningful number of Atkins claims. In a
2008 study, researchers identified 234 adjudicated Atkins claims."8
Nationally, they found that thirty-eight percent of the Atkins
claimants had successfully established their mental retardation.779 Of
the states that had resolved more than ten Atkins claims, the
percentage of successful Atkins claimants ranged between twelve
percent in Alabama and eighty percent in North Carolina.'" At the
time of the study, twelve Texas Atkins claimants had been found
mentally retarded out of the forty-six reported resolved cases. This
represents a Texas Atkins success rate of twenty-six percent. In
comparison to other states that had resolved over ten Atkins claims,
Texas's success rate was higher than that of Alabama, Florida, Ohio,
and Mississippi, where Atkins claimants were successful in from
twelve to slightly over twenty percent of cases. The Texas Atkins
success rate was lower than that of Oklahoma, Louisiana,
Pennsylvania, and North Carolina, all of which had success rates in
excess of fifty percent."'
Since the completion of this 2008 study, Texas has resolved a
significant number of Atkins collateral review claims. Using the
current numbers, Texas has identified fourteen convicted capital
offenders as mentally retarded out of the eighty-one resolved
collateral review claims, for an Atkins success rate of seventeen
percent.' Based on the success rates identified in the 2008 study,
777. Even if the three Texas post-Atkins cases in which the prosecutor chose not to
pursue a death sentence are added to this number, the total number of seventeen
successful Atkins claimants is still below the lowest projection of mentally retarded
offenders, based on the Texas death row population as of Atkins. See supra Table 2; supra
notes 670-71 and accompanying text.
778. See Blume et al., supra note 26, at 627-28 (indicating search for reported and
unreported adjudicated cases); Blume, supra note 204 (reflecting cases successfully
resolved at various stages); cf. Blume et al., supra note 26, at 637 (reflecting 232 cases in
study).
779. See Blume et al., supra note 26, at 628 n.16.
780. See id. at 629, 637.
781. These success rates are calculated based on the comparison of the number of state
claims reported at Blume et al., supra note 26, at 637, and the number of successful state
claims reported at Blume, supra note 204.
782. See supra Table 1; supra notes 351-74 and accompanying text.
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only Alabama's twelve percent success rate remains lower than this
current Texas success rate regarding Atkins collateral review claims.783
If the three successful Atkins claimants (based on prosecutorial
decision making) of the additional nine unduplicated claimants who
have raised Atkins claims through the trial and direct appeal stages
are added to these numbers, the Texas Atkins success rate regarding
these seventeen successful cases out of ninety unduplicated claimants
rises only to less than nineteen percent." This would place Texas's
current Atkins success rate higher than Alabama, and only slightly
higher than Florida's 2008 rate of almost eighteen percent.' Both
methods of assessing Texas's current Atkins success rate demonstrate
that the rate is substantially below the thirty-eight percent national
success rate reflected in the 2008 study of adjudicated Atkins claims.
Of course, the Atkins Court did not mandate any particular
number or percentage of Atkins claimants that must be found
mentally retarded in order for states to be deemed to have followed
its mandate. However, it did bar the execution of mentally retarded
offenders regarding whom it had found that there existed a national
consensus against their execution.8 The fact that the Texas Atkins
results fall below, and even substantially below, the projected
estimates of Texas mentally retarded death row offenders as of the
Atkins decision, as well as the national success rate of states
implementing Atkins, must raise questions regarding whether Texas's
path in implementing Atkins complies with the Atkins mandate. The
next section examines those aspects of Texas's different Atkins path
that may contribute to these results.
D. Does Texas's Post-Atkins Path Comply with Atkins?
Almost a decade after the Court's decision in Atkins, state
legislatures and state and federal courts continue to struggle with the
application-in the context of capital punishment litigation-of
concepts of mental retardation primarily designed for diagnostic,
clinical, and service provision purposes." These challenges are
783. See supra note 781.
784. See supra Tables 1, 2; supra notes 670-71 and accompanying text.
785. See supra note 781.
786. See Blume et al., supra note 26, at 628 n.16.
787. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002).
788. See Duvall & Morris, supra note 376, at 664; Mossman, supra note 376, at 271-74,
289-91; Patton & Keyes, supra note 376, at 239, 253; Weithorn, supra note 376, at 1232-34;
supra notes 376-400 and accompanying text.
experienced by all capital punishment states. The results of the Texas
post-Atkins litigation described in this Article, however, reveal
determinations of mental retardation at rates meaningfully lower than
both expert estimates would predict and research regarding the
national success rate for Atkins claims reflects."9  These results
support the exploration of the question whether Texas's particular
post-Atkins definitional and procedural path complies with the Atkins
mandate to identify mentally retarded capital offenders and exclude
them from execution.'9 In examining Texas's compliance with
Atkins, two aspects of the Texas path are sufficiently distinct from
other state approaches to warrant further exploration: 1) the Texas
Court's failure to specify the fact-finder for and timing of the mental
retardation determination at trial and 2) its crafting of the Briseno
factors to aid in the determination of mental retardation.91
1. Texas Court's Failure to Specify the Fact-finder for and the Timing of
the Mental Retardation Determination at Trial
In the absence of legislative action, the Texas Court has
prescribed interim procedures addressing most aspects of Atkins
litigation." However, in the "absence of legislation or a
constitutional requirement directing when the determination of
mental retardation is to be made or by whom," 793 the Texas Court has
expressly declined to specify either of these aspects of the Atkins trial
procedure or to find error on appeal based on these factors.794 In the
few post-Atkins cases in which Atkins claims have been presented at
trial, they have been resolved by a jury during post-conviction
punishment proceedings. 795  The capital punishment jury has not
found the offender mentally retarded in any of these cases.
789. See supra notes 770-86 and accompanying text.
790. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316-17, 321.
791. See supra notes 707-69 and accompanying text.
792. See supra notes 241-59, 272-80, 617-40, 645-65 and accompanying text.
793. Hunter v. State, 243 S.W.3d 664, 672 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
794. See id. at 672; supra notes 630-40 and accompanying text.
795. See supra notes 633-36 and accompanying text (including a description of two
cases in which both the trial judge and punishment jury determined that there was
insufficient evidence of mental retardation, but the Texas Court only addressed the jury
finding on appeal).
796. See supra Table 2; see also Maro Robbins & Karisa King, Retardation Issue
Looms Big in Bexar, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Mar. 5, 2006, at 1A (indicating that
of the few cases in which juries had determined the Atkins issue, no jury had yet found a
defendant mentally retarded during punishment proceedings).
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As previously described, use of the punishment proceeding jury
to resolve mental retardation for Atkins purposes represents the
minority position among the capital punishment states.m7  State
legislatures, courts, and commentators have disagreed about the
desirability and appropriateness of entrusting the Atkins mental
retardation determination to the same jury that has just convicted the
offender of a heinous crime. Those supporting a pretrial judicial
determination of mental retardation cite the similarity of this
determination to others typically entrusted to the judge, such as
competency; the Atkins Court's conversion of mental retardation
from a culpability factor requiring jury determination to a death
penalty eligibility factor, appropriate for judicial determination; and
the risk of accuracy-diminishing juror confusion of issues relevant to
the mental retardation issue and those relevant to punishment and
resulting prejudice. Those supporting a punishment jury resolution
cite the appropriateness of jury resolution of the punishment-
affecting mental retardation issue, the relevance of some guilt or
punishment evidence to the mental retardation assessment, and the
unsubstantiated risk of unreliable jury determinations.798
Although one may argue the merits of a pretrial judicial versus a
punishment jury determination of mental retardation for Atkins
purposes, the Atkins Court did not address the procedural aspects of
implementing the constitutional ban generally or this procedural
797. See supra notes 759-67 and accompanying text.
798. See, e.g., Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (Meyers, J.,
concurring); J. Amy Dillard, And Death Shall Have No Dominion: How to Achieve the
Categorical Exemption of Mentally Retarded Defendants from Execution, 45 U. RICH. L.
REV. 961, 1,000-07 (2011); James W. Ellis, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: A
Guide to State Legislative Issues, MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP., Jan.-Feb.
2003, at 11, 14-17; Steiker & Steiker, supra note 21, at 725, 727; Scott R. Poe, Note,
Inconsistent Methods for the Adjudication of Alleged Mentally Retarded Individuals: A
Comparison of Ohio's and Georgia's Post-Atkins Frameworks for Determining Mental
Retardation, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 405, 424-30 (2006). But see, e.g., People v. Smith, 752
N.Y.S.2d 356, 357 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002); Neal, 256 S.W.3d at 272; Poe, supra at 429. See
generally Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 104-10, 112-13 (describing competing arguments).
Some have suggested that the Court's decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466
(2002), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), regarding jury determination of
sentence-enhancing facts also require a jury determination of mental retardation for
Atkins purposes. See generally Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 106-08 (describing competing
arguments and concluding no constitutional jury requirement). However, the Court's
decision in Schriro v. Smith, 546 U.S. 6, 7-8 (2005) (per curiam), vacating a federal court's
pre-emptive imposition of a jury requirement on Arizona's Atkins collateral review
decision making suggests that jury decision making is not a constitutional imperative for
Atkins claims. See also Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 770 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Ex
parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 10-11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
aspect specifically.'"9 Had the Texas Court chosen either approach as
its interim trial level procedure, it would likely survive constitutional
scrutiny at this stage of post-Atkins litigation." The Texas Court's
failure to adopt a uniform procedure for the trial level mental
retardation determination, however, raises equal protection, if not
due process, concerns.801 Commentators have previously raised these
issues regarding the lack of uniform Atkins procedures across the
capital punishment states and the resulting possibility of inconsistent
mental retardation determinations. 2
By declining to specify an interim fact-finder and timing for the
Atkins mental retardation determination, and thus effectively
entrusting this decision to the discretion of the trial court, the Texas
Court has created the possibility of inconsistent procedures within
Texas Atkins trial proceedings.' The lack of uniform procedures
within the state exacerbates already existing equal protection
concerns about varying post-Atkins procedures across capital
punishment states. Of course, the Texas Court could easily eliminate
the Texas internal equal protection concern by specifying the fact-
finder for and timing of the trial level mental retardation
determination on an interim basis, as it has done regarding other
aspects of the Atkins procedure. Its failure to do so leaves this equal
protection concern unresolved. Moreover, if the varying trial level
procedures are subsequently demonstrated to produce meaningfully
inconsistent Atkins mental retardation determinations, some may be
799. See Bobby v. Bies, 129 S. Ct. 2145, 2150 (2009); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(2002); see also Blume et al., supra note 21, at 691, 693; Steiker & Steiker, supra note 21, at
725, 731-32.
800. See Smith, 546 U.S. at 7-8 (vacating federal court preemptive imposition of jury
procedure for resolving state Atkins collateral review claim); cf Hill v. Schofield, 608 F.3d
1272, 1291 n.13 (11th Cir.) (Hull, J., dissenting) (identifying three cases in which the Court
had denied certiorari petitions challenging the constitutionality of Georgia's Atkins
reasonable doubt standard), vacated by 625 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (en
banc).
801. See Neal, 256 S.W.3d at 272 (rejecting equal protection challenge based on the
absence of uniform statutory Atkins procedures); cf. Lizcano v. State, No. AP-75,879, 2010
WL 1817772, at *8-9 (Tex. Crim. App. May 5, 2010) (rejecting due process challenges
based on trial court's refusal to determine mental retardation prior to trial or to empanel a
separate jury to make the determination pretrial).
802. See, e.g., Poe, supra note 798, at 430-31; cf DeMatteo et al., supra note 737, at
792; Mossman, supra note 376, at 274-75.
803. See Neal, 256 S.W.3d at 272.
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deemed to be constitutionally "inappropriate" ways to enforce the
Atkins ban.'
2. The Briseno Factors
The Atkins Court concluded that the execution of mentally
retarded offenders is unconstitutional after reviewing objective
evidence of national consensus, such as the actions of state
legislatures, and applying its own constitutional excessiveness
jurisprudence.' In describing mental retardation throughout the
opinion, the Court expressly referenced the three-part clinical
definitions of mental retardation of the AAMR and APA.8 Even
when the Court noted that "[n]ot all people who claim to be mentally
retarded will be so impaired as to fall within the range of mentally
retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus," the
Court observed that the state statutory mental retardation definitions
supporting the national consensus it had found, though "not
identical," nevertheless "generally conform[ed]" to the AAMR and
APA clinical definitions it had provided in the opinion." Both of
these clinical definitions described the adaptive functioning
component by reference to limitations in two or more specified skill
areas such as communication, self-care, home living, functional
academics, work, social skills, and self-direction.'
The Court's statement, in a post-Atkins case, that its Atkins
opinion "did not provide definitive procedural or substantive guides
for determining when a person who claims mental retardation 'will be
804. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (entrusting the states with the task of developing
"appropriate" ways to enforce the constitutional execution ban). Although the Court has
not yet substantively addressed any challenges to Atkins state procedures, it has
acknowledged that such "measures might, in their application, be subject to constitutional
challenge." Smith, 546 U.S. at 7; see Steiker & Steiker, supra note 21, at 731-35 (noting
the importance of the implementing procedure in accomplishing the Atkins ban). In
reviewing any future challenges to Atkins procedures, the Court would be guided by its
previous entrustment to the states of the enforcement of the constitutional ban on the
execution of insane capital offenders in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416-17 (1986)
(plurality opinion). The Ford plurality identified the "lodestar of any effort to devise a
procedure [as] the overriding dual imperative of providing redress for those with
substantial claims and of encouraging accuracy in the factfinding determination." Id. at
417; see id. at 410-12.
805. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-21; supra notes 138-57 and accompanying text.
806. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 & n.3, 309 n.5, 316, 317 & n.22, 318; supra notes 161-67
and accompanying text.
807. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 & n.22 (referring to three-part AAMR and APA
clinical definitions of mental retardation quoted at n.3 of the opinion).
808. Id. at 308 n.3.
so impaired as to fall [within Atkins' compass]"'" does not alter the
fact that the clinical definitions of mental retardation provided the
sole definitional framework for the Court's national consensus finding
regarding mentally retarded offenders in Atkins.8 '0 Thus, in carrying
out the Atkins Court's mandate to the states to develop "appropriate
ways" to enforce the constitutional execution ban regarding mentally
retarded offenders,"' it remains clear that state mental retardation
definitions for Atkins purposes should at least "generally conform"
to the clinical definitions in order to carry out the national consensus
mandate established in Atkins.812 Moreover, while entrusting
enforcement of the constitutional ban to the states, the Court has also
stated, in another post-Atkins case, that measures adopted by the
states for adjudicating Atkins claims "might, in their application, be
subject to constitutional challenge."' In this context, are the Briseno
factors that the Texas Court established to aid in the determination of
adaptive functioning14 "appropriate ways" to enforce the national
constitutional ban on the execution of mentally retarded offenders?
809. Bobby v. Bies, 129 S. Ct. 2145, 2150 (2009) (emphasis added) (reversing federal
court grant of Atkins relief prior to state court opportunity to address the claim). The
Court, however, noted that the Ohio state Atkins procedure used the three-part clinical
definition of mental retardation cited in Atkins, including the demonstration of limitations
in two or more of the specified adaptive skill areas. See id. at 2150. In addition, in
reversing the federal court's grant of Atkins relief prior to state action, the Court stated
that "[njo court found, for example, that Bies suffered 'significant limitations in two or
more adaptive skills."' Id. at 2152 (quoting State v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 (Ohio
2002) (per curiam)).
810. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 & n.3, 309 n.5, 316, 317 & n.22, 318; supra notes 161-69
and accompanying text.
811. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 416-17 (plurality opinion),
regarding states' task to develop "appropriate ways" to enforce the constitutional ban on
the execution of insane offenders).
812. See, e.g., Blume et al., supra note 21, at 690-91, 693-94; Bonnie & Gustafson,
supra note 169, at 812-16, 818-19, 821, 822-23; Everington & Olley, supra note 376, at 2-3;
Steiker & Steiker, supra note 21, at 732; White, supra note 712, at 689-90; cf. Judith M.
Barger, Avoiding Atkins v. Virginia: How States Are Circumventing Both the Letter and
the Spirit of the Court's Mandate, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 215, 223, 226, 237 (2008);
Duvall & Morris, supra note 376, at 658-59; Hagstrom, supra note 21, at 260, 270; Patton
& Keyes, supra note 376, at 243; Weithorn, supra note 376, at 1204, 1209. But see, e.g.,
Fabian, Life, supra note 376, at 8; Mossman, supra note 376, at 274.
813. Schriro v. Smith, 546 U.S. 6, 7 (2005) (vacating federal court preemptive
imposition of jury requirement on Atkins state collateral proceeding).
814. The Texas Court articulated the Briseno factors in the context of its expression of
concern about the subjectivity of the adaptive behavior definitional element. See Ex parte
Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8-9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Although the Texas Court
subsequently stated that these factors were relevant to examining all three aspects of the
mental retardation definition, they have primarily been used regarding the adaptive
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In Briseno, before adopting an interim mental retardation
definition for Atkins purposes, the Texas Court noted that the term
"mental retardation" includes a "large and diverse population," the
majority of which would be classified as "mildly" mentally retarded.
The Texas Court further noted the value of a broad definition by
mental health professionals for the purpose of providing services and
assistance to those whose functioning might benefit from such. In the
absence of legislative action, however, the Texas Court identified its
definitional task differently:"'
We, however, must define that level and degree of mental
retardation at which a consensus of Texas citizens would
agree that a person should be exempted from the death
penalty. Most Texas citizens might agree that Steinbeck's
Lennie should, by virtue of his lack of reasoning ability and
adaptive skills, be exempt. But does a consensus of Texas
citizens agree that all persons who might legitimately
qualify for assistance under the social services definition of
mental retardation be exempt from an otherwise
constitutional penalty? Put another way, is there a national
or Texas consensus that all of those persons whom the
mental health profession might diagnose as meeting the
criteria for mental retardation are automatically less
morally culpable than those who just barely miss meeting
those criteria? Is there, and should there be, a "mental
retardation" bright-line exemption from our state's
maximum statutory punishment? As a court dealing with
individual cases and litigants, we decline to answer that
normative question without significantly greater assistance
from the citizenry acting through its Legislature.
Noting the use of the three-part state mental retardation law
definition in past proposed Atkins-type legislation, its own use of this
definition and the AAMR definition in previous capital cases, and the
Briseno parties' and trial court's use of the AAMR definition, the
Texas Court concluded that it would apply either of these definitions
in addressing Atkins claims until the Texas Legislature enacted an
"alternative statutory definition." 817
functioning element. See Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); cf Ex
parte Heam, 310 S.W.3d 424, 429-31 (refusing to permit clinical assessment to be
substituted for full scale IQ scores in determining intellectual functioning).
815. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 5-6.
816. Id. at 6.
817. See id. at 6-8.
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In defining the adaptive behavior criterion in Briseno, the Texas
Court referenced the state mental retardation law regarding the
degree to which a person "meets the standards of personal
independence and social responsibility expected of the person's age
and cultural group.""' It also referenced a pre-Atkins AAMR
definition of the term: "significant limitations in an individual's
effectiveness in meeting the standards of maturation, learning,
personal independence, and/or social responsibility that are expected
for his or her age level and cultural group, as determined by clinical
assessment and, usually, standardized scales.""' After Briseno,
however, the Texas Court has also reviewed Atkins claims that have
used and has itself applied the AAMR adaptive skill areas referenced
in Atkins (e.g., communication and functional academics) and the
subsequently consolidated AAMR adaptive skill areas (i.e.,
conceptual, social, and practical skills). 20
The Texas Court, however, did not simply adopt these clinical
definitions of adaptive functioning in Briseno and subsequent cases.
Perhaps reflecting its above-described perceived task to define mental
retardation to reflect a distinct Texas consensus regarding the
exemption of mentally retarded offenders from execution, rather than
to enforce the national consensus the Court found in Atkins in
support of the constitutional execution ban, the Texas Court
promulgated a set of evidentiary factors for use by Atkins fact-finders
in addition to what it characterized as the "exceedingly subjective"
adaptive behavior clinical criteria:821
Did those who knew the person best during the developmental
stage-his family, friends, teachers, employers, authorities-
think he was mentally retarded at that time, and, if so, act in
accordance with that determination?
Has the person formulated plans and carried them through or is
his conduct impulsive?
818. Id. at 7 n.25.
819. Id.
820. See, e.g., Hearn, 310 S.W.3d at 427-29; Williams v. State, 270 S.W.3d 112, 122-28
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 770-73 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see
also supra notes 430, 432, 433, 436, 443, 450, 485, 494, 531, 553, 587 and accompanying text
(describing Texas cases referencing the adaptive skill areas).
821. See Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8 (indicating that Atkins fact-finders "might" also focus
on these factors).
152 [Vol. 39:1
Fall 20111 TEXAS'S POST-ATKINS CLAIMS OF MENTAL RETARDATION
Does his conduct show leadership or does it show that he is led
around by others?
Is his conduct in response to external stimuli rational and
appropriate, regardless of whether it is socially acceptable?
Does he respond coherently, rationally, and on point to oral or
written questions or do his responses wander from subject to
subject?
Can the person hide facts or lie effectively in his own or others'
interests?
Putting aside any heinousness or gruesomeness surrounding the
capital offense, did the commission of that offense re uire
forethought, planning, and complex execution of purpose?
Although the initially stated purpose of these Briseno factors, unique
to Texas and presented without citation to any mental retardation
scholarly sources, was to potentially assist Atkins fact-finders in
distinguishing evidence as indicative of mental retardation or a
personality disorder," these factors have been used to defeat
evidence of adaptive functioning limitations corresponding to other
aspects of the clinical criteria and, in some instances, to make the
facts of the offender's crime dispositive of this definitional element.824
In their examination of Atkins collateral review claims, the Fifth
Circuit and Texas federal trial courts have not only endorsed review
of the application of the AAMR adaptive functioning skill area
criteria, they have also concluded that the Briseno factors are not
inconsistent with Atkins regarding the evaluation of adaptive
behavior and have approved, but not required, their use.8
Critics of the Briseno factors have assailed them as contrary to
the basic clinical concepts of mental retardation, consequently
822. Id. at 8-9.
823. See id. at 8. But see Blume et al., supra note 21, at 725-29 (noting that mental
retardation and mental disorders can coexist).
824. See Gallo, 239 S.W.3d at 769 (identifying the Briseno factors as "[o]ther
evidentiary factors" that fact-finders "might also focus on in weighing evidence as
indicative of mental retardation" without limitation to distinguishing mental retardation
from personality disorder); see also supra notes 526-58, 586-97 and accompanying text
(describing Texas state and federal courts' application of the Briseno factors in denials of
Atkins claims).
825. See supra notes 336-43 and accompanying text.
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excluding a smaller group of capital offenders from execution than
mandated by Atkins86 In this regard, the AAMR has identified some
"key factors" regarding the adaptive behavior component of mental
retardation and its assessment. These include the concepts that 1) the
adaptive behavior criterion addresses "significant limitations" in
adaptive behavior, 2) "adaptive skill limitations often coexist with
strengths," and 3) the assessment of adaptive behavior is based on the
person's "typical (not maximum) performance."" The AAMR notes
that "[i]ndividuals with [mental retardation] typically demonstrate
both strengths and limitations in adaptive behavior. Thus, in the
process of diagnosing [mental retardation], significant limitations in
conceptual, social, or practical adaptive skills is [sic] not outweighed
by the potential strengths in some adaptive skills."a8 The AAMR
further explained this notion of the coexistence of strengths and
limitations in a mentally retarded person:
"Within an individual, limitations often coexist with strengths."
This means that people with mental retardation are complex
human beings who likely have certain gifts as well as limitations.
Like all people, they often do some things better than other
things. Individuals may have capabilities and strengths that are
independent of their mental retardation. These may include
strengths in social or physical capabilities, strengths in some
adaptive skill areas, or strengths in one aspect of an adaptive
skill in which they otherwise show an overall limitation.82 9
826. See, e.g., Blume et al., supra note 21, at 691-92, 695-97, 704-25; Steiker & Steiker,
supra note 21, at 727-28; cf. Hagstrom, supra note 21, at 253-54, 269-70.
827. AAIDD, supra note 5, at 45. Another key factor regarding adaptive behavior
assessment is that adaptive strengths and limitations should be evaluated within the
"context of community and cultural environments typical of the person's age peers."
AAIDD, supra note 5, at 45 (indicating that this focus is "tied to the person's need for
individualized supports"). Adaptive behavior testimony from correctional officers
regarding offenders' functioning in the very structured death row environment is often
introduced in Atkins proceedings. Critics of the use of such testimony assert that it is
contrary to the community context prescribed for the assessment of mental retardation
and is not a meaningful measure of an offender's typical adaptive functioning. See, e.g.,
Blume et al., supra note 21, at 717-21; Blume et al., supra note 26, at 635-36; cf. Stevens &
Price, supra note 376, at 19-20; Young et al., supra note 263, at 174-75. In the 2008 study
of Atkins proceedings results, researchers found that almost thirty percent of the losing
cases relied, at least partially, on the offender's prison behavior. See Blume et al., supra
note 26, at 636.
828. AAIDD, supra note 5, at 47.
829. AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 5, at 8; see also id. at 13.
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The concerns about Atkins claim fact-finders and reviewing
courts focusing on an offender's adaptive strengths rather than
assessing asserted limitations and relying on stereotypical notions of
mental retardation are not, of course, limited to Texas Atkins cases8
Without an evidentiary focus on an offender's asserted adaptive
limitations, an Atkins proceeding can easily become a setting for
wide-ranging evidence, much of which is irrelevant to the adaptive
behavior determination, but may nevertheless militate against a
finding of mental retardation." Rather than a generalized assessment
of adaptive behavior, the clinical definition requires a "particularized
balancing of skill area-specific strengths versus weaknesses within
skill areas."832 Courts reviewing Atkins claims also must always be
mindful of their own stereotypical notions of mental retardation and
those presented by lay witnesses in making a mental retardation
determination." Critics of the Briseno factors, however, assert that
rather than addressing these concerns, the Texas Court's adoption of
these factors exacerbates these concerns:834
830. See, e.g., McGowan v. State, 990 So. 2d 931, 999 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (noting
offender's strengths); Brown v. State, 959 So. 2d 146, 149-50 (Fla. 2007) (rejecting mental
retardation due to offender's work and relationship history and car-related abilities);
Blume et al., supra note 21, at 704-10; White, supra note 712, at 701-03.
831. See Blume et al., supra note 21, at 710-11, 713 (noting that the adaptive behavior
determination only becomes a perceived subjective "battle of the experts" if it is detached
from its clinical underpinnings and distinguishing between clinical judgment and
subjectivity); see also Fabian, Life, supra note 376, at 17 (stressing the importance of
communicating an offender's adaptive limitations versus strengths compared to the correct
reference populations and cautioning about the use of strengths to overcome a mental
retardation finding); Patton & Keyes, supra note 376, at 250 (noting that strengths are
often used to discredit a mental retardation claim despite professional agreement that
adaptive strengths can coexist with deficits and deficits need not be shown in all adaptive
skill areas); White, supra note 712, at 702-03 (noting judges' use of personal notions
regarding an offender's strengths and related stereotypes to overcome professional
adaptive behavior assessment and clinical judgment).
832. See Blume et al., supra note 21, at 707. This approach was taken in Holladay v.
Campbell, 463 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (N.D. Ala. 2006), afj'd sub nom. Holladay v. Allen, 555
F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2009) and Lambert v. State, 126 P.3d 646 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005).
833. See Blume et al., supra note 21, at 707-10; Fabian, Life, supra note 376, at 17;
Patton & Keyes, supra note 376, at 239-40; cf. Boccaccini et al., supra note 395, at 1.
834. One group of scholars states that the Briseno factors present an "array of
divergences from the clinical definitions." Blume et al., supra note 21, at 712. For
example, the factor seeking others' perceptions of the offender as mentally retarded relies
on stereotypes and labels. Those factors addressing the offender's abilities regarding the
crime and other abilities focus on the offender's strengths rather than limitations. Those
factors that address certain of the adaptive behavior skill areas do so only through
generalizations. See id.
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Overall, the Briseno factors narrow the scope of relevant
behaviors to a limited group of questions from a universe of
possibilities, and as such fail to fully address all skill areas set
out in the clinical definitions-areas such as home living and
self-care are ignored. Thus, a factfinder applying all of the
factors will not necessarily have assessed the full possibility of
adaptive deficits, and therefore cannot rule out the possibility of
significant limitations in adaptive functioning.
. . . [T]he Briseno factors create their own world of relevance,
redefining the questions that make up the constitutional
determination. Undoubtedly, this gives courts more direction.
But the Briseno factors focus on a few facts, which portray
stereotype, strength-first or strength-only reasoning, at best a
handful of itemized weaknesses and are satisfied by the
answers to those questions alone. .1
Of particular concern is the important, and sometimes
dispositive, role attached to the facts of the crime by the Briseno
factors,"' the consideration of which has been subject to debate in the
mental retardation professional and scholarly communities with
regard to adaptive functioning.837 Of note in assessing the impact of
this concern, the Texas Court has acknowledged that "many of the
Briseno factors pertain to the facts of the offense and the defendant's
behavior before and after the commission of the offense." 838 The
introduction of the facts of the crime is not limited to Texas Atkins
proceedings." Those supporting the introduction of such evidence
835. Id. at 712, 713-14.
836. See infra notes 526-41 and accompanying text (describing the Elroy Chester case);
see also William Lee Hon, Claims of Mental Retardation in Capital Litigation, 69 TEX. B.J.
742, 744 (2006) (providing overview by a Texas prosecutor and noting that "in many
instances the facts of the crime will be the best evidence of a defendant's level of adaptive
functioning").
837. See supra note 395, infra notes 838-49 and accompanying text.
838. Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 777 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
839. See Fabian, State, supra note 376, at 24; Kan et al., supra note 385, at 7; Stevens &
Price, supra note 376, at 18; White, supra note 712, at 704-05. In a study involving twenty
psychiatrists and psychologists who had conducted at least one evaluation of mental
retardation in a Texas capital case (before or after Atkins), sixteen felt that it was
appropriate to consider the crime facts and the offender's past criminal behavior in
assessing adaptive behavior. However, only five respondents identified the review of
criminal records or history as an "essential" element of a complete capital mental
retardation evaluation and only one actually reported using such information in capital
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assert that it can illustrate areas of strengths and deficits in adaptive
behavior in the same manner as other types of evidence." Moreover,
unlike often incompletely documented retrospective evidence used in
Atkins proceedings, evidence related to a capital crime is generally
well-documented." Critics of the use of such evidence to establish or
negate mental retardation state that its use is contrary to the AAMR
diagnostic approach,82 including its focus on a single event rather than
the offender's typical adaptive behavior 3 and its conflation of
maladaptive or problem behavior with adaptive behavior that is the
focus of the diagnostic criteria.8" There are also no normative data
regarding the types of crimes that mentally retarded people can or
cannot perform or professionally validated methods to relate this
behavior to the adaptive behavior deficit areas or their assessment."
Some or all of the crime facts may not be relevant to the offender's
adaptive functioning evaluations. See Young et al., supra note 263, at 169-70, 173, 174. In
another study reviewing the transcripts of Texas pre-Atkins capital cases, researchers
found that evidence of criminal behavior was introduced in thirteen of nineteen cases with
reference to the offender's level of adaptive functioning. See Kan et al., supra note 385, at
8, 17. In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to "pursue and
present" mitigating evidence of mental retardation and potential strategic reasons for
attorneys' non-presentation of this evidence, the Court noted that such evidence "may
have led to rebuttal testimony about the capabilities [the offender] demonstrated through
his extensive criminal history." Wood v. Allen, 130 S. Ct. 841, 845, 850 n.3 (2010).
840. See Young et al., supra note 263, at 173. In the Texas survey of mental health
professionals, fourteen of the twenty respondents indicated that it was appropriate to
consider criminal behavior because it could show "planning and organizational behavior."
However, there was considerable variability in their views of the "strength of the
connection between criminal behavior and adaptive behavior." See id. at 173-74. In the
Texas study of nineteen pre-Atkins cases, evidence of criminal behavior was primarily
presented in thirteen cases with reference to the self-direction adaptive skill area, but few
cases "relied explicitly" on this type of testimony. See Kan et al., supra note 385, at 17, 20.
841. See Young et al., supra note 263, at 173.
842. See Kan et al., supra note 385, at 3, 21 (noting that use of criminal behavior
information in the mental retardation diagnostic process is inconsistent with AAMR user
guidelines); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 21, at 727-28 (stating that use of crime facts and
related Briseno factors "significantly departs" from diagnostic measures used by
professionals and is "not grounded in professional practice or guidelines").
843. See AAIDD, supra note 5, at 47; Everington & Olley, supra note 376, at 11. One
mental health professional observed that an Atkins mental retardation assessment should
follow the diagnostic criteria and classification systems established by the AAMR and
APA. Even if evidence of the offender's criminal behavior and crime facts are considered
by the court as evidence of adaptive functioning, "one cannot generalize an entire
diagnosis on the defendant's isolated behavior in the context of an event." Fabian, State,
supra note 376, at 19.
844. See AAIDD, supra note 5, at 49; Blume et al., supra note 21, at 724; Everington &
Olley, supra note 376, at 11; White, supra note 712, at 704.
845. See Kan et al., supra note 385, at 8; Young et al., supra note 263, at 173-74.
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asserted adaptive deficit areas."" The crime facts may not provide
sufficient or sufficiently reliable adaptive functioning information if
based on the faulty reporting or limited communication skills of a
mentally retarded person."' Finally, heinous crime facts have been
used to overcome evidence of adaptive functioning deficits
established pursuant to the diagnostic criteria" despite the fact that
the Court has not required a nexus between the capital crime and a
mental retardation finding, but instead has found mentally retarded
offenders constitutionally exempt from execution despite their capital
*849
crimes.
The AAMR itself has directly criticized the Briseno factors as a
"departure" from clinical standards for determining mental
retardation that results in an "under-protection of Atkins rights."8 10
846. See Blume et al., supra note 21, at 724-25. This concern has led some courts to
find some crime facts irrelevant to the Atkins mental retardation determination. See, e.g.,
Holladay v. Campbell, 463 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (N.D. Ala. 2006), affd sub nom. Holladay v.
Allen, 555 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2009); Lambert v. State, 126 P.3d 646 (Okla. Crim. App.
2005).
847. See Blume et al., supra note 21, at 723, 725; Kan et al., supra note 385, at 8; Young
et al., supra note 263, at 173; cf. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318, 320-21 (2002); James
W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 414, 427-32 (1985) (describing characteristics of mentally retarded persons that
may affect the completeness or accuracy of their reporting of information).
848. See, e.g., Ex parte Smith, No. 1010267, 2003 Ala. LEXIS 79, at *26-29 (Ala. Mar.
14, 2003); Van Tran v. State, No. W2005-01334-CCA-R3-PD, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App.
LEXIS 899, at *75-76 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 9, 2006); White, supra note 712, at 704-05;
supra notes 537-41 and accompanying text (describing the Elroy Chester case); cf. State v.
Dunn, 41 So. 2d 454, 471-73 (La. 2010) (considering crime facts in the assessment of
adaptive functioning).
849. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317-21; cf. Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 287 (2004).
See generally Fabian, State, supra note 376, at 18 (reviewing use of homicide facts in Atkins
assessment of mental retardation and concluding that professional practice and Court
rulings preclude meaningful use of such).
850. See Brief of the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental
Disabilities ("AAIDD") and the Arc of the United States as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 21, Hall v. Thaler, No. 10-37 (U.S. Aug. 5, 2010) [hereinafter AAMR Brief].
In a case in which the offender's Atkins claim was addressed both before and after Briseno
and was resolved by the Texas state and federal courts without explicit recitation of the
Briseno factors, the offender nevertheless expressly challenged the Briseno factors in his
certiorari petition. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 28-37, Hall v. Thaler, No. 10-37
(U.S. June 30, 2010). But see Respondent's Brief in Opposition at 33-35, Hall v. Thaler,
No. 10-37 (U.S. Sept. 13, 2010) (contending that the Texas state and federal courts did not
rely on the Briseno factors in denying the offender's Atkins claim). The AAMR and
another mental retardation professional organization filed an amicus curiae brief in this
proceeding. See AAMR Brief, supra; see also Brief of Texas State Senator Rodney Ellis et
al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Hall v. Thaler, No. 10-37 (U.S. Aug. 5, 2010)
(criticizing the Briseno factors in an additional amicus curiae brief filed by a group
including Texas mental retardation organizations).
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The AAMR has stated that the Briseno factors have "no basis of
support in the clinical literature or in the understanding of mental
retardation by experienced professionals in the field.",," It has
cautioned that "Briseno has planted a seed that legal principles can be
built out of preconceived notions of what mental retardation looks
like to the lay person and that their conclusions will be followed even
if they are flatly contrary to science."8 2 The AAMR has expressed
concern about according "independent and significant weight" to
non-expert mental retardation assessments for Atkins purposes:
Briseno's reliance on these "evidentiary factors" that have no
basis in the clinical diagnosis of mental retardation is infectious
and has the potential to render the protections afforded by
Atkins meaningless. Because the legal standard under Atkins is
the diagnosis itself, an Atkins determination should not be
based on a list of jury charge-style questions with no clinical
foundation whatsoever. 4
In light of the Court's reliance on the AAMR's concepts of mental
retardation in Atkins, its criticism of the Briseno factors is
particularly noteworthy.
In addition to the views of Briseno among the mental retardation
professional and scholarly communities,"' another way to assess the
constitutional "appropriateness" of the Briseno factors is to examine
the impact that they have had in actual cases.' At the outset,
although the Texas Court has provided the Briseno factors for use by
851. AAMR Brief, supra note 850, at 23.
852. Id. at 24. The AAMR identified several concerns about lay persons' assessment
of an offender's adaptive behavior, including lay persons' incomplete, inaccurate, or
biased recollections about an offender's adaptive functioning and a lack of "understanding
of the continuum of skills and deficits that an individual may exhibit across different
aspects of everyday life." See id. at 20. On the other hand, experts document adaptive
skill limitations in the "ordinary community environments typical of the person's age and
peers," analyze gathered observations "across multiple environments and time periods,"
apply clinical judgment, and filter "potential inaccuracies and biases" of nonexperts to
produce a "more complete and accurate" assessment of an offender's adaptive deficits.
See id. at 20-21.
853. See id. at 20-21.
854. Id. at 24-25.
855. See supra notes 160-67 and accompanying text; see also supra note 159 (describing
the Court's use of the AAMR mental retardation definition and acknowledgment of the
AAMR's position in Penry).
856. See supra notes 826-55 and accompanying text.
857. See supra notes 408-597, 672-700, infra notes 858-79 and accompanying text
(describing application in Texas cases).
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Atkins fact-finders, it has not mandated their use.' The Texas Court
has also stated that these factors are not designed to replace expert
testimony in the Atkins determination of mental retardation, but that
this determination remains for the fact-finder based on "all of the
evidence and determinations of credibility." 9  Nevertheless, the
Briseno factors have often played an important role in the success or
failure of the illustrative Atkins claims presented in this Article."*
Of the fourteen successful Atkins collateral review claims,
interestingly the Briseno factors played an actual role in the adaptive
behavior determination in only four of the cases." Of the eight
successful Atkins collateral review claims resulting from initial or
ultimately agreed findings of mental retardation, offenders'
establishment of deficits in enumerated AAMR adaptive skill areas
(or related areas of adaptive behavior) served as the primary basis for
the adaptive functioning finding.862 An offender's additional
satisfaction of the Briseno factors was discussed in the resolution of
only one of these cases.6 Of the four contested collateral review
cases in which the Texas Court granted Atkins relief, the convicting
court in one case primarily found the adaptive functioning element
858. See Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8-9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (identifying the
factors as "other" evidentiary factors that fact-finders in criminal proceedings "might also
focus upon in weighing evidence" regarding mental retardation); accord Gallo v. State,
239 S.W.3d 757, 769, 776 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
859. See Gallo, 239 S.W.3d at 776-77. In rejecting a claim that Briseno assigned
"superior status" to lay testimony regarding adaptive behavior, the Texas Court stated
that the Briseno factors incorporated lay testimony, but did not "exclude or downplay the
importance of expert testimony or other evidence." Id.
860. See infra notes 861-79 and accompanying text.
861. See infra notes 862-72 and accompanying text.
862. See supra notes 407-66 and accompanying text (describing the cases of Willie
Mack Modden, David DeBlanc, Darrell Carr, Demetrius Simms, Exzavier Stevenson,
Alberto Valdez, Robert Smith, and Doil Lane, resulting in Atkins relief by the Texas
Court or Texas Governor).
863. See supra note 451 (identifying factual findings and legal conclusions regarding
Valdez's satisfaction of the Briseno factors). In Ex parte Modden, 147 S.W.3d 293 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2004), the Texas Court noted that the convicting trial court had made its
findings in the case prior to the issuance of the Briseno opinion and had used the AAMR
and APA mental retardation definitions recited in Atkins, including the adaptive skill area
criteria regarding adaptive functioning. The Texas Court noted the "consistent" mental
retardation definitions it had adopted in Briseno and the Briseno factors and stated that it
would apply the criteria adopted in Briseno in its review. However, the Texas Court's
analysis reiterated that the trial court did not use the Briseno factors in its analysis and it
nevertheless found the trial court's findings of mental retardation supported by the record.
See id. at 295-97. But see id. at 299-311 (Hervey, J., joined by Keasler, J., dissenting)
(indicating that the offender did not satisfy the Briseno factors among other things).
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based on identification of adaptive skill area deficits, also reciting but
not applying the Briseno factors.8" In two cases, the convicting trial
court determined the adaptive functioning element primarily based
on deficits in adaptive skill areas, but also found the offender's
satisfaction of the Briseno factors." In one case, although the
convicting trial court received evidence concerning the offender's
adaptive skill area deficits, its analysis focused on the offender's
satisfaction of the Briseno factors&6 In the two successful contested
cases in which the Texas federal courts determined mental
retardation de novo on collateral review, the courts' adaptive
functioning finding was based on adaptive skill area deficits and not
the Briseno factors.
Of the six illustrative contested unsuccessful Atkins collateral
review cases described in this Article, the Briseno factors were
applied to support the rejection of an adaptive behavior deficit
finding in four of them.' In three of these cases, the convicting trial
court applied the Briseno factors in addition to other conflicting
evidence in rejecting the adaptive behavior element and the Texas
Court and reviewing federal courts upheld the adaptive functioning
finding."6 The convicting trial court's rejection of the adaptive
behavior element in the fourth unsuccessful case was primarily based
on its application of the Briseno factors. In this case, although the
convicting trial court received evidence concerning the offender's
864. See supra notes 484-92 and accompanying text (describing the case of Timothy
Cockrell).
865. See supra notes 468-73, 493-500 and accompanying text (describing the cases of
Walter Bell and Daniel Plata).
866. See supra notes 474-83 and accompanying text (describing the case of Gregory
Van Alstyne).
867. See supra notes 501-17 and accompanying text (describing the cases of Eric
Moore and Jose Rivera); cf. supra note 514 (finding that the federal trial court did not
abuse its discretion in expressly declining to apply the Briseno factors, but noting that the
trial court did consider record evidence pertaining to the factors in determining Moore's
adaptive skill deficits).
868. See supra notes 524-58, 586-97 and accompanying text (describing the cases of
Elroy Chester, John Matamoros, Elkie Taylor, and Curtis Moore). The convicting trial
court conducted its Atkins proceedings in the James Clark case before Briseno and the
Texas Court and federal courts did not apply the Briseno factors in their review of the
convicting trial court's Atkins findings. See supra notes 571-85 and accompanying text.
The Texas Court dismissed the Jeffrey Williams subsequent writ application as an abuse of
the writ for failure to allege prima facie evidence of mental retardation and the federal
courts recited the Briseno factors, but did not apply them in rejecting his Atkins claim. See
supra notes 559-69 and accompanying text.
869. See supra notes 542-58, 586-97 and accompanying text (describing the
Matamoros, Taylor, and Moore cases).
adaptive skill area deficits, its analysis focused on the offender's
failure to satisfy the Briseno factors. In its review of the case, the
Texas Court noted the "persuasive" evidence establishing the
offender's mental retardation pursuant to the diagnostic criteria, but
found that the trial court had addressed the offender's failure to
satisfy each Briseno factor and concluded that the trial court did not
err in rejecting the Atkins claim. In its description of the evidence
supporting the trial court's Briseno factor findings, the Texas Court
devoted the vast majority of its discussion to a recitation of the facts
of the offender's crime. After repeating this lengthy recitation of the
facts of the crime, the Texas federal trial court denied collateral relief,
finding that the Briseno factors were not contrary to or an
unreasonable application of federal law and that the final Briseno
factor regarding the capital crime was sufficient in itself to deny
federal Atkins relief .870
Based on the successful Atkins collateral review cases, offenders
prevailed in over seventy percent of the cases in which the Briseno
factors played no role versus almost thirty percent of the cases in
which the Briseno factors played an additional or primary role.87' In
the illustrative unsuccessful Atkins collateral review cases, these
percentages were almost reversed: the Briseno factors played an
additional or primary role in approximately sixty-seven percent of the
unsuccessful illustrative cases versus no role in approximately thirty-
three percent of the unsuccessful cases.872 These results suggest that
the Briseno factors have been a more frequent factor in unsuccessful
than successful Atkins cases and that they can have a resulting impact
in determining the success or failure of an Atkins claim.
The impact of the Briseno factors on the resolution of Atkins
claims at the trial level is still evolving. No contested Atkins claim has
thus far been successful at the trial level.83 The Texas Court has
reviewed only five post-Briseno cases in which punishment juries
have rejected Atkins claims and it has upheld the jury determinations
in all of them. 874 In each appellate opinion, the Texas Court has
870.. See supra notes 526-41 and accompanying text (describing the Chester case).
871. See supra notes 861-67 and accompanying text.
872. See supra notes 868-70 and accompanying text.
873. See supra Table 2; supra note 668 and accompanying text.
874. See Lizcano v. State, No. AP-75,879, 2010 WL 1817772, at *11-15 (Tex. Crim.
App. May 5, 2010); Williams v. State, 270 S.W.3d 112, 113-32 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008);
Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 272-75 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Hunter v. State, 243 S.W.3d
664, 666-72 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 769-75 (Tex. Crim.
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accompanied its recitation of the applicable three-part mental
retardation definition with a recitation of the Briseno factors.8' In
upholding the jury determinations, the Texas Court has expressly
referenced record evidence indicating the offenders' failure to satisfy
at least one of the Briseno factors in all of these cases. 6 In addressing
challenges to jury instructions in these cases, the Texas Court has
approved, but not required jury instructions that include the AAMR
diagnostic skill area adaptive behavior criteria." It has also upheld
the use of the more general state mental retardation law adaptive
behavior definition referencing "standards of personal independence
and social responsibility expected of the person's age and cultural
group,""7 as well as that definition accompanied by the Briseno
factors.8'
A particularly telling indication of concern about the Texas
Court's development of an "appropriate" way to determine the
adaptive functioning component of the Atkins mental retardation
determination was expressed in a dissent by three of the nine Texas
Court Judges. The majority in this case upheld an Atkins jury verdict
based on the trial court's use of the state mental retardation law
adaptive behavior definition (accompanied by the Briseno factors).
The dissenting Judges specifically criticized the majority's failure to
apply a "hypothetically correct" jury instruction incorporating the
clinical diagnostic criteria in its appellate review.' However, they
also raised more general concerns about the Texas Court's
App. 2007); supra notes 672-700 and accompanying text (describing the Gallo, Williams,
and Lizcano cases).
875. Lizcano, 2010 WL 1817772, at *11 n.44; Williams, 270 S.W.3d at 113-14; Neal, 256
S.W.3d at 272-73; Hunter, 243 S.W.3d at 666-67; Gallo, 239 S.W.3d at 769-70.
876. See Lizcano, 2010 WL 1817772, at *15 (describing lack of others' perception of
the offender as mentally retarded); Williams, 270 S.W.3d at 115-16, 132 (describing crime
facts and lack of others' perception of the offender as mentally retarded); Neal, 256
S.W.3d at 275 (describing planning of the crimes and attempting to conceal evidence);
Hunter, 243 S.W.3d at 671-72 (describing lack of others' perception of the offender as
mentally retarded); Gallo, 239 S.W.3d at 774 (describing how the Briseno factors "lend
further support" to the jury's determination).
877. See Williams, 270 S.W.3d at 132-34 (using instructions regarding the AAMR
conceptual, social, and practical skills areas); supra note 649-50 and accompanying text.
878. See Gallo, 239 S.W.3d at 777-78; supra note 651-52 and accompanying text.
879. See Lizcano, 2010 WL 1817772, at *12, *15; supra notes 653-59 and accompanying
text.
880. See Lizcano, 2010 WL 1817772, at *32-40 (Price, J., joined by Holcomb and
Johnson, JJ., concurring and dissenting). These Judges concurred regarding the guilt
phase appellate issues and the majority's finding that the offender had established the
requisite intellectual functioning limitations for mental retardation. See id. at *32.
interpretation of the adaptive behavior criterion. Rather than
"expressly embracing the specific [AAMR adaptive skill area]
diagnostic criteria" provided in Atkins, the dissenting Judges stated
that the Texas Court adopted the more general state mental
retardation law and pre-Atkins AAMR definitions in Briseno and
"promulgated certain non-diagnostic criteria of our own-the so-
called "Briseno" factors.""' However, the dissenting Judges
expressed doubt that the Court's entrustment to the states of Atkins
enforcement authority included the option of defining mental
retardation "less comprehensively than the clinical definitions it cited
approvingly in Atkins."a
The dissenting Judges acknowledged the scholarly criticism of
the Briseno approach regarding the adaptive behavior elementm
They further expressed concern that the definitional framework
adopted in Briseno permits fact-finders of Texas Atkins claims to base
mental retardation findings on normative judgments rather than the
clinical concepts articulated in Atkins:'
[Identifying mental retardation as a question of fact] does not
justify our apparent grant of latitude to fact-finders in Texas to
adjust the clinical criteria for adaptive deficits to conform to
their own normative judgments with respect to which mentally
retarded offenders are deserving of the death penalty and which
are not. Atkins adopted a categorical prohibition. It was
founded upon the Supreme Court's ratification of the prevalent
legislative judgment that it is inappropriate to execute mentally
retarded offenders. That legislative judgment comprehended
mental retardation in essentially the same "clinical" terms as
the AAMR's and APA's diagnostic criteria. Even if the
Supreme Court in Atkins "did not mandate the application of a
particular mental health standard for mental retardation,. . . it
did recognize the significance of professional standards and
881. Id. at *34-35; cf id. at *33 (noting that the pre-Atkins AAMR definition
contained a somewhat similar standard to the state law, but significantly stated that it was
to be determined by "clinical assessment" usually involving "standardized scales"). The
dissenting Judges concerns are directed to the majority's failure to apply the adaptive
behavior diagnostic criteria in its review of the sufficiency of the jury's determination of
mental retardation. These concerns encompass the use of the state mental retardation law
definition in this case referencing "social responsibility" and "personal independence"
without any use of diagnostic criteria. By characterizing the Briseno factors as "non-
diagnostic criteria," these concerns raise issues about the Briseno factors as well. See id. at
*34-35.
882. See id. at *34 & n.17.
883. See id. at *34 n.23 (citing scholarly criticism of the Briseno factors).
884. See id. at *35; supra text accompanying note 658 (describing this concern).
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framed the constitutional prohibition in medical rather than
legal terms." It would be anomalous to allow the fiat of a fact-
finder to undermine the essentially diagnostic character of the
inquiry. We should not sanction incomplete jury instructions
that would permit a jury, in the guise of "fact-finder,"
capriciously to deviate from the specific diagnostic criteria in
order to conform to its own normative, necessarily subjective,
and certainly unscientific judgment regarding who deserves the
death penalty8 5
In applying a hypothetically correct jury charge that included the
adaptive behavior diagnostic criteria (requiring deficits in at least two
of the identified skill areas) to the evidence presented, the dissenting
Judges concluded that the offender had established the necessary
adaptive deficit areas to support a finding of mental retardation-
contrary to the jury's conclusion based on the instructions it had
received." The dissenting Judges, representing one-third of the
Texas Court Judges, then summarized their views regarding the state
of the Texas Court's Atkins adaptive behavior jurisprudence:
In Briseno, we decried the "exceedingly subjective" nature of
the adaptive-behavior criteria. And it may well be true that
determining mental retardation under those criteria is as much
an art as a science. But it is no solution to this lamentable
subjectivity to substitute the normative caprice of the fact-
finder for the comparative scientific objectivity inherent in the
diagnostic criteria. It is not enough that individual jurors might
choose to be guided by the diagnostic criteria, as depicted to
them by the testifying experts. The jury should be explicitly
bound to those criteria by the hypothetically correct jury
instruction as the best available scientific basis for
distinguishing the mildly mentally retarded offenders from
those who are merely borderline intelligent. Perhaps the
diagnostic criteria are designedly over-inclusive in order to
avoid leaving any deserving individuals out of the social services
net. But it seems to me that to err on the side of over-
inclusiveness is no less a virtue in the Eighth Amendment
context.
I am put to mind of the familiar due-process adage that "it is far
worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go
free.["] The [Texas] Court's scattershot approach to adaptive
deficits-letting the fact-finder hunt and peck among adaptive
885. Id. at *35 (citation omitted).
886. See id. at *36-39.
deficits, unfettered by the specific diagnostic criteria that inform
the expert opinion-will allow some capital offenders whom
every rational diagnostician would find meets [sic] the clinical
definition of mental retardation to be executed simply because
they demonstrate a few pronounced adaptive strengths along
with their manifest adaptive deficits. Better, I think, to be over-
inclusive and mistakenly sentence some borderline intelligent
capital offenders to the not-inconsiderable penalty of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole than to
inadvertently execute even a single mildly mentally retarded
offender in violation of the strictures of the Eighth
Amendment. The [Texas] Court's arbitrary approach today is
unfaithful to-it does not even "generally conform" with-the
criteria for mental retardation that was the basis for the
national consensus the Supreme Court found in Atkins.
Are the factors examined in this section, i.e., 1) the specific
concerns about the Briseno factors articulated by the mental
retardation professional and scholarly communities, 2) the indication
of their impact in actual cases, and 3) the concern by these dissenting
Texas Court Judges about the determination of mental retardation
for Atkins purposes without the diagnostic criteria endorsed in
Atkins,m sufficient to cause the Supreme Court to undertake review
of the "non-diagnostic" Briseno factors? This question is explored in
the following section.
E. Will the Court Find Texas's Different Path an "Appropriate Way"
to Enforce the Atkins Mandate?
After finding a national consensus against the execution of
mentally retarded offenders, the Atkins Court entrusted the states
with the "task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the
constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences."889 The
two aspects of the Texas Court's post-Atkins path that are sufficiently
distinct from other states are its failure to identify a trial level fact-
finder and timing for the mental retardation determination and its
adoption and application of the Briseno factors." Concerns about
the Texas Court's failure to identify a trial level fact-finder and timing
887. Id. at *39-40.
888. See supra notes 826-87 and accompanying text.
889. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
399, 416-17 (1986) (plurality opinion) regarding the execution of insane offenders)
(emphasis added).
890. See supra notes 788-91 and accompanying text.
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for the mental retardation determination may not be ripe for Court
resolution."' However, the Texas Court's unique Briseno factors,
endorsed by the Fifth Circuit, have been available for use in a
significant volume of collateral review cases and are beginning to be
applied at the trial level. Concerns about the Briseno factors may be
sufficiently developed to warrant Court determination of their
constitutional appropriateness to carry out the Atkins mandate.92
Moreover, the Court has previously found that the Texas Court and
Fifth Circuit have developed constitutionally inappropriate ways to
carry out other Court mandates regarding the consideration of
mitigating evidence in capital cases and the execution of insane
offenders. These decisions may provide guidance regarding the
Court's potential consideration of the Briseno factors.893
The Court's dissatisfaction with the Texas Court and Fifth
Circuit implementation of its mandates has been especially
pronounced regarding the consideration of capital mitigating
evidence." In Penry v. Lynaugh,89 ' the Court concluded that the
Texas capital sentencing statute did not provide a constitutionally
adequate vehicle for jurors to "consider and give effect to" proffered
mitigating evidence of mental retardation and was therefore
unconstitutional, as applied in the case."' In addressing post-Penry
claims raising concerns about the constitutionally inadequate
consideration of a variety of mitigating evidence under this
sentencing statute, the Fifth Circuit and Texas Court adopted
restrictive definitions of "constitutionally relevant" mitigating
evidence, requiring a "uniquely severe permanent handicap" that had
a nexus with the crime and that was not otherwise adequately
addressed by the pre-Penry punishment procedures."
891. See supra notes 792-804 and accompanying text.
892. See supra notes 805-88 and accompanying text.
893. See infra notes 894-912 and accompanying text.
894. See infra notes 895-904 and accompanying text.
895. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
896. See id. at 307, 313, 319-28; see id. at 341-42 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 349-50 (Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also supra notes 64-73 and accompanying
text; cf Penry, 492 U.S. at 308-10, 312-13 (addressing this issue also regarding Penry's
mitigating evidence of childhood abuse).
897. See Madden v. Collins, 18 F.3d 304, 308 (5th Cir. 1994); Graham v. Collins, 950
F.2d 1009, 1029, 1033 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc), affd on other grounds, 506 U.S. 461
(1993); Nobles v. State, 843 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Goss v. State, 826
S.W.2d 162, 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (plurality opinion); Lackey v. State, 819 S.W.2d
111, 132-35 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991 (rehearing opinion)); Tobolowsky, Texas, supra note 1,
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In a case over a decade after the Fifth Circuit's adoption of this
standard, the Court criticized the Fifth Circuit's adoption of "its own
restrictive gloss" on Penry and stated that the Fifth Circuit's
analytical framework had "no foundation" in the Court's decisions
and was an "improper legal standard."' The Court specifically held
that the Fifth Circuit's "uniquely severe permanent handicap" and
nexus tests for ascertaining Penry evidence were "incorrect," and the
Court explicitly rejected them." The following term, the Court
rejected the Texas Court's adoption of the Fifth Circuit's Penry
evidence standards and found that the Texas Court had "erroneously
relied on a [Penry evidence] test we never countenanced and now
have unequivocally rejected."a
In two other cases, the Court found that the Texas Court and
Fifth Circuit had incorrectly implemented Penry's mandate by
upholding sentencing procedures that they had deemed to provide an
"adequate vehicle" for mitigating evidence or "sufficient mitigating
effect," rather than providing the constitutionally required "full" or
"meaningful" effect for proffered mitigating evidence.9or The Court
specifically found that the Fifth Circuit had "mischaracterized the
law" by adopting a "sufficient" mitigating effect standard in its review
of Penry claims and that, once again, the "sufficient effect" standard
had "no foundation" in the Court's decisions.902 Finally, the Court
rejected the Texas Court's and Fifth Circuit's approval of
"nullification" jury instructions used post-Penry in conjunction with
the pre-Penry sentencing statute, and found these instructions were a
constitutionally inadequate means to permit the consideration of
mitigating evidence.903 Thus, the Court has forcefully and repeatedly
rejected attempts by the Texas Court and Fifth Circuit to restrict or
at 62-65, 70-77, 92, 97-100 (describing the Texas Court's restrictive Penry evidence and
error tests before it adopted the described Fifth Circuit standards); supra notes 96-109 and
accompanying text.
898. See Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 283-87 (2004).
899. Id. at 289.
900. Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 45 (2004) (per curiam).
901. See Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286, 292 n.2, 295-96 (2007); Abdul-Kabir v.
Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 243, 253 n.14, 259, 260, 262, 264 (2007).
902. Brewer, 550 U.S. at 295-96 (quoting Tennard, 542 U.S. at 284); see also id. at 296
(referring to the "Fifth Circuit's difficult Penry jurisprudence").
903. See Smith, 543 U.S. at 45-49; Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 796 (2001); see also
Smith v. Texas, 550 U.S. 297 (2007); Tobolowsky, Texas, supra note 1, at 68-71, 79-80, 93-
98 (describing the Texas Court and Fifth Circuit treatment of nullification instruction
issues).
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limit its constitutional mandate regarding the consideration of
mitigating evidence in capital cases.
The Court similarly rejected the Fifth Circuit's standard to
implement the constitutional ban on the execution of "insane"
offenders" established in Ford v. Wainwright,"6 the original case in
which the Court entrusted enforcement of its constitutional ban to the
states." For execution competency, the Fifth Circuit required only
that an offender be aware that 1) he committed the underlying
murder, 2) he was to be executed, and 3) the state's articulated reason
for the execution was his commission of the crime." In addressing an
execution competency claim by an offender whose delusions
potentially precluded him from having a rational understanding of the
state's reason for his execution, the Fifth Circuit determined that an
offender's "rational understanding" of the reason for his execution
was not a necessary part of the execution competency
determination." In a decision twenty years after Ford, the Court
found the Fifth Circuit's determination that the offender's delusions
regarding the reason for his execution could not render him
incompetent for execution was "inconsistent with" and based on a
"flawed interpretation" of Ford:910 "It is therefore error to derive
from Ford, and the substantive standard for incompetency its
opinions broadly identify, a strict test for competency that treats
delusional beliefs as irrelevant once the prisoner is aware the State
has identified the link between his crime and the punishment to be
904. See Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. at 263 (identifying these cases in which the Court had
"repudiated several Fifth Circuit precedents providing the basis for its narrow reading" of
Penry); supra notes 894-903 and accompanying text. But cf. Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S.
350, 359-73 (1993) (finding that mitigating evidence of the offender's youth could be
adequately given mitigating effect in the pre-Penry procedure); Graham v. Collins, 506
U.S. 461, 466-78 (1993) (finding that the offender's claim seeking additional punishment
instructions regarding pre-Penry mitigating evidence of "some arguable relevance"
beyond the punishment issues sought a "new rule" of constitutional law not permitted on
collateral review).
905. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 960 (2007). Although the Court's
constitutional ban concerns the execution of "insane" offenders, it essentially addresses
the constitutional requirements for competency for execution. See generally Peggy M.
Tobolowsky, To Panetti and Beyond-Defining and Identifying Capital Offenders Who
Are Too "Insane" To Be Executed, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 369 (2007).
906. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
907. See id. at 416-17 (plurality opinion).
908. See Panetti, 551 U.S. at 956.
909. See id. at 954-56.
910. See id. at 956, 959.
inflicted." 911 The Court found that the Fifth Circuit's "strict test for
competency" was "too restrictive to afford a prisoner the protections
granted by the Eighth Amendment." 912
Thus, the Court has not been reluctant to reject Texas Court and
Fifth Circuit implementation standards for its constitutional mandates
when it has found these standards too restrictive to carry out the
mandates. 913 In the approximately ten years since the Atkins ban on
the execution of mentally retarded offenders was announced,
however, the Court has not demonstrated any eagerness to assess
whether the states' development of ways to enforce the constitutional
ban are constitutionally "appropriate." To the contrary, the Court
has rejected attempts by federal courts in two cases to pre-empt
states' resolution of Atkins claims under their chosen implementation
procedures, and has denied petitions for certiorari challenging state
implementation procedures themselves and their application.914
In Schriro v. Smith," the Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's
judgment suspending federal collateral review of an Atkins claim and
directing its collateral review resolution by an Arizona state court
jury, unless waived.916 In finding that the Ninth Circuit had exceeded
its collateral review authority by imposing the jury trial requirement,
the Court noted its entrustment to the states of the task to develop
"appropriate ways" to enforce the Atkins ban."
States, including Arizona, have responded to that challenge by
adopting their own measures for adjudicating claims of mental
retardation. While those measures might, in their application,
be subject to constitutional challenge, Arizona had not even
had a chance to apply its chosen procedures when the Ninth
Circuit pre-emptively imposed its jury trial condition."
911. Id. at 960.
912. Id. at 956-57, 960.
913. See supra notes 894-912 and accompanying text.
914. See infra notes 915-33 and accompanying text.
915. Schriro v. Smith, 546 U.S. 6 (2005) (per curiam).
916. See id. at 7-8.
917. See id. (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002)).
918. Id. Upon remand, an Arizona state court, without a jury, found the offender was
not mentally retarded under the state's clear and convincing evidence standard (and also
under a preponderance of the evidence standard). Smith v. Kearney, No. 2 CA-SA 2008-
0019, 2008 Ariz. App. LEXIS 227, at *5-6 (Ariz. Ct. App. July 11, 2008).
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In Bobby v. Bies," an Ohio trial court had ordered an Atkins
collateral review hearing pursuant to its state procedure when the
Sixth Circuit intervened and granted Bies Atkins relief based on some
prior state court findings regarding Bies' mental retardation as a
mitigating factor in his pre-Atkins trial. The Sixth Circuit deemed
these prior findings to be a definitive factual determination of mental
retardation that prevented further review of Bies' mental retardation
on issue preclusion and double jeopardy grounds. 0 In unanimously
reversing the Sixth Circuit judgment, the Court stated that the prior
statements regarding Bies' mental retardation for mitigating
circumstances purposes in his pre-Atkins trial were not determinative
of his mental retardation for Atkins purposes.9
In rejecting Bies' claim, the Court noted that its Atkins "opinion
did not provide definitive procedural or substantive guides for
determining when a person who claims mental retardation 'will be so
impaired as to fall [within Atkins' compass]"' and entrusted the task
of developing "appropriate ways" to enforce the Atkins execution
ban to the states. 2  The Court nevertheless continued to
acknowledge the centrality of the clinical definitions it had utilized in
Atkins by further stating that Ohio had "heeded Atkins' call" and
adopted the three-part clinical definition of mental retardation for
Atkins purposes that included the requirement of significant
limitations in two or more of the AAMR and APA adaptive skill
areas (e.g., communication, self-care, and self-direction)." More
specifically, in finding that no prior preclusive factual determination
of Bies' mental retardation had been made, the Court stated that
"[n]o court found, for example, that Bies suffered 'significant
limitations in two or more adaptive skills."'924 The Court concluded
that the federal intervention had "derailed" the state proceeding
designed to determine Beis' Atkins claim."
Recourse first to Ohio's courts is just what this Court
envisioned in remitting to the States responsibility for
implementing the Atkins decision. The State acknowledges that
919. Bobby v. Bies, 129 S. Ct. 2145 (2009).
920. See id. at 2148-51.
921. See id. at 2148, 2151-53.
922. Id. at 2150 (emphasis added).
923. See id.; see also State v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 (Ohio 2002) (per curiam).
924. Bies, 129 S. Ct. at 2152.
925. See id. at 2153.
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Bies is entitled to such recourse, but it rightly seeks a full and
fair opportunity to contest his plea under the postsentencing
precedents set in Atkins and [the state procedure].
In the Smith and Bies cases, the Court articulated its desire to let
states have the initial opportunity to resolve Atkins claims under the
procedures that they have developed to implement the constitutional
execution ban." The Court also stated, however, that these state
"measures might, in their application, be subject to constitutional
challenge."" Nevertheless, the Court has thus far denied certiorari
petitions challenging whether states have adopted and applied
constitutionally "appropriate ways" to enforce the Atkins execution
ban.9" For example, the Court has denied certiorari petitions
challenging Georgia's unique pre-Atkins adoption of a reasonable
doubt standard that offenders must satisfy to establish an Atkins
claim.o The Court has also denied certiorari petitions challenging
states' application of their Atkins definitions and procedures. 931
Finally, of particular note, the Court recently denied certiorari
petitions in the Texas case in which the trial court used the general
state mental retardation law definition of adaptive behavior and the
Briseno factors and regarding which the three Texas Court Judges
presented a vigorous dissent,932 as well as another Texas case that
directly challenged the Briseno factors.33
926. Id. at 2153-54.
927. See supra notes 917-18, 925-26 and accompanying text.
928. Schriro v. Smith, 546 U.S. 6, 7 (2005) (per curiam).
929. See infra notes 930-33 and accompanying text.
930. An Eleventh Circuit panel found the Georgia reasonable doubt standard a
constitutionally "inappropriate" Atkins enforcement mechanism because its restrictiveness
"eviscerated the right announced in Atkins" and therefore violated the "command" of
Atkins. See Hill v. Schofield, 608 F.3d 1272, 1283 & n.11 (11th Circuit 2010). The panel's
opinion has been vacated pending rehearing by the appellate court en banc. Hill v.
Schofield, 625 F.3d 1313 (11th Circuit 2010) (per curiam) (en banc). The dissent in the
panel opinion cited three cases in which the Court denied certiorari petitions challenging
the reasonable doubt standard. See Hill, 608 F.3d at 1291 n.13 (Hull, J., dissenting) (citing
Schofield v. Holsey, 642 S.E.2d 56, 63 (Ga.), cert. denied sub nom. Holsey v. Hall, 552 U.S.
1070 (2007); Head v. Stripling, 590 S.E.2d 122, 128 (Ga. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1070
(2004); King v. State, 539 S.E.2d 783, 798, 802 (Ga. 2000), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 957
(2002)).
931. See, e.g., Clark v. Quarterman, 457 F.3d 441 (5th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S.
1254 (2007).
932. See Lizcano v. State, No. AP-75,879, 2010 WL 1817772 (Tex. Crim. App. May 5,
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 999 (2011).
933. See Hall v. Thaler, 131 S. Ct. 414 (2010); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, 28-
37, Hall v. Thaler, No. 10-37 (U.S. June 30, 2010) (challenging the Briseno factors); supra
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Thus, at this point, the Court does not appear ready to address
substantive challenges to the mental retardation definitions or
implementing procedures that states have adopted to enforce the
Atkins constitutional ban or states' application of them-including
the Briseno factors.9  In this regard, it must be noted that the Court's
rejection of the Texas Court and Fifth Circuit restrictive
implementation of the Court's Penry and Ford mandates came over a
decade after the restrictive Penry standards were adopted and over
two decades after the Ford decision." The time may simply not be
ripe for the Court to determine the outer boundaries of
constitutionally "appropriate" ways for states to enforce the Atkins
ban.'
When such a time arrives, however, the Briseno factors remain a
leading candidate for Court scrutiny.937 Although the Court declined
to review a recent challenge to the Briseno factors,939 the AAMR's
concerns about the Briseno factors, articulated in its amicus curiae
brief in the case, remain unaddressed. 93 9
note 850. But see Respondent's Brief in Opposition at 33-35, Hall v. Thaler, No. 10-37
(U.S. Sept. 13, 2010) (contending that the Texas state and federal courts did not rely on
the Briseno factors in denying the offender's pre- and post-Briseno Atkins claim).
934. See supra notes 930-33 and accompanying text.
935. Compare Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 960 (2007), and Tennard v. Dretke,
542 U.S. 274 (2004), with Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and Graham v. Collins,
950 F.2d 1009, 1029, 1033 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc), affd on other grounds, 506 U.S. 461
(1993).
936. Using the Court's Panetti decision as a model, some scholars suggest a progression
over time from the Court's declaration of the Atkins constitutional ban to its constitutional
regulation of implementing procedures. They identify the Georgia reasonable doubt
standard of proof and the Briseno factors' focus on crime facts as among the "more
extreme procedural impediments to vindicating Atkins's substantive ban" that could be
"winnowed out" through a challenge of this kind. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 21, at
737-39; see also supra note 769 (identifying unique aspects of the Kansas and Utah Atkins
provisions); cf. Blume et al., supra note 21 (contrasting Atkins constitutional ban with
implementing decisions). Another factor that will influence the likelihood of the Court
addressing future claims challenging Atkins' implementation is the change in Court
membership since the decision. See, e.g., Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 962-81
(2007) (Thomas, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and Scalia and Alito, JJ., dissenting); Abdul-
Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 265-80 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., joined by Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting); id. at 280-85 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas and Alito,
JJ., dissenting).
937. See supra notes 805-88 and accompanying text.
938. See supra note 933 and accompanying text; see also infra note 954.
939. See AAMR Brief, supra note 850, at 21-26. See generally id. at 2-26 (identifying
concerns relevant to the Briseno factors and the attribution of the offender's intellectual
and adaptive behavior deficits to postnatal "environmental" factors).
This Court has made clear that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits the execution of individuals who have mental
retardation. The limited task of crafting the procedures under
which courts will determine whether a defendant has mental
retardation has been left, in the first instance, to the states. The
majority of the states have had relatively little difficulty in
establishing procedures that are designed to assure even-
handed evaluation of individual claims based on clinical
diagnoses and expert testimony.
A few states, however, in addition to selecting implementing
procedures, have crafted their own substantive definitions of
mental retardation that are incompatible with scientific and
clinical understanding. The result is that many individuals who
clearly meet the accepted clinical definition of mental
retardation are at risk of being sentenced to death and
executed. Texas is such a state.
This case provides the Court with an appropriate vehicle to
remind lower courts that fidelity to the holding of Atkins
requires even-handed application of the definition Atkins
embraced, and requires adherence to the clinical understanding
of mental retardation that is its foundation. More importantly,
this case provides the Court the opportunity to confirm that
Atkins did not give states license to narrow the class of persons
who fall within the constitutional prohibition and to exclude
some who, in fact, have mental retardation. Unless the Court
acts to affirm Atkins's meaning, persons whom any reasonable
clinician would deem to have mental retardation will be
erroneously and unconstitutionally determined to be death
eligible.940
Even if it did not dictate "definitive procedural or substantive
guides" in Atkins for the resolution of Atkins claims,94 1 the Court
clearly indicated that offenders who meet the AAMR and APA
mental retardation definitions-repeatedly referenced in Atkins as a
foundation for the national consensus it found warranting the
constitutional execution ban-fall within "Atkins' compass."942 The
940. See id. at 2-4 (summarizing the AAMR's position regarding Texas's use of non-
clinical "irrelevant questions to gauge adaptive limitations," i.e., the Briseno factors, and
application of "environmental" factors in its mental retardation determination).
941. Bobby v. Bies, 129 S. Ct. 2145, 2150 (2009) (emphasis added).
942. See id.; supra notes 805-13 and accompanying text.
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concerns about the Briseno factors' compliance with the Atkins
mandate are at least as significant as those the Court previously
addressed regarding the Texas implementation of the Court's Penry
and Ford constitutional mandates. As concerns about the Briseno
factors' restriction of the scope of the clinical mental retardation
definition grow and their application in the significant volume of
Texas Atkins cases continues, the Court should address these
concerns that the Texas Court and Fifth Circuit have not adopted an
"appropriate" way to enforce this constitutional execution ban, but
rather an "improper legal standard" that fails to exclude from
execution offenders protected by Atkins.943
Conclusion
Almost a decade ago in Atkins, the Court held that the execution
of mentally retarded offenders is unconstitutional and entrusted the
states with the development of "appropriate ways" to enforce the
constitutional execution prohibition.9" Since the Atkins decision, and
in the absence of responsive Texas legislative action,945 the Texas
943. See Tennard, 542 U.S. at 287; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002); supra
notes 168, 805-942 and accompanying text.
944. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316-17, 321.
945. As of the writing of this Article, the Texas Legislature has not enacted Atkins
legislation. Companion legislation on this subject did not proceed past committee review
in either chamber during the Legislature's 2011 regular session. The proposed legislation
defined the intellectual functioning element with reference to performance two or more
standard deviations below the test's age-group mean and established a presumption of
mental retardation if the offender had an IQ of seventy-five or less. It defined adaptive
behavior as the "effectiveness or degree to which a person meets generally recognized
standards of personal independence and social responsibility by using learned conceptual,
social, and practical skills in everyday life." The legislative proposal defined a "person
with mental retardation" as one meeting the three-part clinical definition, as "determined
by a clinician in the exercise of clinical judgment." It provided for a pretrial mental
retardation determination by a jury (or judge, if the jury was waived) in which the defendant
had the burden to prove mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence. The
proposed legislation also applied these definitions and procedures to Atkins collateral review
claims. See S. 1079, 82nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011); H.R. 1670, 82nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex.
2011); TEXAS LEGISLATURE ONLINE, http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/ (last visited June 5,
2011) (describing the legislation and legislative action). Of aid to future Atkins
subsequent writ applicants, however, the Texas Legislature modified its subsequent writ
provisions in capital cases to provide appointed counsel regarding subsequent writ
applications that satisfy the statutory filing requirements and are filed on or after January
1, 2012. See H.R. 1646, 82nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011); TEXAS LEGISLATURE ONLINE,
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2011) (describing the legislation and
legislative action). In the state mental retardation law definitional provisions, the Texas
Legislature also substituted the term "intellectual disability" for "mental retardation"
without substantive change in the meaning of the term. See H.R. 1481, 82nd Leg., Reg.
Court has adopted definitional and procedural standards, endorsed
by the Fifth Circuit and Texas federal trial courts, to carry out this
constitutional mandate. 946 These courts have reviewed the Atkins
claims of ninety Texas capital offenders,947 a volume of Atkins
claimants that far exceeds that of any other capital punishment
state.948 Texas Atkins claimants, however, have been meaningfully
less successful than expert estimates of mental retardation among
capital offenders would predict949 and than national estimates of
success regarding Atkins claims have indicated.9 0
One key distinguishing factor in the Texas Atkins approach is the
Texas Court's adoption, and the Fifth Circuit's endorsement, of the
Briseno factors, primarily to aid in the determination of the adaptive
functioning element of the mental retardation definition.9 ' Concerns
about the Briseno factors have been articulated by the mental
retardation professional and scholarly communities, acknowledged by
one-third of the members of the Texas Court, and demonstrated by
their impact on actual Atkins claims.952 Nevertheless, Texas state and
federal courts continue to apply the Briseno factors in their
assessment of Atkins claims.5 The Supreme Court, at this point, has
declined to address these concerns.954 However, as concerns about the
Briseno factors grow, and as it has done in the past regarding other
Court constitutional mandates, 955 the Court should determine whether
Texas's different path regarding Atkins claims represents an approach
Sess. (Tex. 2011); TEXAS LEGISLATURE ONLINE, http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/ (last
visited Aug. 1, 2011) (describing the legislation and legislative action).
946. See supra notes 217-80, 295-350, 612-65 and accompanying text. But see supra
notes 792-804 and accompanying text (describing the Texas Court's failure to identify the
trial level fact-finder for and timing of the mental retardation determination).
947. See supra Tables 1, 2.
948. See Blume et al., supra note 26, at 637 (describing the number of Atkins state
claims in this 2008 study).
949. See supra notes 773-77 and accompanying text.
950. See supra notes 778-86 and accompanying text.
951. See supra notes 815-25 and accompanying text.
952. See supra notes 826-88 and accompanying text.
953. See, e.g., Chester v. Quarterman, No. 5:05cv29, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34936, at
*5-21 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2008); Williams v. State, 270 S.W.3d 112, 115-16, 132 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2008).
954. See Hall v. Thaler, 131 S. Ct. 414 (2010). One possible explanation for the Court's
denial of this certiorari petition is the State's position that the Texas state and federal
courts did not actually rely on the Briseno factors in denying this offender's pre- and post-
Briseno Atkins claim. See supra notes 850, 933 (identifying the adversarial certiorari
pleadings).
955. See supra notes 894-912 and accompanying text.
176 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 39:1
Fall 2011] TEXAS'S POST-ATKINS CLAIMS OF MENTAL RETARDATION 177
that is "too restrictive" to afford Texas Atkins claimants the
protections granted by the Eighth Amendment." The resolution of
this issue is literally a matter of life or death for Texas mentally
retarded capital offenders.!
956. Cf. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 956-57 (2007) (reaching this conclusion
regarding the Fifth Circuit's standard for execution competency).
957. Since the writing of this Article, Michael Hall, in whose case the certiorari petition
challenging the Briseno factors was denied, and Gayland Bradford and Milton Mathis, two
other offenders who raised Atkins claims, have been executed. See Searchable Execution
Database, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
executions (last visited June 24, 2011); supra notes 933, 954 and accompanying text
(describing the denial of the certiorari petition).
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